FIRST THINGS

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

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

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Defining Davidson Down

As a proud alumnus of Davidson College and recent subscriber to FIRST THINGS, I was particularly gratified to read Terry Eastland's piercing article ("God and Man at Davidson," January) about my alma mater. What is particularly disturbing about Davidson is its public dishonesty about the intent of its administrative actions. To drop the requirement that all trustees be active members of a Presbyterian, or indeed any, church and then to represent that act as truer fidelity to Davidson's Reformed tradition is redolent of subterfuge and far from the instruction of John Calvin or the Scriptures he prized.

Since my graduation, I have been ordained, as many Davidson students have been before me. When I finish my theological training I will seek out a church to serve. Unfortunately, it seems future Davidson students interested in serving God through the ministry will have to do so despite, not because of, the leadership of their Reformed college.

Will Williams
Waco, Texas

Darwin's Designs

Christoph Cardinal Schönborn ("The Designs of Science," January) writes that "modern science first excludes *a priori* final and formal causes, then investigates nature under the reductive mode of mechanism (efficient and material causes), and then turns around to claim both final and formal causes are obviously unreal." The cardinal is not the first to characterize science in this way, but he is wrong nonetheless.

Contemporary science does not exclude final and formal causes *a priori*; excluding anything *a priori* would be contrary to the scientific cast of mind. Rather, beginning with Galileo, natural scientists crafted theories making no use of formal and final causes, and it has turned out that such theories are tremendously successful in predicting and explaining large areas of our sensory experience. Formal and final causes were thus eliminated from biology and physics on the scientific merits, not by methodological *diktat*. They went the way later followed by phlogiston and the interstellar ether.

His protests notwithstanding, the cardinal's argument presupposes that formal and final causes, if they exist, are on an epistemological par with whatever entities contemporary scientific theory posits to explain experience.

When the cardinal asserts that the contemporary scientist fails to notice and explain "an obvious, indeed an overwhelming pattern" in "the sweep of life," he is contending that the contemporary scientific account fails to explain certain observable aspects of reality. This is a scientific objection to a scientific theory epistemologically akin to the objection that Newtonian mechanics could not explain the precession of the perihelion of Mercury. When the cardinal further asserts that by positing formal and final causes he can explain the observed patterns he alleges, he is proposing an alternative theory that is as scientific in its intent as the theory it seeks to replace.

But the cardinal's account is unconvincing as science. The fact about the world that contemporary theory fails to explain, according to the cardinal, is the correlation between "two indisputable facts: Evolution happened . . . and our present biosphere is the result. The two

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sets of facts correlate perfectly." The cardinal would explain this supposed correlation by appeal to final causality, hypothesizing that life forms evolved the way they did *in order that* human life result.

There are many problems with this argument, but I will mention only one: What are correlated, as natural science understands correlations, are variables, not one-time events like the happening of evolution and the existence of the present biosphere. In a trivial sense, we can say that any two one-time events—say, the assassination of John F. Kennedy and the accession of Lyndon Johnson to the presidency—are "perfectly correlated" in the sense that both in fact occurred, but there is no reason to assume that there must be a connection between the events mediated by formal or final causes. Oswald assassinated Kennedy and Johnson became president, but only conspiracy theorists think that Oswald assassinated Kennedy *in order that* Johnson become president.

Not recognizing formal and final causes as concepts discarded from the scientific enterprise, Cardinal Schönborn assigns them to what he calls natural philosophy, a discipline that "provides our most fundamental and most certain grasp on reality" and, it seems, underlies science, for "true science is impossible unless we first grasp the reality of natures and essences, the intelligible principles of the natural world."

An additional indication that the cardinal has misunderstood the status of these concepts is that the notion of philosophy he urges is not found in Thomas Aquinas, whom the cardinal purports to follow. Far from thinking of philosophy as delivering knowledge of essences, Aquinas thought that we do not have much knowledge about the essences of things, and such knowledge as we do have we gain only after long empirical (we might say scientific) investigation. It is no doubt part of the essence of gold, for example, to have atomic number 79, but we know this only by scientific inquiry, not by philosophical speculation involving formal and final causes.

Following Aristotle, Aquinas did recognize a branch of philosophy that treats existence *qua* existence, which I take to be the meaning of Cardinal Schönborn's "intelligible principles of the natural world." But this kind of philosophy, generally called metaphysics, does not do what the cardinal wants. It does not treat particular kinds of things like plants and animals with a special set of concepts unknown to empirical science; rather, it treats all of existence indifferently at a very high level of generality. Nor does it precede science in the order of inquiry; it was taught last in the medieval curriculum, as the culmination of natural human knowledge.

Such philosophy does indeed yield arguments for the existence of God, arguments like the Five Ways of Thomas Aquinas, but these arguments are based on the broadest features of existence generally, not on the particular characteristics of a particular class of things like the higher forms of life.

These arguments, incidentally, are scientific in the sense that they attempt to explain aspects of our observed experience, albeit very general ones, such as the existence of the universe generally and the lawlike regularity of its behavior. When the Catholic Church has taught that the existence of God can be known by human reason, it has had arguments like these in mind.

Inventing new arguments based on the particular characteristics of biological organisms is a dubious business, especially if it requires us not only to rely on formal and final causality, both long discredited in science, but also to invent a new branch of philosophy unknown to St. Thomas. We do better staying with the traditional arguments, suitably updated and elaborated using the resources of analytic philosophy.

Robert T. Miller
Villanova University
School of Law
Villanova, Pennsylvania

The Canadian literary critic Northrop Frye coined a term that has stuck with me: "the fallacy of premature teleology." He was speaking of an error in literary criticism, not biology, but his term captures what bothers me so much about the Intelligent Design movement. In his op-ed piece in the *New York Times*, Christoph Cardinal Schönborn claimed that "by the light of reason the human intellect can readily and clearly discern purpose and design in the natural world, including the world of living things," an assertion he repeated—without alteration or demurral—in his article for First Things. I too can discern purpose in the natural world, an insight I share with the rest of the human race: Everyone now reading this sentence knows that eyes are meant for seeing. But I think it important to stress that, while all design bespeaks purpose (no one ever designs anything without having an ulterior purpose in mind), not everything purposive has to have been designed. Admittedly, this distinction did not become clear until Charles Darwin introduced the concept of natural selection into biological thought. But once his argument entered the world, those who want to argue that the concepts of purpose and design are coterminous, as did William Paley in the early nineteenth century, have a lot of work to do.

A too-tight equation of purpose and design only ends up becoming a stalking horse for atheism. Consider the case of bird flu: If any form of biological complexity whatever is to be taken as an automatic argument for divine design without further ado, then we should be praying that God not design a mutation of the

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avian virus that could jump over into the human population, which is absurd. We rightly fear a crossover mutation because random mutations *may or may not* happen. But we also know that if the random mutation does happen to allow the virus to make the jump to humans, the human host will prove a fertile ground for the virus' multiplication according to the principles of natural selection.

Whenever anyone raises questions about antibiotics or antiviral drugs as an argument for natural selection, Intelligent Design advocates immediately concede the point but then claim that natural selection doesn't operate to give rise to new species. If that is their position, then they should at least admit that the *onus probandi* is on them; plus it wouldn't hurt if they could praise Darwin for giving us the heuristic ability to understand the mutating behavior of viruses and bacteria.

As to the worries, constantly expressed, that natural selection undermines theism, I think it is important to keep in mind St. Thomas' distinction between primary and secondary causality, that is, between God's providence and the effects of natural law operating on its own steam, as it were. As he says in his *Summa Theologiae*: "Divine providence does not impose necessity on things to the exclusion of contingency. . . . Whatever divine providence decrees shall happen inevitably and through necessity, happens inevitably and through necessity. Whatever it intends to happen contingently, happens contingently."

An example will illustrate the point: I once knew a student of deep faith whose parents met when his father was involved in a severe automobile accident, which forced him to spend several weeks in the hospital. There he met his future wife who was working in the hospital as a nurse. "From my mother's womb you called me," the student readily believed. And yet he would be horrified if someone had told him that God directly *caused* the accident that led, accidentally but providentially, to his conception.

I do not deny the worry caused among believers by "Darwinian hijackers" like Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett. But the best way of dealing with them is to adopt the strategy Thomas adopted with Aristotle's much less severe philosophical errors. Thomas knew on the basis of his faith that certain conclusions Aristotle drew about the nature of the soul or the providentiality of God had to be wrong. But he also realized that these were *philosophical* errors that had to be refuted *philosophically*.

In other words, the big mistake in dealing with atheist Darwinians is to buy into the major premise of their argument: that Darwinian biology is incompatible with theism. Panicked statements by Intelligent Design advocates that "we will either be a nation under God or under Darwin" are unhelpful. (I can just imagine Screwtape and Wormwood smacking their lips and rubbing their hands in glee at *that* concession!) Much better would be to let these naturalistic ideologues hang themselves on the rope of their own contradictions. By a happy coincidence, and because of the generous hospitality of the editors of First Things, I was already able to do that with Dennett in the same issue where the cardinal's essay appeared. As for Dawkins, I recommend Simon Conway Morris' book *Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe* (Cambridge) for a full-scale refutation of Dawkins on solid Darwinian grounds.

Although atheists do a lot of damage to susceptible minds by depriving them of the consolations of religion, their ideology should never pose an *intellectual* threat to believers, but only provoke justified dismay at their arrogance. As C.S. Lewis said in *A Grief Observed*, "I will never believe—more strictly I can't believe—that one set of physical events can be, or make, a mistake about other sets."

Edward T. Oakes, S.J.
University of St. Mary
of the Lake
Mundelein, Illinois

Christoph Cardinal Schönborn's article in your last issue has a special resonance for Protestants who cheer on the Intelligent Design movement. Whereas the Catholic thinker may rely on an intellectual Christian framework offered by St. Thomas and, before him, Aristotle, the Protestant has a patchwork of Barth, Bruner, Bultmann, Tillich, Hartshorne, Cobb, Gilkey, et al. All of these were and are serious, worthy scholars of Christian thought, but they offer contemporary Protestants meager ammunition in the current battles over design. In particular, as Cardinal Schönborn demonstrates, the Catholic thinker can develop a compelling argument—both for its critical insight and its venerable tradition—from the Thomistic analysis of causes. This analysis demonstrates that the modern scientist excludes two of the traditional causes—formal and final—at the outset. Thus, when the zoologist asserts he sees no design in the chambered nautilus, he is acknowledging not so much that a design is not evident to him as that a design or formal cause was excluded from the beginning.

The exclusion of formal and final causes tells us several things about modern science: one, that it stands in defiance of nearly two thousand years of unaided human reason from Aristotle to St. Paul to the Scholastic Fathers; two, that it restricts our definition of reason to the point that our senses are no longer permitted to inform us adequately. Science closes the door to nature. As long as the excluded causes, formal and final, continue to fall outside the purview of the intellect (as defined by

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scientific reductionists), the Intelligent Design movement will face opposition.

B.L. Levens
Savannah, Georgia

Christoph Cardinal Schönborn replies:

I am grateful for the thoughtful letters from readers. It would take a book-length treatment to do justice to the issues raised in summary fashion by my essay and the letters. Here I provide only the sketchiest of responses, while looking forward to a continuing dialogue.

Robert T. Miller points to, in effect, an equivocation on the word "science." In my essay I followed the modern usage, in which the word means (borrowing Jacques Maritain's term) the empiriological investigation of nature. I certainly agree, however, that philosophical arguments are scientific in the broader, older meaning of the term and must stand or fall based on their relation to observable reality.

It is true that excluding truths and explanations *a priori* is contrary to "the scientific cast of mind." But early modern scientists were humans too, with all the usual weaknesses that implies. They were, for example, deeply influenced in their science by various theological and philosophical commitments well known to historians of mechanical philosophy. They did indeed rule out certain kinds of explanations *on the supposition* that they were either useless or false. Part of that supposition was justifiable, in that one can and must *assume* the existence of substances with their natural ends in order to investigate experimentally and explain mathematically the mechanical "inner workings" of their natures. Moreover, in its bold and very fruitful decision to study nature in a "species-neutral" fashion—that is, according to the regularities common to all material things, reified as "laws of nature"—modern science appropriately excluded from consideration those aspects of nature that make things specifically what they are—that is, the natures and essences of substances.

The problem, however, is that once assumed and thus excluded from active scientific study, these aspects of reality soon drop out of understanding completely, and that is largely where we find ourselves today. The kinds of problems to which I refer are sketched out for us in the realm of biology by the American biochemist and medical doctor Leon Kass in his brilliant essay "The Permanent Limitations of Biology."

Miller provides a fine example of the problem when he implies that humankind did not really *know* what gold is—did not know it essentially—until its "atomic number" was known. Yet surely humans have known the essence of gold for thousands of years, and our modern empiriological knowledge only supplements and gives greater precision to knowledge that was already well established. The truths of empiriological science go hand in hand with the truths of natural philosophy, each depending on and making up for the limitations of the other, as a fine recent article by Michael Augros in the *Thomist*, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy," makes clear.

As to whether I am a faithful son of St. Thomas, here I must with regret disagree with Miller. The undeniable basis for the metaphysics of Aristotle and St. Thomas is their prior study of the natural world of changeable being—of "physics" in their sense of the term. If modern science had shown that Aristotle's studies of the natural world were *false* in all relevant ways, then it would also have shown that the metaphysics of St. Thomas was false as well. Conversely, if St. Thomas' metaphysics is a true science of being *qua* being, then in some essential respects his underlying physics—suitably updated and purified of empirical errors—is a true description of the natural world.

Fortunately, in this very moment in history some empiriological scientists have a sufficiently "scientific cast of mind" to begin to see and grapple with the limits of reductionism in science, and thus return "from below," as it were, towards a classical understanding of nature. Thus in biology we find a growing rebellion against reductionism and a return to holism in the writings of first-class scientists such as Franklin Harold in *The Way of the Cell*.

Even in physics there is a movement toward holism and hierarchical ordering in nature, exemplified by the Nobel laureate Robert Laughlin's astounding book *A Different Universe: Reinventing Physics from the Bottom Down*. Wherever we see scientists grappling with the existence of "emergent properties" in nature, we see the bottom-up rediscovery of the formal and structural principles long known to classical philosophy and still needed for a complete grasp of material reality.

As to the allegedly unscientific nature of my comments about the teleological pattern evident in evolution, I refer Professor Miller to the excellent book mentioned in Father Edward T. Oakes' letter. Simon Conway Morris' work *Life's Solution: Inevitable Humans in a Lonely Universe* is a fine example of what natural teleology looks like from the "bottom-up" perspective of the modern empiriological scientist.

In the magnificent words of St. Thomas, "Hence it is clear that nature is nothing but a certain kind of art, *i.e.*, the divine art, impressed upon things, by which these things are moved to a determinate end. *It is as if the shipbuilder were able to give to timbers that by which they would move themselves to take the form of a ship*" (emphasis added).

Thus, the Thomistic philosopher would expect nature to exhibit an

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intrinsic teleology, an immanent, lawlike self-unfolding that would appear to the empiriological scientist as "self-organization," "emergent properties," and other such philosophically question-begging locutions, as if matter itself was the source of the ontologically prior (although not necessarily temporally prior) principles that organize and structure it.

Turning to the next letter, I sense that I may be caught somewhat in the crossfire between Oakes and his Intelligent Design opponents in their fascinating debates that have unfolded in the pages of FIRST THINGS. Since I have no ability to defend, or interest in defending, Intelligent Design theory, I will step back, leaving behind three comments.

First, I respectfully disagree with his characterization of the work of Simon Conway Morris as a "refutation of Dawkins on solid Darwinian grounds." Morris' work on teleological, lawlike evolution is in fact a powerful *challenge* to Darwinian orthodoxy, which is based in large part on the absolute contingency of the results of variation and natural selection as they drive the purposeless meanderings of phylogeny across an arbitrarily changing fitness landscape. This is made clear by the book reviews of Morris' work by ultra-Darwinists who, emboldened perhaps by his known status as a Christian believer, have gone so far as to label him a "creationist" for claiming to find scientific evidence for laws of evolution.

As to the question of "purpose without design," I agree that the extrinsic teleology and implied perfectionism of William Paley is untenable, but I think a proper understanding of the problem is more difficult than Oakes seems to think. A careful discussion of this problem would, however, far exceed the scope of this response. As I hope my essay made clear, a suitably tamed version of neo-Darwinism is certainly compatible with traditional philosophical truths about nature. But unfortunately in practice Darwinism as science seems almost always to transform itself into Darwinism as pseudo-philosophy, the fact that led to my attack on an overreaching Darwinism in my *New York Times* essay. What the biological sciences need is a "non-Darwinian Darwinism," as Father Stanley Jaki makes clear in a fine essay by that name in the recent volume *L'Evoluzione: Crocevia di Scienza, Filosofia e Teologia*.

Finally, Oakes raises the important question of theodicy, but I wonder whether it is fair for him to focus his critique on "intelligent design" theorists. After all, our Catholic faith teaches that God providentially reigns over *all* of reality, down to its tiniest details. So orthodox Christianity itself must answer the charges of "natural evil" raised by Oakes. Darwinism provides no easy answers for theology, unless one incorporates evolutionary thinking into theology, using Darwinistic and heterodox "process theology" to absolve God from the responsibilities of His all-encompassing providence.

I have given some attention to these problems in my series of catechetical lectures, but certainly there are no easy answers. As with so many mysteries, orthodox Christianity must accept completely and unequivocally two truths—in this case, that God is all good and all powerful—and humbly shoulder the difficult burden of fitting those two truths together without diluting either of them.

I give thanks for the kind words from B.L. Levens. As with so many battles in the modern world, Protestants and Catholics have in common a defense of the traditional Christian faith, even unpopular and uncomfortable truths such as we find in Romans 1:19–20. I hope my year of catechetical lectures on these difficult topics can be of some service in this great work.

Benedict's Europe

Pope Benedict's essay ("Europe and Its Discontents," January) attempts historical survey within the confines of a manifesto. Its insights are bright and concise, but its greatest omission is its treatment of Marxism exclusively within the context of a survey of political theory. To be sure, Marxism was a delusion ending in enormous cruelty, but why did it draw so much support? We cannot dismiss those who believed in it as idiots. And how can we attribute to Communism the dehumanization that has visited America in recent times, when we were for many years a fiercely anti-Communist nation?

I would suggest that Marx gave a wrong answer to a right question: How shall we counter the dehumanizing of the Industrial Revolution? If we wish to defend the family today, we need to understand the extent to which it was attacked by the sudden explosion of industrial capitalism. Almost overnight, cities replaced villages, factories replaced guilds, and the blue-collar commuter was born.

Marx defined the problem as a class struggle and insisted that classes had to be eliminated. The first thing that had to fall, of course, was private ownership and capital. We rightly rejected this proposition. I would argue, however, that we did not reject one of the insidious premises of Marxist theory: that the value of a life is judged by its contribution to the economy. Feminism behaves like the last-surviving child of Marxism when it seeks to establish woman's value by moving her into the workplace. Our youngest children are sent to child-farms so that mothers can go do more profitable things. It was in the pope's homeland that the term *Kinderfeindheit* arose—seeing children as the enemy. This is the origin of the self-hatred pervading the West.

Rev. Al Hoger
Immanuel Lutheran Church
Wichita, Kansas

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Pope Benedict wrote a highly challenging, comprehensive, and respectful article calling for a European identity with three strong pillars—a pillar of human rights and dignity, a pillar of marriage and the family, and a pillar of religious multiculturalism that respects the Christian religion and its European traditions. This learned, gentle leader shows little patience with the self-hatred of the West toward its own religious origins. He ends his article with a call for Christians in Europe to become a creative minority that helps Europe reclaim the best of its heritage.

In this spirit, realizing that we cannot go back to a time when Christian thought and tradition were dominant in European affairs, we should recognize that secularists are not necessarily the enemy we often presume them to be. In order to go forward, we must appreciate that many atheists can be people of good will who fully support human rights and dignity; that certain types of permanent, civil homosexual unions may be respectful and even supportive of the long-term goals of traditional marriage; and that a secular culture can express much that is spiritually positive when it encourages, in addition to its own views, the full expression of religious beliefs in a wide variety of forms and traditions.

To go forward in this way is necessarily to loosen our grip on dogma, at least insofar as it might be used as a club against others. The "peculiar self-hatred" that the Holy Father notices in the West is our continuing guilt over how Western Christian dogmas were misused in the past to exclude, humiliate, and punish those who held different beliefs, or who held no religious beliefs at all. The hand of friendship, love, and service must now be extended, as the Holy Father says, "to show the face of the revealed God."

Daniel J. Biezad
San Louis Obispo, California

As a French American who dearly loves both countries and feels blessed to be able to move comfortably from one culture to the other, I want to speak to Americans reading Pope Benedict's article about our response as Christians to Europe's problems: Whatever is happening in Europe can happen in the United States, or is already happening here. Americans should not indulge in a false sense of security.

When the pope says that "modern democracies reject God as being the shaper of history," that only "the will of its citizens counts," and that the "secular and modern state declares that God is a private question, God is a sentiment," American readers of First Things might sense that the pope is talking about their own country.

Michele Szekely
San Francisco, California

Twins and Embryos

In commenting on the review of *The Soul of an Embryo*, Father Neuhaus (The Public Square, January) introduces a red herring: "The point at which one entity (a single embryo) splits into two entities (two identical twins) is of defining importance in determining whether a human life (or lives) has been unjustly taken." He says he has "never found it persuasive," and he is right, because there is no scientist who says that a geranium plant, for instance, is not a single organism simply because it is possible to break off a branch and grow a twin from it.

All this means is that the unifying energy of the geranium plant, which pervades the whole, is not destroyed when the branch is broken off, and it proceeds to do its work of producing a whole, unified plant out of what was only a branch. In the human case, it is obvious to any objective observer that there is a unifying energy organizing and directing the development of the "cell mass" from the beginning—selecting, for example, which cells shall be specialized and how and when. The fact that, at an early stage, what this unifying energy is doing is simple enough and the parts it produces are not specialized enough so that, if the "mass" is separated, it can still do its work in each part does not prove that the unifying energy is not (a) single or (b) unifying a single organism. This unifying energy is what philosophers call the "soul" and is what later expresses itself in consciousness and personality.

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Song of the Soul that Takes Pleasure in Knowing God by Faith

How well I know the spring that feeds the torrent,
though night has fallen!

The spring runs from forever, and past finding;
how well I know it as it flows down winding,
though night has fallen.

Since it has none, I know not where its source is,
but know that there all things begin their courses,
though night has fallen.

I know nowhere exists so fair a treasure,
yet heaven and earth there slake their thirst with pleasure,
though night has fallen.

So clear it shines that nothing foul can scum it,
and every light, I know, emanates from it,
though night has fallen.

So full its current, and so strongly churning,
that heaven rains on hell and on the burning,
though night has fallen.

The stream that flows, I know, from that first welling
equals the source in might beyond all telling,
though night has fallen.

The stream that from these two flows forth together
keeps equal pace, as bonded by a tether,
though night has fallen.

For that eternal spring is safely hidden
in this, life's bread, the feast to which we're bidden,
though night has fallen.

They're called to this, all creatures here abiding,
to come and drink their fill, although in hiding,
since night has fallen.

That living fountain that I most desire
I find in this, the bread of life, entire,
though night has fallen.

St. John of the Cross, translated by Rhina P. Espaillat

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Opinion

Darwin in Dover, PA

Robert T. Miller

While Christoph Cardinal Schönborn and Professor Stephen Barr were arguing over questions of evolution and teleology in the last few issues of First Things, down in Pennsylvania Judge John E. Jones III was deciding *Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District*.

The case arose when the Dover school board voted to require that high-school biology teachers read to their students the following disclaimer: "Because Darwin's theory is a theory, it continues to be tested as new evidence is discovered. The theory is not a fact. Gaps in the theory exist for which there is no evidence.... Intelligent Design is an explanation of the origin of life that differs from Darwin's view. The reference book *Of Pandas and People* is available for students who might be interested in gaining an understanding of what Intelligent Design actually involves."

Parents of some students sued, alleging that the board's policy violated their constitutional rights under the establishment clause. Applying the Supreme Court's holdings in *County of Allegheny v. ACLU* and *Lemon v. Kurtzman*, Judge Jones determined that the policy endorsed a religious message, was motivated by a religious purpose, and had the effect of advancing religion. Since any one of these taken singly would constitute a violation of the establishment clause, the court permanently enjoined enforcement of the school board's policy. There will be no teaching of Intelligent Design in Dover.

Like others who support the original understanding of the Constitution, I disagree with many of the Supreme Court's decisions under the establishment clause, but in our system of government a federal-district judge like Judge Jones is bound by those decisions. In applying *Allegheny County* and *Lemon*, Judge Jones had to determine whether Intelligent Design is religion or science: If it is religion and not science, then the government's advancing it would violate the establishment clause.

To the outrage of many Intelligent Design proponents, Judge Jones concluded Intelligent Design is religion and not science. I think he's half right: Intelligent Design is not science, at least not in the usual sense, but neither is it religion.

To see why, we have to start with neo-Darwinism, the theory that Intelligent Design seeks to replace. In neo-Darwinism, species evolve through random genetic mutations and natural selection. In accordance with the laws of physics, the genes of reproducing organisms are sometimes altered on the molecular level, with the result that offspring have features different from those of their parents. These new features, if they confer an advantage in surviving, will be more likely to be passed on to future generations. Each genetic mutation produces only a very small change in the biological features of the organism, but such small changes accumulate over immense periods of time and lead to the evolution of new species from old.

Intelligent Design poses two distinct challenges to neo-Darwinism. The first is purely negative: Neo-Darwinism is insufficient to explain the existence of certain observed features of organisms. The second is positive: Intelligent Design proposes an alternative theory that purportedly succeeds in explaining what neo-Darwinism cannot.

The argument against neo-Darwinism begins from the undoubted observation that many features of living beings, like the bacterial flagellum or the human eye, are the result of not one genetic mutation but of a large number of such mutations. The Intelligent Design theorist next argues that none of these mutations, taken singly, would confer any survival advantage on the organism: The survival value comes only when all the mutations are present simultaneously. This may or may not be the case. There is significant evidence to suggest that at least some complex features of organisms result from what biologists call *exadaptation*, a phenomenon in which one genetic mutation confers a certain kind of survival advantage on an organism, and later, after subsequent mutations have occurred, the original mutation combines with the subsequent ones to confer a wholly different advantage. In this way, the mutations necessary to produce complex biological structures could slowly build up over time.

Although most scientists working in the area think exadaptation or similar mechanisms can explain the emergence of complex biological forms, most would probably admit that the issue is not fully settled. Intelligent Design theorists, however, take their objection to be decisive and then advance a new explanation for the existence of complex features of organisms: There is an intelligent designer who intervenes in the process of random genetic mutation and natural selection to

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cause, simultaneously, a host of genetic mutations needed to produce the observed complex features of organisms. Most Intelligent Design theorists claim to be agnostic about the nature of this intelligent designer, but many will admit privately that they think that the intelligent designer is God.

Even assuming that neo-Darwinism cannot explain the existence of complex biological forms that we observe in the world, does Intelligent Design's theory that there is an intelligent designer that causes such forms count as science? The answer depends on exactly how we understand science. Judge Jones' opinion in *Kitzmiller* goes astray here, for in one sense (which I shall call the Quinean sense, after Harvard philosopher W.V. Quine) we might count as scientific any theory that purports to explain and predict observed phenomena. In his *Two Dogmas of Empiricism*, Quine wrote,

> As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in light of past experience. Physical objects are conceptually imported into the situation as convenient intermediaries—not by definition in terms of experience, but simply as irreducible posits comparable, epistemologically, to the gods of Homer. For my part I do, *qua* lay physicist, believe in physical objects and not in Homer's gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and the gods differ only in degree and not in kind.

In other words, we posit things unseen in order to explain and predict what we observe. Intelligent Design theorists posit an intelligent designer to explain the existence of certain observed phenomena, and thus Intelligent Design has just as much right to be called science in the Quinean sense as neo-Darwinism does. In this light, the argument between neo-Darwinism and Intelligent Design is a scientific dispute between two competing scientific theories; the dispute is analogous, from an epistemological point of view, to the dispute between Newtonian mechanics and general relativity. The only issue is which theory is best supported by the empirical evidence.

But this Quinean sense of science, while epistemologically important, is a thin one. There is a more robust sense of science in which we require not only that a theory explain and predict phenomena but also that it appeal to lawlike generalizations—to statements that purport to be not only true but necessarily true. For instance, Newton's Second Law of Motion states that the force acting on a body is directly proportional to its acceleration. This statement is meant as a law of nature: It purports to be true in every case there ever could be. It is the lawlikeness of scientific laws that makes them predictive and so allows them to be falsified by appropriate experiments. When practicing scientists think about science, they generally have in mind this understanding of science: theories that predict and explain observed phenomena by appeal to lawlike generalizations.

We often give explanations for observed phenomena that, while fully justified by the evidence and undoubtedly true, are not couched in lawlike generalizations. In *The Hound of the Baskervilles*, for example, Sherlock Holmes examines a walking stick and concludes that the owner is a medical doctor, once employed in London but now practicing in the country, under thirty years of age, amiable, unambitious, absent-minded, and the possessor of a favorite dog, larger than a terrier and smaller than a mastiff. Holmes is positing the existence of a certain kind of person to explain observed phenomena (not, as he habitually says, making deductions), but we would not normally call his conclusions science, even when true and convincing. And the reason is that his explanations are not couched in lawlike generalizations.

It is not a law of nature that young doctors who give up practice in the city for a quiet life in the country are unambitious or that everyone who leaves a walking stick in the room of someone on whom he has called is absent-minded. Such statements may be true in general and for the most part, but they admit of exceptions and are not necessary truths. Science in the Quinean sense may make use of such generalizations, and it is a tremendously important human epistemic activity. In fact, almost all of our knowledge is scientific in the Quinean sense; only a small fraction of our knowledge is scientific in the stricter sense. This is not surprising, for clearly the realm of human knowledge is much wider than what we generally think of as science.

The problem with Intelligent Design's positive explanation positing an intelligent designer is that such a designer would operate not by lawlike necessity but by intelligence and free choice. Explanations that posit intelligent agents to explain observed phenomena are often justified, but they are never scientific in the strict sense, for they do not explain by reference to generalizations that are necessarily true.

That is because the necessity of the scientific law is inconsistent with the freedom of the free agent's choice. Science explains behavior on the basis of what its objects must necessarily do. Intelligent agents, human or otherwise, make free choices, but these choices flow from the will. Hence, there is no necessity to them, and explanations that appeal to the free choices of intelligent agents—while scientific in the Quinean sense,

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tremendously important in human knowledge generally, and often justified by the evidence and true in every sense of the word—are not scientific in the sense that physics and chemistry and biology are scientific.

The problem with teaching Intelligent Design in public high schools, therefore, is twofold. First, discussion of Intelligent Design's argument against neo-Darwinism is out of place in a high-school science classroom because most scientists working in the area do not accept the Intelligent Design criticism of neo-Darwinism and because understanding the scientific issues involves sophisticated arguments far beyond the capacity of nonspecialists, let alone high-school students. Second, even if Intelligent Design's criticism of neo-Darwinism is warranted, the Intelligent Design theory is not scientific in the strict sense. That is, even if true, Intelligent Design does not belong in a *science* class.

If Intelligent Design's proposed explanation of observed phenomena is not science, is it religion? No, at least not in the sense that religion is a revealed doctrine, surpassing human reason and accepted as a matter of faith. That's not what Intelligent Design is at all, and, to the extent that he held otherwise in *Kitzmiller*, Judge Jones is mistaken.

The truth is that Intelligent Design is metaphysics, a branch of philosophy. Metaphysics at its best is scientific in the Quinean sense, because it posits things in order to explain the existence of observed phenomena. Aristotle's arguments about an unmoved mover, Aquinas' Five Ways, contemporary versions of the cosmological argument in analytic philosophy of religion—all of these are, in the end, proposed explanations of observed phenomena. These arguments seek to explain why there is something and not nothing, usually by positing an extraordinary being causally responsible for the existence of all other beings. To the extent that philosophers have thought of these arguments as proofs or deductions, they are as mistaken as Sherlock Holmes was about his treatment of the walking stick in *The Hound of the Baskervilles*.

Intelligent Design's positive thesis is similar to these well-known arguments in metaphysics. It differs primarily in that the phenomena it seeks to explain are much more modest—the existence of complex biological forms rather than the existence of things generally. In one important way, Intelligent Design's argument is in a much weaker position than traditional cosmological arguments, for empirical results in biology could show that the mechanisms of neo-Darwinism are sufficient to explain the existence of complex biological forms, and in this case the motivation for Intelligent Design's theory would collapse. It's much harder to imagine results in physics or other lawlike sciences that could analogously undercut cosmological arguments.

So, if Intelligent Design is not science but still not religion, is *Kitzmiller* rightly decided? I think so. Like Cardinal Schönborn, I think it is unhelpful to get philosophy mixed up with science. Philosophy should take the results of science as given, as data from which philosophical speculation begins. As Quine wisely said, "No inquiry being possible without some conceptual scheme, we may as well retain and use the best one we know—right down to the latest detail of quantum mechanics, if we know it and it matters." We ought not inject a philosophical argument into a science class; this is bad epistemology, and it is likely to create confusion. Moreover, scientists are generally as incompetent at philosophy as philosophers are at science. Regardless of how we ought to understand the establishment clause, Intelligent Design does not belong in high-school biology classrooms.

The larger problem the Dover Area School Board was trying to address—the apparent atheistic drift of much public education—may still have a solution, however. I think public high schools ought to offer, at the senior level, a course in philosophy, including metaphysics. The texts should include Aristotle and Aquinas on arguments for the existence of God but also the criticisms of such arguments by Hume and Kant, as well as some contemporary philosophy of religion. This would negate the impression, perhaps created in science classes, that science explains everything there is to explain about the universe.

There's no doubt that such a class would pass muster under even the Supreme Court's understanding of the establishment clause. It would also do a lot of good in the world. One thinks that, had he been forced to take such a course in high school, Daniel Dennett—the crusader for biology as the final destroyer of religion—might not say so many foolish things.

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Broken Promises

Stephen Schwartz

"Never forget what happened here!" John Paul II demanded in 1993 when he visited Albania—where, under the dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, the Communists were at their most ferocious in the suppression of religion. More than a dozen years later, the pope's heartfelt warning seems utterly forgotten. Albanian Catholics were

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promised help in reconstructing their religious and civic life, but little has been given, and the foundations for a renewal of Catholic traditions do not exist.

In other Leninist-ruled countries, the party-states combined repression with manipulation, recruiting pliable clergy to advance the foreign-policy agenda of Moscow. But Albania was horribly different. Seventy percent of its population was Muslim, divided between moderate Sunnis in the Ottoman Turkish style and spiritual Sufi followers of the Shia sect, the only indigenous Shias in Europe. Some 20 percent were Christians who belonged to Orthodox churches, concentrated in southern Albania, and 10 percent were Catholic, mostly in the north. But when the Communists came to power in 1944, they quickly moved against all religious observance, and by 1967 they declared Albania the world's first atheist state.

Albanians have consistently put their cultural identity before religion; a nineteenth-century Albanian Catholic who rose to become the Ottoman governor of Lebanon, Pashko Vasa, wrote memorably, in a verse known by all his coethnics, "the religion of the Albanians is the Albanian nation." Although their numbers have been small, Catholics have a distinctive place in the intellectual legacy of the Albanians. They were the vanguard in education, in literary and linguistic efforts, and in promoting national consciousness. In particular, Catholics helped develop Albanian literacy and an alphabet appropriate for their language. The first novel in Albanian was written by a Catholic priest, Ndoc Nikaj, born in 1864. Another priest, Gjergj Fishta, born in 1871, composed a national epic in verse, *The Mountain Lute*, recently published in English for the first time. Other Albanian Catholic scholar-clerics were crucial in recording ancient oral traditions, including epic ballads.

Conservative believers but committed to social progress, those Catholics produced in Albania a Christian Democratic movement similar to that in Italy. They were also firmly anti-Communist and viewed Bolshevism mainly as an expression of the Slavic imperialism of their hereditary enemies, the Serbs—with the result that nearly the whole Albanian Catholic intellectual leadership was systematically destroyed by Hoxha's Communist regime after the war. Nikaj was tried and executed, as were the outstanding folklorists Monsignor Vinçenc Prennushi and Bernardin Palaj, the social and cultural writer Anton Harapi, and the priest-poet Lazër Shantoja.

It was these stories of Albanian martyrdom that John Paul II insisted we not forget. Think of Monsignor Nikolle Deda, who was arrested by Communists in 1946, when he was fifty-six. Beaten and tortured with electricity, his body was a ruin by the time he was finally brought before a judge and sentenced to death. He was executed in 1948 along with Bishop Frano Gjini and seventeen other Catholics.

Or think of Nikoll Gazulli, the fifty-five-year-old pastor of the town of Shkreli, who was caught and hanged by the Communists after he had fled into the mountains to join resistance forces opposed to the new order. As 1948 came to a close, Peter Çuni, a village priest beginning to gain a reputation among the Catholic faithful, was arrested and perished after two weeks of continuous interrogation, beatings, and electric shock. His corpse was thrown on a garbage heap.

The parish priest Ndre Zadeja was an important playwright killed by the Communists in 1945—to be succeeded in his parish by Ded Maçaj, a twenty-seven-year-old priest who was promptly accused of spying for the Vatican. After two weeks of torture, he knelt before a firing squad, calling, "Long Live Christ the King! Long Live the Pope! Long Live Albania!" Father Anton Muzaj returned from his studies in Rome to be arrested as a Vatican spy. Father Mark Gjani, pastor of the Catholic region of Oroshi, was beaten for a week, his feet burned by hot irons. His flesh was then pierced and ripped from his body. He died, his body left by the river. Father Jak Bushati was seized in 1946, beaten and hanged upside down for several days. His corpse was thrown into a swamp near the city of Lezha.

Three of the most famous victims of the Red Terror were Catholic women active in the anti-Communist resistance. Elena Shllaku was arrested, beaten, and had her hair pulled out; her body was then bound with barbed wire. Sentenced to twenty years, she disappeared into a labor camp. Bianca Krosaj came from the mountains; at twenty she was beaten, shocked, and had her skin burned. She was forced to eat a large quantity of salt and denied water, while subjected to lice and drugs. All her hair was pulled out, and her teeth were ripped out with pliers. She perished of tuberculosis.

And then there was Marie Shllaku, killed in Kosovo. A Catholic schoolteacher born in Shkodra, she joined a group of armed fighters after the triumph of the Communists in Yugoslavia. She was seriously wounded during fighting in Drenica, a fabled center of resistance in western Kosovo. Sheltered by a peasant family, she was discovered and arrested. The Yugoslav police ignored her injuries, beating and tormenting her. She was carried into the courtroom in the Kosovo city of Prizren. The judge was Ali Shukrija, the leading Communist among the Kosovar Albanians for many years afterward. He ranted at her during the proceeding, declaring that she was unfit to be shot and should

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be burned alive. As she awaited death, she was heard in her prison cell nightly, singing folk songs from Shkodra. She was only twenty-eight when she was executed late in 1946, along with a Franciscan, another schoolteacher, and three others.

After the liberation of Kosovo in 1999, a street in the capital was named for Marie Shllaku. But little more has been done to memorialize these martyrs or to maintain their heritage. Under Albanian Communism, persecution of the Catholic faithful continued long after the convulsion at the end of the Second World War: Father Shtjefen Kurti, for example, was executed in 1971 for the crime of performing a baptism. But no one in the West seems moved by John Paul's call to restore Albanian Catholicism, and the Albanians themselves continue to suffer. They should have a fine religious university, a flourishing press, and new writings in their language. But Catholic culture remains the object of suppression and harassment by the remnants of the Communist bureaucracy in Albania, which still infest the schools, the courts, and the media.

Paradoxically, the only support the struggling Catholics have found is from the Muslim intelligentsia in northern Albania, who admire the Roman apostolate for its contribution to local and national progress. People like the Muslim journalist Blendi Kraja are more avid in their promotion of Catholic culture than local Church representatives, who seem to have fallen into passivity. Tens of thousands of Albanians have returned from Islam to Catholic Christianity, the faith of their ancestors before the Turkish conquest of the country in the fifteenth century. Local Muslim clerics make no protest against these religious reversions, arguing that the descendants of Catholics have the right to reaffirm their traditional faith.

But though the historic center of Albanian Catholicism is found in the north of the country, the Catholic hierarchy is officially headquartered in the central Albanian port of Durres, on the pretext that it is closer to the capital, Tirana. During a recent visit to Shkodra, the northern metropolis, I found the city suffering through darkness and cold every night, its electric power supply restricted by the central authorities—in the middle of a snowy winter. According to the Shkodrans, the national leaders thus punish them for their Catholicism and their indomitable hatred of Communism. Shkodra does not have a decent daily newspaper or any of the kind of thriving Catholic media it enjoyed even in the 1930s.

Albanian state discrimination against Catholics extends to their use of the northern, Gheg variant of the Albanian tongue, which the old Catholic intellectuals took as their literary medium. The Albanian state demands that children be instructed, and books and media published, in a "Unified Literary Albanian," and authors who write in Gheg are subject to harassment. Even in Kosovo, the name of Shkodra, the Catholic cultural capital, is hurled as a vulgar insult in the media, along with Jew-baiting and irresponsible accusations of Muslim fundamentalism.

This is a people whose greatest national hero, Skanderbeg, defended the Christian faith, sword in hand—a people whose outstanding modern ideal was Mother Teresa, and a people who gave so many creative minds and martyrs to the Church. They must not be forgotten. We in the West must remember the promise made by John Paul II that we would act speedily and generously to help restore Albanian Catholic culture.

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In Conformity to Christ

Guy Mansini, O.S.B. and Lawrence J. Welch

On November 29, 2005, the Congregation for Catholic Education in Rome released an instruction concerning the admission of men with homosexual tendencies to seminaries. Barring men "who practice homosexuality, present deep-seated homosexual tendencies or support the so-called gay culture," the instruction was immediately subjected to endless commentary about what it means by "deep-seated homosexual tendencies."

Gradually, the questions shifted to what the document means by "affective maturity"—but there are other important theological issues raised by the instruction that have yet to receive the attention they merit. One is an issue of moral theology. The second is a concern of theological anthropology or the "theology of the body." The third is an issue in the theology of orders. And the last concerns marriage.

Within the instruction, "deep-seated tendencies" are contrasted with "homosexual tendencies" that are "only the expression of a transitory problem—for example, that of an adolescence not yet superseded." So, deep-seated tendencies are relatively permanent, not transitory. Deep-seated tendencies are not some

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developmental glitch that one grows out of or past, as it were. They are "seated" deeply in the person, and are not so much a passing product of environment or situation but something the person brings with him to every situation and environment. The instruction is saying that the bare presence of such "deep-seated tendencies" is reason enough to bar a candidate from the seminary. It is not what the person makes of such tendencies but the fact of the tendencies themselves that, according to the instruction, is a problem.

Some—even several in the American hierarchy—suggest that the instruction is concerned not with the tendencies but with the place the person gives them in his own sense of himself, his personal identity. This interpretation understands the instruction to mean that the problem is not the presence of homosexual tendencies but one's self-definition. Those men who have deep-rooted tendencies cannot be called by the Church to priesthood because their self-identification revolves around being gay. In this way, the problem of "deep-seated tendencies" is moved toward what the instruction identifies as "the so-called gay culture"—for the adherents of which, typically, a homosexual orientation is indeed taken to define a person and to be the most important fact about themselves. And it is said that part of the problem with such a self-definition is that it may lead to homosexual activity.

Some who subscribe to this interpretation have even gone so far as to identify or equate the problems of homosexual and heterosexual candidates. They argue that, if a man's heterosexual orientation dominates his self-definition and personality and therefore makes him unable to live the celibate life, then he, like the man with deep-rooted homosexual tendencies, would be disqualified from ordination as well. In these ways, the category of possessing "deep-seated homosexual tendencies" is moved to the other categories of being homosexually active or of engaging in gay culture. At the same time, the psychologies of heterosexual and homosexual men are put on par with each other, suggesting that they face the same prospects with the same chances for affective maturity.

Now, it may be that deep-seated tendencies turn out to be uncontrolled or uncontrollable. But "deep-seated" does not mean "uncontrolled or uncontrollable." Nor does it mean "desires I have chosen or allowed to be central or predominating in my sense of identity." The instruction is speaking of desires that are not situational or transitory (as perhaps in adolescence, in the case envisioned by the instruction). Some American seminaries may find attractive the notion that the problem is "self-definition," because it would not require them to do anything different from what they are doing now. Even now, no seminary enrolls men who are actively homosexual or who live a gay lifestyle. This sort of interpretation, in fact, would make the instruction completely unnecessary, and all could say, as several have done, that all the instruction demands of us is that we carry on as usual.

As for the psychosexual parity of heterosexual and homosexual men, a standard American Catholic seminary practice is indeed to suppose, with the American Psychiatric Association, that a man can possess affective maturity, of which psychosexual maturity is part, while at the same time having deep-seated homosexual tendencies.

The instruction, however, supposes no such thing. For the instruction, an affectively mature man may once have had homosexual tendencies; but if so, they were transitory and he has grown—to maturity—out of them. Affective maturity is thus a more foundational issue than parsing "deep-seated homosexual tendencies." If we paraphrase and speak of "tendencies that won't go away," then the real difference is whether such tendencies all by themselves are compatible with affective maturity or not. Those for whom the problem is self-definition think they are; the instruction thinks they are not. This is clear enough, really, from the letter of the document. It is also clear from the comments of Cardinal Grocholewski, the prefect of the congregation that issued the instruction.

This important psychological issue, however, is intimately and ineluctably related to a matter of moral theology. Affective maturity requires the consolidation of a man's passions and emotions into stable patterns that are congruent with and cooperate with moral virtue. So, a heterosexual man who has reached affective maturity and is ready for orders is serenely chaste, and the stable pattern of his passions and emotions does not spontaneously and precipitously bring him to the brink of immoral action: He not only wants to be chaste but his sexual desires and emotional responses are chastened—disciplined, schooled—and therefore ordinate; they cooperate with his moral decision to be chaste, whether as a married man or as a celibate.

Affective maturity does not prohibit affections, of course; it means having good affections—ordinate and well-tempered affections. A man of deep-seated homosexual tendencies can certainly attain to chastity, refraining from all sexual behavior that is intrinsically disordered. He can be chaste, in that his sexual desires and tendencies are not unruly in the sense of regularly bringing him to the brink of immoral sexual activity. He may be chaste to the extent that his sexual desires do not preoccupy him. Nonetheless, if homosexual

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activity itself is always intrinsically immoral, and homosexual tendencies are therefore always objectively disordered because they incline to what is always intrinsically immoral, then it makes good sense to say that his sexual affections, as such, are not good. They do not bear on the feminine, which is the target of mature male psychosexual desire. And therefore, since they are deep seated, they prevent "affective maturity," which means, if it means anything, having good desires rightly ordered.

In fact, if a man of deep-seated homosexual tendencies can be affectively mature, then it cannot be said that homosexual tendencies are objectively disordered. And, obversely, if homosexual tendencies are objectively disordered, then no man with deep-seated homosexual desires can ever be affectively mature. In this light, it is hard to see how such a position that understands the problem to be one of self-definition can be in line with the 1986 Letter on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.

Further, if homosexual tendencies are not *objectively* disordered, then there can be nothing *intrinsically* disordered about their satisfaction—and therefore one could not agree with the 1975 Declaration on Certain Questions Concerning Sexual Ethics from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Nor could one agree with the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Those who make self-definition the problem may not have expressly denied the teaching about either homosexual tendencies or homosexual acts, but they cannot consistently assert this teaching and at the same time read the instruction as they want and take affective maturity in the way they wish to understand it.

Also at stake in the faulty reading of the instruction is theological anthropology—attached to what the instruction calls the "spiritual paternity" the priest is supposed to exercise. Affective maturity requires a disciplining of sexual desire and affection, and the priesthood requires a kind of sublimation or redirection of a man's natural sexual orientation to the service of the Church, the spouse of Christ, and to spiritual paternity in bringing forth children of God from the laver of baptism. In this, the heterosexual man does not have to suspend or abstract from what would be his felt and conscious choice of "sexual object" were he sexually active. The celibate priest has renounced something that nonetheless, on a different plane, the symbolic and ecclesial, finds expression; he has embraced something—the Bride of Christ, the Church—that is in harmony with what he has renounced.

The instruction indicates this framework for understanding its teaching in its very first section. For affective maturity, it directs its readers to *Pastores Dabo Vobis*. But for "spiritual fatherhood," the instruction sends us to the 1994 Directory on the Ministry and Life of Priests from the Congregation for the Clergy, and this document in turn sends us to the paragraph on celibacy in *Presbyterorum Ordinis*, the Decree on the Ministry and Life of Priests of the Second Vatican Council. Through celibacy, the council teaches, priests "more expeditiously minister to his Kingdom and the work of heavenly regeneration, and thus they are better fitted to accept paternity in Christ more widely." The text also puts celibacy in the context of the nuptial relation of Christ and the Church. Priestly celibacy in the service of Christ and the Church is therefore properly that of a man, a male—it is an exercise of "paternity." The priest's maleness, his sexuality, his sexual psychology, is a part of his conformation to Christ.

In priestly celibacy there is a form of life in which the meaning of sexual difference for self-gift—nuptiality—is lived and in which the specific finality of sexuality in fruitfulness is preserved. In this, the priest is configured to Christ. Because of celibacy, moreover, which makes the gift of self to the Church total, there is even greater configuration to Christ, as John Paul II pointed out in *Pastores Dabo Vobis*. But this realization of nuptial self-gift occurs in its characteristically masculine form. The theologian Sara Butler has noted the priority of the love of God relative to our love, the initiative that characterizes the love of Christ and the love of God and that makes their figuration as masculine appropriate: "This priority in loving can be compared to a *masculine mode of loving*, of self-donation," she writes, "when considered in light of the 'nuptial meaning of the body' and the active role of the husband in the marital embrace." Feminine and masculine modes of loving are coordinate; they complement and evoke one another, but they are distinct.

Presbyterorum Ordinis therefore envisages a seamless integration of the psychosexual and affective with the sacramental and spiritual. The priest renounces ordinary paternity, but he gives himself to spiritual paternity. He renounces something good, and something to which he is by nature directed, and something for which he may have felt a conscious desire. And yet, in its own way and at its own level, spiritual paternity expresses the truth of the body. All is harmonious, and there is no discord between one's own identity, affectivity, and sexuality—and the representation of Christ as bridegroom the bride of the Church.

There is thus a sort of "affective" conformation to Christ that priestly mission and life calls for. Ordination, to be sure, effects a conformation to Christ at a sacramental level, making the priest an instrument of Christ. But just as there is a prior conformation to

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Christ required of the candidate at the level of the body, at the level of the moral virtues, and at the level of charity, so also at the affective level. It is, therefore, not merely that the man of deeply seated homosexual tendencies cannot be affectively mature but also that his affective immaturity, since it fails of *masculine* maturity, prevents him, at that level, from conformation to Christ. Claiming that a man with deep-seated homosexual tendencies is an apt candidate to exercise spiritual paternity means emptying it of any meaning specific to maleness.

If we are going to ordain men of deep-seated homosexual tendencies to the priesthood, we will have to excise from spiritual fatherhood anything that connects it to actual sexual desire, sexual differentiation, and bodiliness. For the same reason that there is nothing to prevent a child in a modern family from having "two daddies" or "two mommies," there will be nothing to prevent a homosexual man from exercising spiritual fatherhood. But then, it will be hard to see why it is that only men can be ordained to the priesthood, contrary to the universal practice of the Church as confirmed by *Ordinatio Sacerdotalis*. If a priest does not have to be psychologically masculine, why should a priest be somatically male? It will follow as well that there can be no significance to the manhood of Jesus of Nazareth. In the end, we will have to practice a studied ignorance of all paternity, even that of the Father of Lights, from whom every fatherhood takes its name.

Marriage, too, must be among the casualties of the neglect of the natural order of desires and affections that ignoring the plain sense of the instruction implies. The relation of Christ and the Church is the great sacrament of which the relation of husband and wife in Christ is the little sacrament. If the manhood of Christ is theologically insignificant, then sexual differentiation must be immaterial to the little sacrament as well. It cannot become irrelevant for one without becoming irrelevant for the other. If *spiritual* paternity is whatever we want it to be, then marriage—with is own paternity and maternity—is whatever we want it to be, too. We land squarely in the postmodern sensibility about matters sexual and marital.

There are serious implications to the attempt by some commentators to interpret the recent instruction as being concerned primarily with self-definition. There are implications for the morality of homosexual acts. There are implications for the psycho-physico-spiritual unity of man. There are implications for the theology of orders. And there are implications for marriage, as well. All these implications are contrary to the established, universal, and constant teaching and practice of the Church.

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Ancestral Tumulus

Daggers, broadswords, halberds, battle-axes,
shields, helmets, scabbard parts and buckles, spearheads,
manacles, necklaces, wine jars, war trumpets,
wagon, chariot and harness fittings,
armor and heraldic metalwork

entombed in wooden mortuary houses
under earthen mounds with severed skulls
of conquered enemies fashioned into goblets
ready beside the skeleton of the lord
seated in his vehicle of prestige

disassembled for passage to the next world
the godlike male, all drinking fighting man
surrounded by his concubines and servants
and strangled children to keep him company
across this threshold, and coins, millions of coins.

Jim Powell

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To Be a Christian College

Alan Jacobs

In 1877 some concerned citizens of Wheaton, Illinois, decided that they needed to do something about the strange little college that stood in the midst of their town. It had been there since the early 1850s, first as a Wesleyan school called the Illinois Institute and then—reinvented by Jonathan Blanchard, a Congregationalist minister, abolitionist, sworn enemy of "secret societies," and former president of downstate Galesburg's Knox College—as Wheaton College. On almost every conceivable political or social issue Blanchard was a radical, and he worried the local burghers.

So they turned to the Congregational Association for help. Blanchard, they said, was guilty of "narrowing [the college's] constituency to a small class of men of extreme views." He needed to be shown that the more moderate and hence wiser path was to offer "a broad, generous, liberal education under moral and religious influences." All denominational and doctrinal extremities were to be shunned; Blanchard and his red-hot revivalist fanatics needed to be submerged in the lukewarm bath of mere "moral and religious influences." The Congregationalist authorities, having long been frustrated with Blanchard anyway, were more than happy to do their part: They declared that Blanchard was no longer a Congregationalist minister and Wheaton no longer a Congregationalist college. Blanchard ignored them and continued on his chosen path—and Wheaton has been an interdenominational college ever since.

In 2004, the administration of Wheaton College chose not to renew the contract of Joshua Hochschild, an assistant professor of philosophy, for one reason and one reason only: He had expressed his intention to be received into the Roman Catholic Church. (Full disclosure: I consider Josh Hochschild a friend, and during his time at Wheaton, where I teach, I came to value him greatly both for his intellectual incisiveness and his deep Christian commitment.) Hochschild, after some pleading by his department, was ultimately allowed to remain at Wheaton for another year, but in 2005 left to teach at Mount Saint Mary's University in Maryland.

This event did not draw much attention beyond Wheaton as it was unfolding, but when a reporter for the *Wall Street Journal* heard about it some months later and wrote an article that appeared in January 2006, a considerable amount of public comment ensued. Much of the commentary has been less than well informed and less than enlightening, but once the proper clarifications are made, the Hochschild case can be seen to illuminate a set of crucial choices facing Wheaton College—and, perhaps, Christian higher education in America.

First, misconceptions and clarifications:

- Some commentators have assumed that Wheaton has only recently decided to exclude Catholics from teaching positions. In fact, in the 2004–2005 academic year Josh Hochschild became the first Catholic ever to hold a full-time teaching position in the nearly one-hundred-and-fifty-year history of the college.
- Some have assumed that the Statement of Faith—which all employees of the college must sign—is crafted in such a way that all Protestants are acceptable but no Catholics are. But many Protestants would reject Wheaton's position that the Holy Scriptures are "of supreme and final authority in all they say" or its affirmation of "the bodily resurrection of the just and the unjust." The statement is not even one that all *evangelicals* could sign. For instance, one of the most famous of all evangelical leaders, John Stott, is not sure he could affirm "the everlasting punishment of the lost."
- Some have contended that Catholic colleges do not in this way exclude Protestants, but while most Catholic schools do indeed allow Protestants (and Jews, and Muslims, and atheists) to join their faculty, such policies are by no means uniform. Schools such as Franciscan University in Steubenville, Ohio, Thomas More

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College in New Hampshire, Ave Maria University in Florida, and Thomas Aquinas College in California expect their faculty to be faithful Catholics, though they may make exceptions in certain cases; and each of them would certainly think it a serious matter indeed if a faculty member left communion with Rome in order to become a Protestant.

• Some have said that Hochschild allowed his situation to be publicized because he rejects the idea of an exclusively Protestant college. But Hochschild has written, "I expected to lose my job upon converting to Catholicism, and I acknowledged the college's right to exclude Catholics. I have never challenged this right."

What quarrel, then, does Hochschild have with Wheaton, if he has one at all? There is indeed a key point of dispute. Wheaton's president, Duane Litfin, contends that Catholics who believe they can faithfully sign Wheaton's Statement of Faith—especially the clause about Scripture—are mistaken, either about what Wheaton's statement means or about what the Catholic Church teaches. Hochschild disagrees, contending that Catholics do indeed affirm that the Holy Scriptures are "of supreme and final authority in all they say," and that the statements on the Bible in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* and the documents on which it is based (notably *Dei Verbum* from the Second Vatican Council) clearly support his contention.

President Litfin counters that, when the Statement of Faith is read in its proper context—which includes a preamble that identifies Wheaton "not only with the Scriptures but also with the reformers and the evangelical movement of recent years"—it becomes clear that the statement about Scripture is *intended* to imply clear dissent from the Catholic position that Scripture is coequal with Holy Tradition, and that Scripture and Tradition form an indissoluble whole that is authoritatively interpreted by the Roman magisterium and by the magisterium alone. In other words, a reasonably careful and informed reader of the statement will discern that the phrase "supreme and final authority" is meant to invoke the central Reformational commitment to *sola scriptura*.

To this Hochschild replies that the statement simply doesn't *say* that, and the ordinary or obvious meaning of the phrase "supreme and final authority" quite accurately captures the Catholic position on the Bible. (Thus *Dei Verbum*: "Yet this magisterium is not superior to the Word of God, but is its servant. It teaches only what has been handed on to it.")

At the risk of seeming to weasel my way out of a tight place, I must say that I think both men—and I have talked or corresponded with both on this matter, and at some length—are exactly right. Certainly Wheaton's Statement of Faith is instantly identifiable to any reasonably informed person as an evangelical *Protestant* document: No Catholic would ever think it a sufficient formulation of core Christian belief. It arises from the disputes of twentieth-century American Protestantism and is meant to stake out Wheaton's territory in those disputes. If the statement is meant to exclude anyone, that would be liberal Protestants or half-hearted evangelicals. I do not believe there has been any point in Wheaton's history—until now—when the college's board of trustees has looked at the Statement of Faith with Catholics in mind.

To a large extent this is because, throughout much of American history and late into the twentieth century, evangelicals and Catholics had little to do with one another. They came, by and large, from different ethnic groups; they lived in different neighborhoods and even in different regions of the country; they went to different schools—in short, they were socialized into American culture in dramatically different ways. Throughout much of its history Wheaton College's leaders would have reacted with horror at the thought of Catholics on the faculty—but they would have been highly unlikely to entertain that thought in the first place. Catholic scholars would have been equally unlikely to think of teaching at Wheaton. Duane Litfin is right to say that Wheaton is getting hammered for taking a position that, as recently as thirty years ago, scarcely anyone on either side of the Reformational divide would have questioned.

But times have changed. And here is where the correctness of Hochschild's position comes in. He is not the only Catholic to look at Wheaton's Statement of Faith and think, "Yes, that suits me very well." Having served on hiring committees a number of times in Wheaton's English department, I have seen dozens of applications from Catholic scholars who see nothing in Wheaton's self-description that would rule them out.

Now, in some cases these Catholic applicants fail to understand what kind of school they are applying to: They think Wheaton is a Christian college in the way that Notre Dame is a Catholic university—that, to borrow terms favored by President Litfin in his book *Conceiving the Christian College*, Wheaton is an "umbrella" institution rather than a "systemic" one. Umbrella institutions welcome all sorts of people, with all sorts of beliefs, onto their faculty, as long as those people can support the principles on which the institution is founded. (Thus Notre Dame in no way compromised its mission as a Catholic university when, some years ago, it hired Nathan Hatch—an evangelical Protestant who both graduated from Wheaton and served on its board of trustees—as its provost.) But Wheaton is in

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fact a systemic institution which asks all of its faculty—and indeed its other employees—to *affirm*, not merely to support, its core beliefs.

Still, in any given year several Catholic scholars apply for jobs at Wheaton, not because they are ignorant of Catholic doctrine or of Wheaton's institutional purpose but precisely because they *do* understand the systemic nature of Wheaton's faith commitments and are genuinely enthusiastic about teaching in such an environment. If such problems did not arise thirty years ago, they are certainly arising now and will do so for the foreseeable future—unless Wheaton's board of trustees revises the Statement of Faith to render unmistakable its commitment to a specifically Protestant and non-Catholic theological stance. Certainly either clarification or change is called for. The current situation creates a great deal of unnecessary friction, confusion, and pain in the hiring process.

But what principles or concerns should guide Wheaton's leaders as they reflect on the options before them? It is easier perhaps to say what should *not* guide them. First on that list would be the all-too-common assumption that religious particularity is always a bad thing, that it amounts to "sectarianism" or violates the gospel of "diversity."

On the contrary, there are good reasons that *some* colleges and universities might choose, in the interests of intellectual coherence and the promotion of fruitful conversation, or in the interests of, say, service to the Church, or out of a love for Truth itself, to confine their constituency to those who share a set of core beliefs. The wide-open doors of the modern university—even supposing that they really exist—are a good thing but not the *only* good thing. Certain valuable and productive conversations happen in classrooms at Wheaton or Thomas Aquinas that simply cannot happen in the classrooms of secular universities. This was a point lost on the concerned citizens of Wheaton in 1877—with their longing for the unspecifiable uplift of "moral and religious influences"—and it is equally lost on many of Wheaton's critics today.

Moreover, as James Tunstead Burtchaell has shown in his book *The Dying of the Light*—a book well known to the leadership of Wheaton College—dozens and dozens of American colleges and universities have discovered that there seems to be no "undo" button for schools that broaden their religious self-understanding. What happened at Harvard, and then happened at Oberlin, is now being completed at Davidson: The history of American higher education indicates that such sequences of events run one way only. So any school that has a distinctively Christian character and wishes to retain it had better take great care before "opening up" the institution to the previously excluded.

Yet if Wheaton *were* to accept Catholics on its faculty, this would not be a "broadening" of the kind that Burtchaell describes so compellingly. By such an action not a single provision of any orthodox Christian creed would be compromised; not a single concession to theological liberalism would be made. Such a move would not signal that Wheaton takes its core theological commitments any less seriously. Rather, it would reflect an acceptance of the fact that Catholics and Protestants have a far better understanding of each other, and a deeper recognition of their great common cause, than has been the case since the earliest days of the Reformation. (My colleague Mark Noll and his coauthor Caroline Nystrom have explored this reconciliation with great skill in their book *Is the Reformation Over?*)

Indeed, some people believe the *rapprochement* between Catholics and Protestants is so nearly complete that the acceptance of Catholics as faculty at Wheaton would mark a relatively minor change. I wish I could agree, but I cannot. Certainly such a decision would reverberate in Wheaton's constituency: There are many alumni and other donors who share the old hostility to and suspicion of Catholicism. And I am sure President Litfin has thought more than a few times of how he might handle that first phone call from a Baptist or Presbyterian parent irate because his daughter, under the influence of a charismatic Catholic professor, has just expressed (while nervously clicking the beads of her rosary) her desire to be received into Mother Church.

Then again, perhaps Wheaton would gain more support than it would lose by such a move and develop a stronger, if altered, constituency. Such matters are hard to calculate. In any case, the doctrinal modifications are more significant. President Litfin sometimes says that they would amount to "changing the DNA" of Wheaton, and, while I might quibble with that metaphor, it has some force. The school contains quite a wide range of Protestants: Arminians and Calvinists, Anglicans and Dispensationalists, Baptists, Nazarenes, Plymouth Brethren. These folks disagree on quite a few things. But they all accept a doctrinal statement that draws heavily on the Nicene Creed. More important in the daily life of the college, they all *use* the Bible in a similar way.

This is a kind of binding agent for the community—we may not agree in our conclusions about the Bible, but people carry Bibles around a lot, and quote from them, and employ them to cite evidence for arguments in a way that I rarely see among my Catholic friends. Faithful Catholics don't believe in the authority of Scripture any less than evangelical Protestants, but they certainly *employ* the Bible in very different ways, large-

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ly because it is more natural for many Catholics to cite magisterial interpretations of Scripture than to cite Scripture directly.

President Litfin sees this difference as *the* fundamental one that separates Catholics and Protestants. In his reading, "the Catholic principle" is the view that "the Scriptures and Tradition, *both as authoritatively interpreted by the magisterium*, are our supreme and final authority," while "the Protestant principle" is the view that "the Scriptures *alone* are our supreme and final authority."

I do not wholly disagree with this, though I think one cannot separate the Catholic view of Holy Tradition from its position on (especially) apostolic succession and holy orders—just as *sola scriptura* is inextricable from the other "solas" of the Reformation. And I would also argue that this strict dichotomy better captures the situation in 1540 than the one we are faced with today.

But let me for the sake of argument grant the point. Does it follow that Catholics and Protestants cannot be coworkers in a school like Wheaton? Certainly it has long been thought that this difference is more momentous than, say, the differences between Arminians and Calvinists regarding soteriology, but I can see no obvious reason for this to be so. Questions of how we may be saved are no less significant than questions about who authoritatively interprets the Bible. Nor are they obviously less germane to Christian higher education.

To be sure, if Catholics taught at Wheaton we would all have to make not-insignificant rhetorical adjustments. We would need to learn to make arguments in somewhat different ways and to hear different kinds of arguments as having possible validity. Such adjustments, I believe, would mainly have an invigorating effect on the campus's intellectual and spiritual life, but they wouldn't be easy.

I have other concerns. Would the clause in the Statement of Faith affirming that "all human beings are born with a sinful nature that leads them to sin in thought, word, and deed" need to be revised to make room for those who believe in Mary's immaculate conception? What would it do to the Christian unity and fellowship of the faculty to have some among us who (while not doubting that the rest of us are Christians) do not believe that we belong to the Church in the form intended by Christ?

I think it is important to avoid the claim that the differences between Protestants and Catholics are insignificant; they are not, and it is frivolous to think that they are. But it may well be that sufficient common ground in the gospel exists, and is recognized to exist, so that it makes sense for a college like Wheaton to take a significant step toward effective Christian unity. It was, after all, the prayer of our Lord that we be one as he and the Father are one, and if we neglect any legitimate and significant opportunity to pursue that oneness, great is our sin.

President Litfin, while seeing such a change as a kind of genetic engineering, has also noted that this is a "prudential judgment" for Wheaton's leadership. After all, since the Congregationalists washed their hands of Jonathan Blanchard, Wheaton has been a self-defining entity, accountable to no other institution. Its leaders *can* engage in genetic engineering, if they so wish. And as they meditate on this issue, I would encourage them to reflect on the college's mission statement: "Wheaton College exists to help build the church and improve society worldwide by promoting the development of whole and effective Christians through excellence in programs of Christian higher education."

What elements of Wheaton's mission are aided by its faculty being confined to Protestants? This, it seems to me, is the question that matters most. I must confess that I have difficulty in saying what such elements might be. Conversely, the riches of Catholic intellectual traditions, when embodied in persons of deep Christian conviction and piety, offer great resources for the fulfillment of that mission. Wheaton has never neglected the traditions themselves, but it has chosen to pass over brilliantly gifted proponents of those traditions when those proponents have also stood under the authority of Rome. At this juncture in the history of Christianity in the West—when it is besieged in so many ways by so many opponents—I am not sure that a school like Wheaton can afford to go it alone much longer. Even if we could, would it be wise and charitable to do so?

We are, so our motto states, "for Christ and His Kingdom." Josh Hochschild was a strong contender for that Kingdom while he was at Wheaton, and he has contended for it no less vigorously and skillfully after swimming the Tiber. Josh and I remain allies in that cause, but I lost something valuable when he ceased to share with me the daily work of teaching the extraordinary students whom Wheaton attracts. And though Josh will do fine work at Mount Saint Mary's, or wherever he goes, I think that when he left Wheaton the cause lost something, too.

The Reformation may not be over, but many of the suspicions and hostilities that accompanied it should be. Wheaton could strike a great blow, not for insipid and vacuous "moral and religious influences," but for true Christian unity, if it welcomed into its midst Josh Hochschild and other Catholic teacher-scholars who share his passion for Christian truth. FT

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The Mad Scientists' Club

Joseph Bottum

The Mad Scientists' Club (Purple House, 217 pages, $17.95)
The New Adventures of the Mad Scientists' Club (Purple House, 210 pages, $17.95)
The Big Kerplop! (Purple House, 238 pages, $17.95)
The Big Chunk of Ice (Purple House, 288 pages, $18.95)

by Bertrand R. Brinley

There's a kind of negative sound a model rocket makes after you throw the switch or light the fuse, a sort of indrawn breath as the spark disappears into the touchhole.

For an instant the whole rickety contraption—dunce-hat top, stove-pipe body, shark-tail fins—seems to shrink back like one of those wide-eyed girls on the cover of a 1940s *Amazing Stories* as the tentacles of the space monster stretch toward her scoop-necked blouse. Then with a screech of exhalation, the rocket begins to lift, straining from the metal-tubing frame to climb through the blue sky toward the black of space: faster and faster, too fast to see, a parabolic smoke trail penciling its passage. And maybe, if everything goes right, at the end there's this little poof and the handkerchief parachute pops from the nose and floats the bombard gently home to earth: a victory, an achievement—a marker laid down, with a surveyor's precision, for a world in which things *work*.

Except that it hardly ever did go right. The ignition spark would fail, or the flight would start to corkscrew, or the rocket wouldn't climb more than a few inches, thrashing against the frame like a demented squirrel until it finally flipped over and burned itself out burrowing into the ground. Besides, metal tubing was expensive, and the frame was probably rusty tie-bar, those knobby metal sticks that reinforce concrete, filched from a construction site and strung together with baling wire and duct tape—for baling wire and duct tape were the fallbacks and the fix-alls for every one of the after-school rocketeers: the young inventors, the proto-geeks, the science boys.

You almost certainly knew some of them, if you are of a certain age. They were the ones in your algebra class drawing suspension bridges and cloverleaf freeway interchanges in the margins of their spiral-bound notebooks. They understood all about slide rules and ham radios and those physics-lab gizmos that sparked and hissed and made your hair stand up with static electricity so you looked just like Lon Cheney. *Mad!* you'd howl, *They said I was mad!* while the science teacher was out of the room. And the girls would giggle, but the science boys would look down at the careful cross-hatchings in their notebooks, because it wasn't funny to them. It was real, the way things worked. The way things *wanted* to work.

Theirs was a world of the kind of stuff army-navy surplus stores used to stock on the dusty tables way in the back: leftover radar parts from Korea and oversized walkie-talkies in olive drab—*Press To Talk, Switch NOT Depressed While Receiving*—and metal detectors like mop-handled soup plates and Geiger counters and Breast-Plate Microphone Holders for Wireless Set WS-19 and vacuum tubes and radio headphones and manuals on COMSEC and Morse code. Theirs was the erector-set cosmos of *Popular Mechanics*, with its pictures of moonwheels and frictionless bearings, and its ads for kits to put a sleek fiberglass body—*As Aerodynamic as a Porsche!*—on the chassis of a Volkswagen Beetle, and its stories about how some credulous banker in Spokane had been suckered again by con men with a perpetual-motion machine.

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Part of the attraction may have been the Tomorrowland utopia the technology seemed to promise, with its glimpses of a Jetsonian future: the People-Mover! the Paperless Office! the Self-Cleaning Corningware Stove Top! the Robots That Will Serve Us Coffee in the Sparkling Comfort of Our Space-Age Homes! And part of it was the sheer gadgetry: the fetish of the accessory that made, for instance, a 1960s shutterbug ache for all the telephoto doohickeys and widgets in the mail-order catalogue that came every other month from that We-Have-It-All! camera emporium in New York City.

But an underappreciated element, I've always thought, was the language, the nuts-and-bolts poetry in all those pre-computer words: a kind of rhetorical gluttony that might have driven Rimbaud mad—that *did* drive Kipling mad as he scribbled down stories filled with Scottish engineers and ship's boilers and No. 12 steam-fitting wrenches and the work of the men who actually make things work. For the American science boys, it was oscilloscopes and cathode rays, diodes and dynamos, capacitors and step-down transformers. Or the great mechanical words they got to use: axial force and momentum, vector and differential, tension and torsion.

Do they still exist? All the junior engineers I knew have flown now, arcing like rockets with a small, eccentric wobble as they fluttered across the sky. One—maybe the smartest of them—went mad and disappeared for a while, resurfacing a decade later to move back into his mother's basement and work in her garage on the solar-powered car he's never quite gotten to run. Another made a fortune, inventing something or other during the gold-rush days of semiconductors, and retired at age thirty-five to a fancy mountain house in Colorado, where he tinkers happily all day with the nineteenth-century mechanical toys he collects. Yet another teaches basic physics, explaining to prep-school students why iron filings make a pattern when you sprinkle them on paper above a magnet and why light dissociates into rainbows when you shine it through a prism.

Each of them has a workshop with a lathe and a little motor, vises mounted on wooden benches, and every tool's exact place outlined with a thin white line on the peg-boards along the wall. Each of them still sometimes gets that eyes-down, hunted expression they used to have in high school, especially when the conversation moves to politics or novels or something else too amorphous to discern the rules by which it works. And each of them seems different, somehow, from the computer kids one meets today.

It's hard to say quite what the difference is. Over the past few months, an enormous number of words have been spilled about how the United States is falling behind the rest of the world in science: cover stories in news magazines, chin-pulling on television talkshows, widely publicized demands for legislative action.

Much of it is driven simply by partisan politics—like the brouhaha about evolution, the nation's failing grade in science is yet another stick with which to beat the pro-lifers who oppose creating embryos for stem-cell research. But some of it is the familiar spell of self-doubt that seems to come upon us every few years, regular as clockwork, ever since the Russians beat us to space with that shiny ball called Sputnik in 1957, and there was President Bush in this year's State of the Union address, calling for an increase of $136 billion in science education over the next ten years.

The evidence for America's decline is less than convincing. When *Time* magazine emblazoned "Is America Flunking Science?" on its cover this February, the columnist Charles Krauthammer responded, "The U.S. leads the world by an immense margin in just about every measure of intellectual and technological achievement: Ph.D.s, patents, peer-reviewed articles, Nobel Prizes. But in the end, . . . the economy follows culture, and American culture is today, as ever, uniquely suited for growth, innovation and advancement. The most obvious bedrock of success is entrepreneurial spirit. The U.S. has the most risk-taking, most *laissez-faire*, least regulated economy in the advanced Western world."

That seems right, and yet also wrong, somehow. The United States has certainly had its share of brilliant scientists, particularly over the last fifty years, but they don't exactly define the nation. The whole gigantic, weird, sprawling, entrepreneurial *American thing* was never really about science, and the all-American science boys, cast from the Ben Franklin–Thomas Edison mold, were never really scientists. They were tinkerers, engineers, and machinists rather than theorists and experimenters. They were inventors, more than anything else, which is why the U.S. Patent Office has issued them more than three hundred patents for apple-peelers since 1803.

During the 1960s, when advertising campaigns were filled with catch-phrases like "German Engineering," there was a sense that other nations manufactured higher-quality goods than we did. And during the "Made in Japan and Korea" panic of the 1980s, there was a sense that other nations manufactured goods more cheaply than we did. But always Americans believed that we had probably invented those goods in the first place.

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A few moments of serious money came along (especially with automobiles in the 1890s, radios in the 1920s, and personal computers in the 1980s), when all the tinkering boys in the bicycle shops and cinder-block basements seemed to be getting rich. But mostly the distinctive American inventing was non-financial, or pre-financial, or extra-financial, or, anyway, somehow partly outside the realm of money. It was really just some guy with a lathe and a drill who had to find out whether his idea for—oh, I don't know, a self-compensating rotary pump, maybe—could be made to fly.

In truth, all the classic American inventors lived in a Newtonian universe of fundamental laws that worked just fine, as long as you were willing to bash them a little with a ball-peen hammer when they didn't quite fit, tie them back together with duct tape and baling wire when they came apart, and fill in the nicks with a scrape of putty and a dab of paint. But though they gave birth to the world of Apple PCs and Microsoft and the Internet, their computerized children seem to live instead in something more like a Cartesian universe—the mind-body distinction cleaner, the logic-puzzle elements come to the fore, the math side triumphing over the engineering side, the reality grown more virtual and less physical.

Or perhaps that's just the view of the aging inventor types I know, grown now too crotchety and set in their ways to understand what it is that the kids are up to. But if you want to recall what it used to be like for the American science boys, you can see bits of it in those old Mad Scientists' Club volumes that once upon a time the Scholastic Book Service sold to schoolchildren across the nation.

For years and years—long before J.K. Rowling and the *Harry Potter* books made it the most successful publisher on the planet—Scholastic used grade schools to help market its softcover selections. As a money-maker, the scheme was hard to beat: Teachers handed out catalogues, the students would bring in their quarters and dimes, and a small portion kicked back to the school.

The books were usually illustrated, and they were always sweet, in one way or another. Children's fiction began to be dominated by Judy Blume's sort of feminist angst in the 1970s and by Daniel Pinkwater's kind of black humor in the 1980s, but Scholastic was invariably late to any trend that was going around, and for decades there was a feeling of 1958 to every one of the publisher's books.

Maybe you have to have gone to school in a small town with only a Carnegie library and a single bookstore to know the excitement of those catalogues that came midway through the fall and again in the spring. The paper was pulpy newsprint, and the ink always smeared while you carried it home, but for 60¢ you could get such now-forgotten favorites as May Nickerson Wallace's *The Ghost of Dibble Hollow*, and for $1.25 you could take home a genuine classic like Elizabeth George Speare's *The Witch of Blackbird Pond*. It was Scholastic's grade-school marketing that made a star out of Encyclopedia Brown, with Donald J. Sobol's twenty-three little volumes about a boy detective, his tough girl sidekick Sally, and his enemy Bugs Meany. And about 1965, the catalogues added *The Mad Scientists' Club*, a collection of stories by an army captain named Bertrand R. Brinley.

Brinley was an unlikely children's author. Born in upstate New York in 1917, he lived an unsettled life as a child—dragged from Pennsylvania to Illinois to California—before finishing high school in West Newbury, Massachusetts, and heading off to Stanford for college. Though he took a degree in history, it was amateur theater that attracted him, first in Palo Alto and then while working for Lockheed Aircraft in southern California as a systems analyst.

Tiring of his draft-exempt defense work, he joined the army in 1944 and seems to have had one of the most curious military careers over the next fifteen years—working as a kind of passe-partout mix of showman, concierge, press agent, and circus promoter in a captain's uniform. According to his son, a surviving copy of a résumé he prepared at the time reads: "Assigned as Special Services Officer, Third U.S. Army in Munich and Heidelberg. . . . Escorted USO shows. Directed Troop Entertainment Program for U.S. Occupied Zone, Germany. . . . Organized road circuit of twenty-one show units and ninety-five dance bands. . . . Arranged talent exchange with Bal Tabarin and Folies Bergère in Paris, and the Palladium in London. . . . Wrote and directed seven musical productions for troop entertainment . . . utilizing both soldier and professional talent, twenty-girl ballet, and concert orchestra."

Did the army really need men like this? While in uniform, he ran a nightclub for GIs in Germany and a resort hotel for American officers in Austria, served as the fast-talking press aide to American negotiators during the UN talks that ended the Korean War, and finished his career as news chief for the First Army on Governors Island in New York.

Somewhere along the way, he picked up an interest in science and by 1957 had started an army program for recreational rocketeering. The book he wrote as a result, *Rocket Manual for Amateurs*, remained the standard introductory reference for years after it was published in 1960. It was, as it claimed on its cover,

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"The Complete, Authoritative Handbook for Safe Procedures in Design, Testing, Preparation of Fuels, and Firing of Rockets Which You Can Make Yourself!" But a typical sentence runs: "Monopropellants are fluids which contain both a fuel and an oxidizing agent, either as a single chemical such as *nitromethane*, or as a mixture such as *ammonia* and *nitrous oxide*"—all perfectly true, and yet not exactly the raw stuff of bestselling children's books.

In 1961, however, there appeared in the magazine *Boys' Life* three stories by Bertrand R. Brinley: "The Strange Sea Monster of Strawberry Lake," "Night Rescue," and "The Unidentified Flying Man of Mammoth Falls." Four more stories joined them to make up *The Mad Scientists' Club*, which the publisher MacRae Smith brought out in hardback in 1965—and which Scholastic Books quickly added to its paperback catalogue, along with the five additional stories that formed *The New Adventures of the Mad Scientists' Club* in 1968. A novel, *The Big Kerplop!*, was published in 1974, but MacRae Smith was nearing the end and, unable to pay the printing bill, produced only a thousand copies. The Mad Scientists' Club seemed to have reached an end as well, and the final novel, *The Big Chunk of Ice*, was still unpublished when Brinley died in 1994.

Except that the stories never quite faded away, and when the science boys grew up they began hunting down and collecting old copies. By the end of the 1990s, used-book services were asking over $300 for the MacRae Smith hardbacks, and good copies of the Scholastic paperbacks routinely sold at $50 or more. Finally, in 2001, a small children's reprint publisher called Purple House Press began issuing the books, finishing this winter with the fourth volume, *The Big Chunk of Ice*.

You'd be hard pressed to call the accounts of the Mad Scientists' Club great literature, but there is a kind of small perfection—the feel of something doing the work of its genre in a classic way—when the first story opens: "Dinky Poore didn't really mean to start the story about the huge sea monster in Strawberry Lake. He was only telling a fib because he had to have an excuse for getting home late for supper. So he told his folks he'd been running around the lake trying to get a close look at the huge, snakelike thing he'd seen in the water, and the first thing he knew he was too far from home to get back in time."

And with that we're launched immediately into the mandatory us-vs.-them, clever-child-vs.-stodgy-adult, of the traditional schoolboy tale. Owen Johnson's Lawrenceville stories—*The Prodigious Hickey*, *The Tennessee Shad*, *The Varmint*—are probably the best American examples. But the genre was first sharply defined in England in 1881 when Talbot Baines Reed took *Tom Brown's School Days* and played it for laughs in *The Fifth Form at St. Dominic's*, and with Rudyard Kipling's *Stalky & Co.* and P.G. Wodehouse's *Mike and Psmith*, two genuinely talented writers showed how to make the genre run.

It's a gentle version that Brinley gives, and once the New Englandy town of Mammoth Falls starts to believe Dinky Poore's fib about the monster in Strawberry Lake, *The Mad Scientists' Club* picks up another classic element of boys' books—for that's the moment when Henry Mulligan, the club's vice president and chief of research, leans his piano stool back against the wall of Jeff Crocker's father's barn and begins to think about how the boys could use their radio equipment, a wrap of canvas around a chicken-wire frame, and a quiet outboard fishing motor to make the monster come alive.

There's something deep in the nature of boys that almost always requires the books they like to contain a how-to element: how to sail a boat, or how to build a treehouse, or how to send Morse code—or how to rob a bank, for that matter. You can see it Ernest Thompson Seton's *Two Little Savages: Being the Adventures of Two Boys Who Lived as Indians and What They Learned*, or Jules Verne's *Around the World in 80 Days*, or R.M. Ballantyne's *The Coral Island*. You can see it as well in *The Mad Scientists' Club*, when Brinley explains how to fly a balloon in "The Great Gas Bag Race" and keep a compass heading in the dark in "Night Rescue" and—best of all, for the boy reader—how to haunt a house in "The Voice in the Chimney."

What Brinley layers on top of all this, however, is a kind of late 1950s or early 1960s gloss of something that he calls science, though it isn't really. The stories pay ready lip service to the experimental method, the glories of theory, and the high calling of the scientist. But what they are actually after is, instead, the simulacrum of science that is old-fashioned *science-boy science*—invention, in other words, and the problem-solving of elegantly and cleverly applied technology. Each story is like the latest patent-worthy plan for yet another genuine American apple-peeler, though in the case of *The Mad Scientists' Club*, the apple to be peeled is some traditional challenge of literary boyhood: adults to be bamboozled, rival clubs to be defeated, adventures to be had, dragons to be slain.

With Freddy Muldoon, Brinley adds the happy fat boy all such stories must have, and with Mortimer Dalrymple, the sardonic skinny boy—together with the club's phlegmatic president, Jeff Crocker, and its mad genius, Henry Mulligan. And into their hands he puts all the things a science boy would love to have: the

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oscilloscope and ten-channel transmitter they get a newspaper to buy for them, the gastroscope a professor at the nearby university lends them to look inside a sealed cannon, the radiosonde beacons they can attach to almost anything.

Maybe the cleverest literary element in the stories is the first-person narration by a club member whose name, Charlie Finckledinck, isn't even given until midway through *The Big Kerplop!*, Brinley's third book about his Mad Scientists' Club. Unfortunately, midway through the third book is also when the series starts to falter and the books lose their classic feel.

The early stories often show a whimsical, science-doesn't-know-everything element of fantasy. "The Big Egg," for instance, ends with a hint that maybe a dinosaur egg really could hatch, and "The Secret of the Old Cannon" finishes with the suggestion that maybe there actually are ghosts. But *The Big Kerplop!* (a story about the boys finding an atom bomb the air force has lost) suddenly introduces a comic adult named Professor Stratavarious—based on a character from Sid Caesar's 1950s television comedy show, though for some inscrutable reason Brinley took the already unbelievable figure and added the further unbelievability of making him a Romanian: "'Oh, zat is a marvelous idea, 'Enry!' the professor exclaimed. 'Zat will make a really big expedition. Zat will make zere eyes pop out!'" In the final volume, *The Big Chunk of Ice*, the boys thwart a jewel heist when the professor flies them to Europe in his blimp to look at a glacier.

The decline in the later book-length tales is proof, perhaps, of how surprisingly delicate a thing Bertrand R. Brinley pulled off with the early stories. They had comedy, and comradeship, and wish-fulfillment fantasy—and, most of all, they had that science-boy thing of chemistry sets that got used instead of gathering dust in a closet, of walkie-talkies that proved useful instead of being lost in the basement when their batteries died, of junkyards where you could actually find the eight-foot steel bar you needed to bring one of your ideas to life.

In the years since Brinley wrote, Homer Hickam has covered some of this ground with his memoirs (made into the 1999 movie *October Sky*) of a 1950s rocketeering boyhood in Coalwood, West Virginia. But no one else has quite captured the world in which American know-how used to live: the Tomorrowland technology, the sheer gadgetry, the poetry of all those science words. Really, by the time Brinley wrote *The Big Chunk of Ice* in 1974, it was going fast. The last of the old style of science boys created the personal computer, and after them came—well, something new, something different.

The computer kids, I suppose we have to call them: the natural Cartesians who, for example, don't seem much drawn to the conquest of outer space any more. The mind-body dualists whose first idea for a problem is to model it on a computer. The boys who don't quite hear the magic that model rockets make when you first throw the switch—the sudden negative sound, the quick indrawn breath. FT

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Theology's Continental Captivity

R.R. Reno

Last year, while London suffered under terror bombings and insurgency continued in Iraq, a local UCC minister wrote in my hometown newspaper that the violence we are experiencing is caused by the spirit of religious exclusivity. Universal claims on behalf of faith (the minister was scrupulous to include in this camp claims about salvation in Christ alone) lead to hatred, bigotry, and oppression. Dogmatism and the dogmatic personality are at the root of our problems. The way toward peace and cooperation, he concluded, requires us to realize that our religious faith is culturally conditioned and relative to our unique personal needs.

Such treason of the clerics provides the context and urgency for Thomas Guarino's book *Foundations of Systematic Theology*. A professor of theology at Seton Hall University, Guarino begins with what would seem obvious: Christianity has long had a penchant for proclaiming doctrines about Jesus and salvation, the Trinity and the Church, as true, and not just true for certain cultures, certain personality types, and at certain times, but universally and enduringly true. The core teachings of the faith are asserted and affirmed "with a certain dimension of clarity, objectivity, and perpetuity." This may offend UCC ministers and grate against liberal sensibilities, but the fact remains. Christian faith is dogmatic and its claims to truth red-blooded.

Guarino structures his study to bring into view and analyze the problems facing the truth-affirming character of Christian teaching. These problems can be divided roughly in half.

The first concerns contemporary postmodern philosophical trends that support the antidogmatic prejudice. By and large, the work of postmodern philosophers cuts against "clarity, objectivity, and perpetuity."

The second half of *Foundations* considers more narrowly theological issues. To what degree and how can finite human language convey knowledge of the transcendent Creator? How should theology use philosophical conceptions of God or the Absolute? To what extent must theology accept norms of argument and reason from contemporary intellectual life? What does Athens have to do with Jerusalem? The tenor of our answers to these questions will influence the ways in which we think and talk about the truth of Christian doctrine.

Being by training a theologian, I am best prepared to analyze the second part. It would be pleasant to discuss why I think Balthasar got the best of Barth in their mid-twentieth century debate about nature, grace, and the so-called *analogia entis*. I would like to correct Guarino's misuse (which is widespread) of the term "fideism" and discuss his rejection of postliberalism as "anti-metaphysical." His nuanced and sympathetic discussions of Rahner and Lonergan provide opportunity for reassessing their legacies. But what one might pleasantly undertake is not necessarily what one ought to do.

In *Fides et Ratio*, the encyclical devoted to encouraging a renewal of reason, John Paul II observes that philosophy has two roles, both of which are dear to the Church. Philosophy has a broadly humanizing role to encourage and express "reason's drive to attain goals which render people's lives more worthy": The health of philosophy directly influences the health of culture. But philosophy also has another role, involving theology, as "an indispensable help for a deeper understanding of faith and for communicating the truth of the gospel."

Guarino asks, "To what extent can some current

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modes of secular thought serve as a medium for theological reflection?" Given the dual role and importance of philosophy identified by John Paul II, formulating a satisfactory answer is imperative.

Guarino's question about the value of current modes of secular thought is posed against the background of post-Vatican II misgivings about the present age that have shifted from worry about human creativity run wild to concern about a retreating renunciation of human dignity. To a large degree, Catholicism after the French Revolution was defined by its resistance to an aggressive humanism that imagined itself all-sufficient. This changed in the twentieth century. At the outset of his pontificate, John Paul II did not urge, "Be not arrogant and overconfident." He read the signs of the times differently, and his motto was "Be not afraid." With its strong defense of philosophical ambition, *Fides et Ratio* illustrates this shift. Where the old Syllabus of Errors in the nineteenth century warned against the danger of rationalism and rejected attempts to build an empire of reason, John Paul II observes in contemporary culture a "widespread skepticism," an "undifferentiated pluralism," and a "lack of confidence in truth" that encourages us to think that "everything is reduced to opinion." In a word, we seem not smugly certain about our possession of truth; we are instead afraid of truth.

This atmosphere has not come upon us from without. It is the program of a significant segment of contemporary intellectual life. The contemporary Italian philosopher Gianni Vattimo, for instance, argues that the present lack of confidence in truth, far from a problem for Christianity, is a sign of the millennial triumph of the gospel. The faithful must resist the "metaphysical temptation" and "authoritarian interpretation" of the Bible.

Against this "fanaticism and intolerance" (which Vattimo associates with John Paul II), we should embrace "the weakening of the idea of truth," for it leads to the freedom to live in tolerant harmony with others. "Christian existence," Vattimo sums up in antidogmatic flourish, does not "allow itself to be defined by any positive content on the plane of faith or by any positive obligation on the moral plane (this too would be a form of idolatry, of Antichrist)." The evaporation of visible Christian belief and practice constitutes the final triumph of charity. To assert nothing as true is the great *kenosis* Christ came to teach us. If this sounds like a highbrow version of the editorial written by my local UCC minister, that's because it is.

By Guarino's analysis, Vattimo, along with such figures as Derrida, Foucault, Lyotard, Baudrillard, Rorty, and others reflect what he takes to be the defining feature of contemporary philosophy: nonfoundationalism. These figures may differ widely on particulars, but they are unified in their rejection of "metanarratives" and the "tyranny of globalizing presence." In the more sober vocabulary of Richard Bernstein, among postmodernists "there has been a prevailing suspicion that the appeal to reason functions as a deceptive mask for ruthless power; that all appeals to universality are disguises for violently suppressing cultural, ethnic, and religious differences."

To be a nonfoundationalist, then, is to defend humanity by denying truth. The position may be accompanied by obscure literary-theoretical vocabulary, but the underlying logic is not that difficult to discern. As my local UCC pastor suggested in his editorial, we overcome violence by eliminating appeals to universality. We resist ruthless power by pulling off the deceptive mask of reason. We blunt oppressive claims by criticizing the idea of objective truth. We encourage tolerance and cooperation by affirming that all are entitled to their own truths. Everybody can live together in peace if nobody insists too strongly on anything in particular.

It is clear from the title of his book that Guarino thinks Christian faith antithetical to nonfoundationalism, and he argues that the Christian intellectual should seek foundations. At minimum, affirming the Nicene Creed entails at least tacit commitments to truths both universal ("for us and for our salvation") and particular ("crucified under Pontius Pilate").

These commitments have, as he puts it, "certain theoretical exigencies." A person who believes Christian doctrine may not have a theory of truth, a metaphysical account, or a theory of language, but the substance of faith points in the direction of a "strengthening" of the idea of truth, and not, as Vattimo endorses, a "weakening." In its largest sense, then, Guarino's affirmation of foundations amounts to encouraging philosophical inquiries that explain and encourage the truth-asserting dynamic of Christian doctrine.

Guarino is certainly right about the "theoretical exigencies" of Christian faith, and he is not alone. In *Fides et Ratio*, John Paul II consistently emphasizes the "universal elements of knowledge," "the truth of being," and "the search for ultimate truth," and he encourages the renewal of the perennial philosophy that seeks to discern the "fundamental truths about human life." Each phrase can be associated with the basic vocation of the intellect: to found or base human life in the goodness and beauty of truth rather than fantasy, self-deception, or lazy presumption. The strengthening of foundations does not entail loyalty to a particular philosophical system. "The Church has no

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philosophy of her own," John Paul II writes, "nor does she canonize any one particular philosophy in preference to others." However, Christian faith does endorse a philosophical optimism and ambition on behalf of truth. The exhortation "Be not afraid!" includes shedding the postmodern fear of the power of truth.

Thus, when Guarino engages postmodern thinkers such as Derrida or Vattimo, the issue is straightforward. The classical Christian approach treats the perennial quest for foundations or basic truths as a project both intrinsically humanizing and broadly supportive of the life of faith. In contrast, the postmodern project sees the desire for foundations as a terrible impulse that encourages power seeking, leads to social conformity, and culminates in violence. "Such an approach," writes Guarino, "can only with difficulty be reconciled to an understanding of Christian doctrine that is, in some significant measure, enduring, universal, and normative." Difficult, I would say, to the point of impossible.

If we go back to the crucial question of what current philosophy has to offer, it seems our answer must be largely negative. This is bad news. Not only do the prophets of difference and the end-of-metaphysics crowd seem to contribute to the dehumanizing nihilism of contemporary culture, they also provide little other than resistance to the work of any theology committed to the truth of doctrine. But do Hegel and Heidegger, Derrida and Deleuze, Vico and Vattimo, exhaust the options? Are there currents of modern philosophy that affirm the power of reason, support the universality of truth, and defend the objectivity of knowledge? Or, to use Guarino's term, is there a form of contemporary philosophy that seeks foundations?

The answer is, I think, yes. It is called analytic philosophy, and it dominates the English-speaking world. Yet it seems invisible. For all his welcome defense of doctrinal truth, on this point Guarino is typical. He mentions some analytic philosophers, but only to drop them immediately. Like so much of contemporary theology, a great deal of effort is spent reading and analyzing the tradition of thought that informs Vattimo, while the analytic philosophers whose work is filled with foundational words such as "real" and "universal" and "fact" and "true" go unnoticed. The blindness begs for explanation.

In the first place, the language of foundations can certainly create confusion. Most analytic philosophers would describe themselves as nonfoundationalists, but they would also be amused by the postmodern description of reason and argument as a mask for power. Totalitarian governments tend to silence reasoned arguments, not encourage them as tools for domination. The equation of universal truth with violence would strike them as absurd. In what sense does the principle of noncontradiction lead to colonialism or gender inequality? How does $2 + 2 = 4$ suppress religious differences? In Guarino's terms, the analytic philosophers seem to be self-described nonfoundationalists who fall into the foundationalist camp.

The apparent contradiction comes about because, for mainstream English-speaking philosophy, foundationalism and nonfoundationalism do not have a large-scale, metaphysical meaning. The narrower meaning of foundationalism stems from the work of W.V. Quine, perhaps the most important figure in twentieth-century English-speaking philosophy.

Quine was trained in a school of philosophy called Logical Positivism. That school set about to vindicate the authority of modern scientific dogma by demonstrating that scientific dogma could be grounded in (or "founded upon") logical truths and experimentally verifiable facts. It is not just that the Logical Positivists believed in and sought truth. They had a specific theory, a foundationalist theory, about what allows us to be confident or certain that our beliefs are true. By the 1950s, however, Quine had become convinced that the foundationalist project of Logical Positivism was misguided.

His insights were roughly as follows. First, Quine came to see that we convey material claims about the world in human language that participates in the complexities of human cultures. For this reason, it is very difficult to move from timeless logical formulae to ordinary sentences without a great deal of slippage. This was his critique of the direct extension of analytic truth into ordinary language. Second, like many others working on the philosophical question of experimental verification (the so-called problem of induction), Quine came to see that the fixed facts in syllogisms are not the same as the flux of phenomena. This undermined the empiricist notion of synthetic truth.

Quine's demolition of what he called "the two dogmas of empiricism" made him a nonfoundationalist in epistemology. He did not think merely that Logical Positivism is mistaken in certain technical ways. His analysis convinced him that we cannot explain the truthfulness of our scientific teachings (or any other teachings) by reducing them to something more foundational. We cannot test or verify beliefs by breaking them down into more-primitive pieces such as logical truths and sense experiences.

For some casual readers of Quine, this conclusion is equivalent to saying that truth does not exist. There are obvious overlaps between Quine's thinking and Heidegger's to encourage this reading. The criticism of analytic truth amounts to a recognition of the historicity of

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language. The criticism of synthetic truth roughly follows Heidegger's gnomic descriptions of the way in which "onto-theology" leads to a "forgetfulness of being" through a false formalizing of particularity. So we might conclude (as Richard Rorty has done) that truth is a fiction and that claims of universality and truth function only to "stop the conversation."

But neither Quine nor the mainstream of American philosophy that was so influenced by his work agrees. It is a fallacy to say that because we cannot prove our beliefs by way of the twin foundations of analytic truth and synthetic truth, we therefore cannot know truth at all. It is even more foolish to say that only what we can prove or explain exerts influence in our lives. Our inability to understand how the mind comes to know things no more makes truth vacuous and empty than the ancient inability to explain gravity rendered it inoperative.

Quine made neither mistake. He distinguished between epistemology and ontology. How we can verify or prove what we know is different from what we can with confidence say about the nature of mind, the world, and truth. This allowed Quine to be modestly skeptical about the capacity of philosophy to say helpful things about *how* we know. But in the realm of ontology (broadly understood as inquiry into the way things are) he went on to initiate an extraordinary period of creativity.

In fact, the two are linked, for the foundationalist project in epistemology (of which Logical Positivism was but one particularly vigorous form) had a tendency to confuse truth with certainty, and this greatly constrained the scope of philosophy. Thus, Quine was a nonfoundationalist with respect to epistemology, but he certainly did not think that truth was socially constructed, or that the universality of scientific teaching entails an oppressive suppression of difference, or that logic is an expression of the will-to-power. In Guarino's terms, Quine was an unrepentant foundationalist. He thought that good arguments should compel the mind and that a responsible intellectual should set out to discern what is and is not true about the world.

A loyal Quinean might find the confusion created by the different uses of foundationalism and nonfoundationalism a frustrating example of theologians neglecting proper use of terms, but Guarino is in good company. In *Fides et Ratio*, John Paul II treats foundations in the same robust, metaphysical fashion. And in any event, the confusion created by such terms as foundationalism and nonfoundationalism is not that great. We can sort out the issues and see that Quine was skeptical about the ability of philosophy to explain why particular beliefs are justly held as true (thus nonfoundational in epistemology)—while, at the same time, he did not think that truth and the human ability to know truth are illusory or sources of violence and oppression (thus foundational in the more robust, metaphysical sense). Guarino says as much in a very brief digression of his own.

So why then does Guarino neglect Quine and the analytic tradition? The neglect is even more striking when we think about what is actually going on in the academy. Aren't the governing sentiment and thrust of analytic philosophy—its logic-chopping, its punctiliousness about argument, and its tireless defense of reason—obvious to even the most casual observer? The opposition to the spirit of postmodern philosophy is evident.

Consider, further, Guarino's reiteration of John Paul II's call for a *prima philosophia* with "metaphysical 'range' or 'horizon.'" We are living in a period when continental philosophers and literary critics are proclaiming the death of metaphysics. Yet the American Philosophical Association sponsors sessions on metaphysics at its annual meetings.

Still further, Guarino follows John Paul II in calling for a restored confidence in truth. While it is a dogma of postmodernism that truth is socially constructed, nearly all contemporary Americans who do analytic philosophy hold a realist view of truth. Relativists are nearly impossible to find in American departments of philosophy—unless, of course, those departments are recusant and organize themselves around such continental figures as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Derrida. So, again, why the neglect?

I do not mean to single out Guarino. *Foundations of Systematic Theology* is, I think, typical of contemporary theology. Catholic or not, in the main it cannot see the apparent renewal of philosophy in the English-speaking world. Alvin Plantinga, Peter van Inwagen, William Alston, and the rest of the Society of Christian Philosophers can meet for twenty years, but theology remains blind to ways in which analytic philosophy can contribute to the "evangelization of culture" and renewal of theology that John Paul II—and now Benedict XVI—identify as singular imperatives in the West.

There are exceptions. Bruce Marshall's *Trinity and Truth* assesses and reformulates the remarkable new philosophical resources developed since Quine lead analytic philosophy out of its epistemological captivity. Marshall's colleague, William Abraham, works out of the analytic tradition. There are self-described analytic Thomists. The late Donald Mackinnon helped his theological students see the value of analytic philosophy. But by and large, these figures and trends are eccentric to the main body of contemporary theology. The overwhelming majority of theologians today sift through

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Heidegger and his philosophical children and grandchildren to try to find useable material.

This impulse is understandable but misguided. Heidegger and his progeny have developed into a tradition unsuited to the traditional role of philosophy has played in Christian intellectual life. It has little to offer for the task John Paul II thought so pressing, to renew confidence in reason, and it does more harm than good in the technical work of systematic theology.

What explains the peculiar loyalty of contemporary theology to inauspicious postmodern trends? Here we need to think clearly about how and why Western philosophy broke into two very distinct streams: the continental and the analytic. In antiquity, philosophy was a form of theology, or, to use Pierre Hadot's phrase, philosophy was a way of life, organized around doctrines about ultimate truth coordinated with moral and spiritual disciplines of the soul.

After the triumph of Christianity in late antiquity, the meaning of philosophy changed. The proclamation of Christ provided Christendom with "the Way." The Church supplied the crucial doctrines about ultimate truth, as well as disciplines to cure the soul. In this context, philosophy took on a more modest role. It provided logical training and a conceptually precise vocabulary for Christian thought, expressed the perennial longing of the human heart for the infinite, and served as a clearinghouse for natural knowledge. This subordinate role is the essence of scholasticism.

St. Thomas described scholastic philosophy with the analogy of the handmaiden. Its key feature is not a commitment to Platonism, Aristotelianism, or any other set of positions. Nor is scholasticism simply a technical or formalized system of thought. Modern science is both, but it is not a form of scholasticism. Instead, a philosophy "of the schools" is a way of thinking about logic, language, metaphysics, and morals that helps the scholar with his basic task: to understand and expound material truths discerned by other means. A scholastic philosophy does not so much sing about the meaning of life as prepare for, clarify, order, support, and clear away interruptions to the song sung according to another score.

In the Christian tradition scholastic philosophy has flourished. The Cappadocians in the fourth century turned Platonism into a scholastic philosophy in order to develop their theological synthesis. St. Anselm in the late eleventh century had a different style, but he too was a Platonist, though in an even more formal, deracinated sense. Aristotle looms large in later scholasticism, perhaps because so much of his work was already highly formal and suited for scholastic use and because the material elements of his thought were congenial to the emerging observational and descriptive ethos of medieval natural philosophy. Yet, there was never just one scholastic philosophy: Scholars debated; new resources were adopted; systems were developed. What remained constant and what made all this work "of the schools" was its function or role. Philosophy operated as a supporting intellectual practice within a settled consensus about the truth of Christian doctrine.

What makes modern philosophy modern has been its response to the collapse of the Christian consensus among European elites. In the wake of that collapse, the *philosophes* of the Enlightenment were forced toward new conceptions of philosophy and its practice. Philosophy could no longer work out problems and develop avenues of speculation under the umbrella of doctrinal truth.

As Descartes observed in his *Discourse on Method*, the old systems had become intellectually ineffective. "I firmly believed," he confessed of his decision to break with inherited methods, "that in this way I should better succeed in the conduct of my life, than if I built only upon the old foundations." Extending the metaphor of foundations, Descartes wrote that we need to "pull down the house of knowledge that, upon closer inspection, is structurally unsound and at the point of collapse." In its place philosophy was to construct a new and better house of knowledge on firm foundations.

Textbooks often divide the new initiative of modern philosophy into two streams: British Empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume) and Continental Rationalism (Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz). There was a division in the development of modern philosophy, but this textbook distinction is jejune. The real difference concerns the practice of philosophy, not its empiricist or rationalist doctrines. We need to understand this difference if we are to understand and assess the philosophical preferences and blindnesses of modern theology.

For one half of the modern tradition, the fundamental scholastic role was retained. What changed was the queen that it served. For figures such as Locke and Hume, the emergence of modern science allowed it to rotate into the position once held by theology. The same holds for most of the subsequent English-speaking tradition of philosophy. Quine was a scholastic philosopher in precisely this sense. He accepted the authority of modern scientific inquiry, and, to use Guarino's terminology, he explored the "theoretical exigencies" of the scientific project, not the least of which are the universality and objectivity of its teachings.

This scholastic form is not limited to the English-speaking world. Edmund Husserl's phenomenological

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project is highly formal and lends itself to scholastic applications, as Robert Sokolowski demonstrates. John Paul II championed the potential of personalism in his career as a philosopher. The school of Logical Positivism that so influenced the young Quine emerged out of the so-called Vienna Circle.

In fact, the history of modern philosophy is so interesting and complex because it contains figures who have tried to take various modern doctrines and methods and return them to the older scholastic role. Malebranche attempted as much with Cartesianism, which was why he and Antoine Arnauld could conduct a voluminous debate about the operation of grace in the form of detailed treatises on ideas, perception, and mental representation. Berkeley advanced a strikingly counterintuitive thesis about reality (the "immaterialist hypothesis," as he called it) in order to pull early modern analysis of knowledge back into a theological orbit.

The early-twentieth-century Belgian Jesuit Joseph Maréchal developed what was called "transcendental Thomism," and he convinced a generation of Catholic theologians, most notably Karl Rahner, that modern philosophical analysis of human subjectivity could function in the place of Aristotelian metaphysics as the scholastic idiom for modern theology.

All these complexities and exceptions duly noted, the cultural fact remains fairly simple and clear. The main form of contemporary philosophical scholasticism is analytic philosophy, and it is almost entirely written in English. It announces by its name the secondary or handmaidenly role it is to play: not revealing or disclosing truth but analyzing the exigencies of what is taught or disclosed.

Indeed, not a few undergraduates become disappointed by this basic and defining characteristic. They want revelations and epiphanies, but analytic philosophers seem always to be operating in the shadows, not saying immediately what is right or wrong but discussing the concepts of right and wrong so that one might approach moral questions with clarity and responsibility, not announcing what is true but investigating the nature of truth. One hears a common complaint, "empty formalism," and it makes my point. Second-order technical discussions are the bread and butter of scholasticism, and students have complained of the apparent existential dryness since the days of Plato's Academy.

Because analytic philosophy is a scholasticism that has shifted loyalties from theology to science, most modern theologians have thought it a godless antagonist. One needs to read only a little of Bertrand Russell to see that he was both very smart and very opposed to Christian doctrines. A.J. Ayer serenely dismissed metaphysics, ethics, and religion as sentiments wrongly retailed as propositions. I do not know what Quine's religious views were, but he certainly had no more place for God in his philosophy than does modern science. Add the verbal aggressiveness characteristic of analytic philosophers, an intellectual arrogance that quickly dismisses as fools those uninitiated into the specialized vocabulary, and, let's be honest, the natural human impatience with technical arguments (that old "empty formalism" complaint), and it is easy to see why modern theology would turn elsewhere.

But how has the other tradition of modern philosophy developed? By and large, the so-called continental tradition takes the cultural decline of theology not as occasion to find another source of truth to serve but as warrant for shedding the scholastic role altogether. By the time Hegel wrote at the beginning of the nineteenth century, the new role of the philosopher had become clear: He is to recover his original, pre-Christian vocation as oracle and prophet.

In *The Phenomenology of Spirit*, Hegel provides an account of the "genius of Spirit." Spirit, says Hegel, alienated itself into the division of labor characteristic of Christendom: formal scholastic philosophy in its "abstract universality" as against the "picture-thinking" of the Bible. The collapse of Christendom is thus a dialectical necessity, and the new, synthetic work of philosophy is the "labor of the concept" that marries reason (the old formalism of scholastic argument) with reality (the "picture-thinking" concreteness of the religious imagination).

However one reads the details of Hegel's notion of dialectical thinking, it is clear that philosophy is no longer a handmaiden. It must take responsibility for the act of creating the future for Western culture by thinking through its postclerical, postdoctrinal identity. Although Marx rebelled against Hegel's intellectualism, his great dictum—that philosophy is no longer to understand the world but to change it—accords with the shift to the prophetic role. To use Heidegger's later description, the philosopher is to be "a shepherd of being."

This stream of modern philosophy is no more homogeneous in doctrine than the analytic tradition. Hegel, Marx, and Heidegger have different views on different topics. But if we step back and think about the role or function of philosophy, we can see the similarity. As an intellectual practice, this branch of modern philosophy organizes itself around the task of discerning and proclaiming the deep meaning that is necessary to breathe life into a Western culture that has lost its confidence in the power of Christian teaching. Such a role fundamentally differs from the develop-

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ment of so much of English-speaking philosophy, which agrees about the end of Christendom—but does not wish to link analysis with proclamation and thus does not ascend to the role of prophet and priest. This is why the most casual student of philosophy can recognize that Friedrich Nietzsche is doing something very different with his mind than is John Stuart Mill.

The prophetic trajectory of development intensifies in postmodern philosophy. The style of postmodern thought is given over to messianic projects of social and personal transformation that are based upon vatic formulas. Guarino recounts the stock phrases of critique: "theoretical coronation of the whole," "tyranny of globalizing presence," "release the truth police." Postmodern prescriptions are less boldly enameled with metaphor: "apologetics of the accidental," "present the absent," "keep the conversation going."

In all of this a student of the history of philosophy hears echoes of the aphoristic style of Parmenides and Heraclites. My point is not that Derrida and Lyotard are disciples of the pre-Socratics. I mean, rather, that the rhetoric of contemporary continental thought signals its return to the deeply religious and theological ambitions of ancient philosophy.

Like seeks like. Bertrand Russell repels contemporary theologians, not only in his atheism but also in his highly formal approach to intellectual problems. In contrast, those theologians gravitate to modern and postmodern continental philosophy, but not because it is particularly congenial or useful for expounding classical doctrine. (As Guarino's sober assessment concludes, by and large it is not.) Rather, theology turns toward continental philosophy *because it has become a form of theology*. All too aware of the collapse of Christendom, contemporary Christian theologians are reassured by the familiarity of the idiom: "They are talking about the Big Questions, just like us."

The impulse is understandable but perilous, and not just because the evolution of continental thought, like the European culture it seeks to interpret and shape, is now accelerating in a more explicitly post-Christian direction. Ever since the collapse of Christendom among European elites, theology has found truth a site of intense contest. The critics of dogma have been fierce, and their arguments have drawn heavily (if not justly) on the authority of modern science. In this situation, the continental tradition's prophetic structure can seem a safe refuge. Better to argue over what it means to be modern than to struggle over truth.

Modern liberal Protestant theology was shaped by the decision to shift from truth to meaning. Friedrich Schleiermacher effected the change with a theory of doctrine that turns on its ability to evoke a feeling of absolute dependence. Catholic theology fought over truth for most of the modern period (hence, a "Syllabus of Errors" rather than a "List of Unhelpful Theological Metaphors"), but most liberal Catholic theology since Vatican II has followed liberal Protestantism in the shift from truth to meaning.

And make no mistake, the kind of philosophy one adopts can help or hinder this shift. This is why traditional Thomism was rejected by the progressives, and why someone like Vattimo is not altogether unwelcome. The weakening of truth may seem attractive to theologians anxious about their status in today's universities.

Because of its legacy as a scholastic philosophy in the service of modern science, the analytic tradition is foundational in the larger sense. Given the postmodern flight from truth, how much longer can theology ignore this resource?

This is not to say that the continental tradition is bereft of importance. All contemporary Western intellectuals should read Hegel, if only to know the source of so many of our distinctively modern mental habits. Nietzsche was a brilliant critic of the mediocre liberal humanism of his day. Heidegger's distinction between Being and beings has paid dividends in Jean-Luc Marion's analysis of philosophical idolatry and defense of divine transcendence. Guarino points out the ways in which the continental tradition has provided a disciplined vocabulary for talking about the historicity of the gospel.

Neither do I advocate neglecting the postmoderns. Paul Griffiths, in an essay in the June/July 2005 issue of FIRST THINGS, demonstrates that a close reading of contemporary continental figures can help us read the signs of the times, and, as he argues, it may be the case that the dying words of modernity are an inchoate request for baptism. If so, Christian intellectuals have a religious duty to listen and respond.

Further, I do not want to give the impression that the great scholastic traditions that antedate modernity should be discarded. One need read only John Haldane and John O'Callaghan to see that the Thomist tradition both corrects and takes nourishment from contemporary analytic philosophy. Nor do I wish theologians to run to Hilary Putnam and Saul Kripke as oracles and sages. They, too, have their ignorances and prejudices. In any event, in relation to philosophy, theology should learn and discuss and correct, not subserve.

But I do think it crushingly obvious that in contemporary Western culture the English-speaking, analytic tradition in philosophy holds out the most promise as a suitable partner for theology in the crucial jobs of strengthening the doctrinal backbone of theology and restoring a culture of truth.

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Today, postmodern continental philosophy is dominated by rhetoric that urges us not to make the move toward something so threatening as truth. All is to be kept plastic and open so that we might play on the surfaces. In the terminology of Guarino and John Paul II, postmodern philosophy is more than nonfoundational: It is antifoundational and antidogmatic at its core.

In contrast, analytic philosophers have produced a great body of literature about human identity, the nature of truth and the concept of knowledge, the good and the nature of evil, what counts as real and how consciousness is related to matter, and more. This literature is developed with extensive arguments and in a scholastic mode open to Christian use.

And not just open but positively congenial in its basic structure. Analytic philosophy has often been antagonistic toward the old queen of the sciences, theology. To this day, most who would fashion themselves analytic are also atheistic. Moreover, there can be little doubt that a long tradition of serving science has calcified the concepts and distorted the ontology of this modern scholasticism (a problem that has not been adequately addressed by Plantinga and the rest of the Society of Christian Philosophers). I do not doubt that there are many long, complex, and obscure arguments that must be made in order to shape analytic philosophy into a truly Christian project.

But the crucial point is not that analytic philosophy provides a useful array of doctrines and a handy set of principles for theology. What matters most is the underlying loyalty to truth that it encourages. No analytic philosopher, however antagonistic toward Christianity, wrote anything that provided support for the way of thinking that informs my local UCC pastor and his call for religion without dogma—indeed, for life without truth.

This is because analytic philosophy is unequivocally and fundamentally a force for the strengthening of truth, not its weakening. If John Paul II is right about the dangers of the postmodern fear of truth and the urgency of the Church's need to contribute to restoring a culture of truth, this dynamic of strengthening is invaluable. FT

Metaphysical Song

First principle,
Being's pure act,
Infinite cause
Of finite fact;

Essential being,
Beyond our sight,
Without which, nothing,
Neither love nor light,

Only through You
Love's infinite power
Brings into being
Atom and flower.

Only through You,
Infinite light
Illuminates
Both seen and sight,

Beckoning us—
Alert, awake—
Along the way
That we must take,

Resting in this:
The journey's true,
First, midst, and last,
Grounded in You.

Helen Pinkerton

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Iraq: Then & Now

George Weigel

Even as history continues to unfold—and explode—in ancient Mesopotamia, the Iraq War has already proven itself the most consequential international political event of the post-Cold War period.

It changed, and continues to change, the political, psychological, and perhaps even theological landscape of the Middle East. It drove great wedges between America and many of its oldest continental European allies for a time. It brought the Anglo-American "special relationship" to a high point of cooperation not seen for decades. It strengthened the United States' strategic partnership with Australia. And it suggested the possibility of important alliances with the new democracies of central and eastern Europe, even as it likely precipitated new thinking in emerging powers like India and China.

Meanwhile, it exposed in painful detail the incapacities and corruptions of the United Nations, which turned out to be an accomplice, witting or not, in Saddam Hussein's efforts to escape international sanctions and recommence his quest for regional hegemony. And it roiled the domestic politics of the United States and western Europe as they had not been shaken since the nuclear-freeze demonstrations of the early 1980s.

Yet even as it sent political shockwaves throughout the West, the Iraq War was also creating conditions for the possibility of something actually resembling "politics" in Iraq itself, as well as in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, the Gulf emirates, Pakistan, and perhaps even Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Syria. Moreover, the often bloody drama of the postwar transition to responsive and responsible government in Iraq—a society that suffered for thirty years under the lash of a regime that rivaled those of Pol Pot and Kim Il Sung for viciousness—has guaranteed that the seismic shocks generated by the Iraq War will affect world politics for years, and likely decades, to come.

The Iraq War has also had a dramatic impact in the world of ideas. In policy documents like the 2002 *National Security Strategy of the United States* and this past November's *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq*, the Bush administration—convinced that the attacks of September 11 defined a pivotal moment in world politics—has laid down a sharp challenge to certain well-entrenched ideas about the nature of "realism" in international affairs, even as its policy on the ground has challenged numerous conventions of post-World War II international public life.

Perhaps most dramatically, the Bush administration, in its effort to define a more truly "realistic" approach to world politics, was willing to challenge the seemingly settled consensus that the Middle East was a region so politically volatile, economically important, and culturally retrograde that it could only be "managed," never transformed.

All this has led, in turn, to a remarkable reversal, even an inversion, in the geography of ideas in American public life. Who would have imagined, fifty years ago, that a passion for the democratic transformation of the world would find its primary American political home in (at least some) conservative circles? Who would have imagined, fifty years ago, that much of American liberalism, rather than making the moral and political case for deposing a genocidal maniac, would find itself in *de facto* alliance with the status-quo forces in world politics? It is impossible to know with any confidence where this dramatic alteration in the political location of great ideas will take the United States, or the world. But if ideas really do have consequences, the impact is likely to be significant.

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In a related realm of ideas, the Iraq War crystallized the tensions that had been apparent in just war thinking for the past several decades. The debates before and after the brief ground-combat phase of the war have demonstrated that contemporary distortions of classic just war thinking—in particular, confusions over the nature of the classic *ad bellum* or "war-decision" criteria and their relation to one another—continue to affect the judgment of many of the religious leaders, philosophers, and theologians who are presumed to be the among the custodians of this venerable method of moral reasoning. No comprehensive survey of opinion in these quarters has been made, to my knowledge. But if it were, it's a safe bet that such a survey would find that the overwhelming majority of Western religious leaders thought the Iraq War imprudent at best and unjust at worst, a judgment for which they would have found ample support among most contemporary just war philosophers and theologians.

In my view, that judgment—that the Iraq War was an unjust war according to classic just war criteria—is mistaken. Demonstrating that does not require the moral theorist to become an apologist for American policy in Iraq. As the Bush administration has conceded, it made mistakes, some of them serious, in its appraisal of likely post-Saddam politics in Iraq, in its approaches to the pacification of the country, and in aspects of its counterinsurgency strategy.

What demonstrating the intellectual impossibility of the current consensus against the Iraq War among many just war theorists and religious leaders does require is a willingness to think through the classic just war criteria in a *classic* way: that is, by understanding those criteria as a demanding yet supple framework for morally informed prudential political reasoning about the achievement of morally worthy political ends through the means of proportionate and discriminate armed force.

The just war tradition is a tradition in the service of *tranquillitas ordinis*, which was St. Augustine's definition of peace. That is, the just war tradition is a method of moral reasoning about the use of certain kinds of means toward the end of a peace that is composed of justice, security, and freedom. This link between moral reasoning and the noblest ends of politics is what gives just war thinking its *gravitas*—and its tether to the world in which statesmen must make real decisions with life-and-death consequences. Most religious leaders, moral philosophers, and theologians who opposed the Iraq War continue to insist that theirs is the "peace" position. But it is precisely the link between moral reasoning and the politics of peace in a conflict-ridden world that the putative custodians of the just war tradition seem to have largely forgotten.

Some of their critique bordered on the risible. A lengthy report by a working group of the Church of England's House of Bishops spent several pages bemoaning the alleged impact of Hal Lindsey's *Late Great Planet Earth* and Tim LaHaye's *Left Behind* novels on what the bishops deplore as aggressive American nationalism and the Bush administration's unilateralism. Then there were the ninety-five United Methodist bishops who publicly repented their "complicity" in the "unjust and immoral" invasion and occupation of Iraq—even though these allegedly complicit clergymen had loudly opposed the war for years before March 2003. Dr. Konrad Raiser, general secretary of the World Council of Churches, simply pronounced the war "immoral, illegal, and ill-advised," and, oddly for a German whose country might still be living under the totalitarian jackboot, concluded that "wars cannot be won, only peace can."

Other critiques exposed the rather large ambitions of some intellectuals. Father Drew Christiansen, the Jesuit now editing *America* magazine, proposed that the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* be revised in light of the Iraq War, so that it would be clear that a new shadow government of theologians, religious leaders, and activists shared public officials' responsibility for determining when the conditions for a just use of armed force had been met. Where that might lead was illustrated by the Catholic bishops of the United States, who, in a letter to President Bush in September 2002, framed the just war criteria "so restrictively and prejudicially as to make [it] virtually impossible" for the criteria to be met, as one prominent just war scholar put it.

The critics were not beyond misrepresenting the facts. The ethicist Mark Allman, among many others, wrote that "Pope John Paul II . . . condemned the U.S. invasion of Iraq as unjust." Yet for all his vigorous opposition to a military solution to the problem of disarming Iraq, and notwithstanding the somewhat overheated rhetoric of various Vatican officials in early 2003, the late pope never used the word "unjust" to describe the war—perhaps in part because he knew, as Professor Allman evidently did not, that Catholic Church leaders in Iraq had thanked American diplomatic representatives for liberating their country.

There was, in fact, little sustained analytical critique of the Bush administration's policy from a just war point of view. Even such normally sober philosophers as Michael Walzer and John Langan, S.J., failed to make detailed critical arguments in support of their claim that the Iraq War failed the test of just war analysis. Professor Walzer, writing in an Internet edition of the journal *Dissent* in March 2003, declared: "America's war is unjust. Though disarming Iraq is a legitimate goal,

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morally and politically, it is a goal that we could almost certainly have achieved with measures short of full-scale war. . . . At this time, the threat that Iraq posed could have been met with something less than the war we are now fighting. And a war fought before its time is not a just war."

Addressing the Pacific Section of the Society of Christian Ethics, Father Langan averred that "both the general policy of preventive war advocated in the 2002 *National Security Strategy* and the exercises in deception and self-deception which led up to the invasion of Iraq constitute an unacceptable aberration from the concern for maintaining international order and for building a peaceful world of free and equal states which has been at the heart of U.S. foreign policy over the last century"—and then proposed that the assembled ethicists and their colleagues issue a "repudiation of those politicians and their advisors who brought the war about."

Insofar as one can tease an argument out of what amounted to an array of sometimes confused and often confusing assertions, the just war case against the Iraq War went something like this: Granted that Saddam Hussein ran an odious regime that brutalized the Iraqi people and that, rearmed, posed a grave security threat to the Middle East (and perhaps beyond), it was unnecessary tactically and unjust morally to depose him and affect regime change by means of an Anglo-American invasion and occupation. The United Nations' sanctions had Saddam "in the box"; maintaining sanctions (or perhaps intensifying them, which was Michael Walzer's proposal, echoed by the U.S. Catholic bishops) would either keep Saddam in that box or would lead to his eventual overthrow. Moreover, to invade Iraq without an explicit mandate from the United Nations violated international law and further weakened the already delicate fabric of international public life.

That seems to be the gist of the opponents' case. In response, let me offer a just war defense of the moral probity of the decision to remove Saddam by armed force, with specific focus on the classic *ius ad bellum* criteria that are the intellectual and moral core of the just war tradition. Such a defense will, I hope, demonstrate the unpersuasiveness of the assertions and judgments implicit in the unarticulated just war critique of the war that has so dominated the moral rhetoric in both America and Europe.

Let us begin with the question of sovereign authority. As James Turner Johnson, the world's premier historian of the just war tradition, has argued endlessly (and, it seems, rather fruitlessly), the just war method of moral reasoning begins with the legitimate sovereign's responsibility to defend and promote *tranquillitas ordinis*, the peace of order.

In other words, the just war tradition is, first and foremost, a tradition of prudential political reasoning about good political ends, informed by the natural moral law; the natural law dimension of just war reasoning also creates the possibility of a public moral grammar for the public deliberation of public goods. The just war tradition begins not with casuistry about this or that particular military or nonmilitary option, and not with a set of hurdles that moral theorists set before statesmen, but with the legitimate sovereign's moral obligation to defend and promote right order. Thus, in the just war tradition, war is not an abandonment of the moral realm; war *is* a moral category—war is the use of proportionate and discriminate armed force by legitimate public authority in order to secure certain worthy public goods. Anything else is brigandage, in one form or another.

Although this moral-political starting point for just war thinking—the defense and pursuit of peace by legitimate sovereign authority—has been largely forgotten by many of those who speak to and from the just war tradition, the question of the location of sovereign authority for legitimate warmaking was, in fact, one of the questions at issue in the claim that the United Nations alone could authorize the resort to armed force to compel Saddam Hussein to comply with the obligation of disarmament laid on him by the 1991 ceasefire agreement that followed the first Gulf War and by a host of subsequent resolutions. All authority to make war in the world had been remanded to the United Nations—or so the assertion went.

That assertion raises any number of questions. If we are reasoning in classic just war terms, the first question to be asked is whether the United Nations in fact constitutes a sovereign authority. Some would undoubtedly answer yes, but a far more persuasive case can be made that the United Nations, as it is presently structured and as it currently functions, lacks many of the crucial features of sovereignty. Its charter describes it as an organization of sovereign states, not a superstate to which core attributes of national sovereignty have been deputed. Thus it is not at all clear that the state members of the United Nations consider the organization a "sovereign" entity—a suggestion grimly confirmed by the fact that, since 1945, more than twenty million people have been killed in the more than 150 armed conflicts *not* authorized by the United Nations.

Then there is the question of accountability: The present UN system is only weakly accountable to the people of the world, for member-states alone can hold the organization accountable for its policies and prac-

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tices (and frequently fail to do so). Further, when the question turns to the legitimate use of armed force, the United Nations' lack of sovereignty is suggested by the fact that the organization has no military capability of its own and exercises an extremely limited form of command and control over the forces that act in its name. That, in turn, suggests that the United Nations cannot responsibly direct those forces, which is another core characteristic of sovereignty.

To assert, without further ado, that the UN satisfies the attributes of sovereign authority—the core *ad bellum* question with which just war reasoning begins—is to leave the realm of moral reasoning and enter a highly contentious and thoroughly unsettled realm of legal argument. For there is a serious question as to whether the UN charter claims for the organization the monopoly on the legitimate use of force that some claim for it. Article 51 of the charter recognizes that member states possess an "inherent" right of self-defense: If your country is being invaded or attacked—if, in other words, you are the victim of aggression—you do not have to secure the permission of the Security Council or the General Assembly to do something about it. American, British, and continental European scholars have widely different readings of the meaning of Article 51. But this itself suggests that, from a just war point of view, the question is not the controverted and open one of whether the United Nations has been ceded a legal monopoly on the moral and political authority to authorize armed force. The far more decisive moral question raised by Article 51 is, rather, a just cause question: How does one make the judgment that aggression is, indeed, underway?

This is one of the crucial questions that a developed, classic just war analysis must address. How is aggression defined in a world where the minimum requisites of order are threatened by bellicose regimes with weapons of mass destruction, ballistic-missile capability, links to terrorist networks, and no domestic political checks on their leaders' actions? That question and its implications for the question of sovereign authority had to be faced in 2002 and 2003, when sovereign national authorities reached the judgment, but could not persuade the Security Council to accept the judgment, that aggression was indeed underway, if not yet in the classic cross-border sense of the term—and that a proportionate and discriminate military response was not only legitimate but *necessary* as an exercise of the national sovereign's moral responsibility.

Beyond these questions of just war theory, there were the realities of UN practice, which were, to be plain, ugly in the years between the first Gulf War and March 2003. Assertions about the United Nations' singular moral authority to wage war today must contend with the hard facts of the UN's deep corruption, which is now beyond reasonable doubt. It is bad enough when UN "peacekeepers" in Africa become complicit in the sex-trafficking of young girls. Still, any large organization has its share of reprehensible characters whose odious behavior does not call into question the moral legitimacy of the organization as a political actor of consequence.

What does raise that question with respect to the United Nations and Iraq are the recent congressional inquiries and the investigations of the Volcker Commission appointed by Secretary General Kofi Annan, into the United Nations-run Oil-for- Food program in Iraq. These strongly suggest—some would say, decisively prove—that the Security Council process in the debate over Iraq was thoroughly corrupted, with French and Russian diplomats admitting to having been paid off with illegal oil vouchers by the Iraqi regime. It is not unreasonable to believe that others were similarly bribed. Indeed, the United Nations Oil-for-Food program was the crucial component in a colossal swindle in which Saddam Hussein embezzled some $21 billion in oil money over a dozen years.

But there was more, and worse. According to the September 2004 Duelfer Report, the embezzled billions (of which the bulk were from Oil-for-Food) were used by Saddam Hussein both to maintain his regime's economic viability and to sustain his pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. As the Duelfer Report puts it, "The introduction of the Oil-for-Food Program (OFF) in late 1996 was a key turning point for the regime. OFF rescued Baghdad's economy from a terminal decline created by sanctions. The regime quickly came to see that OFF could be corrupted to acquire foreign exchange both to further undermine sanctions and to provide the means to enhance dual-use infrastructure and potential WMD-related development."

The United Nations itself, in other words, was materially complicit in Saddam Hussein's success in running what the *Wall Street Journal* has succinctly called "the largest bribery scheme in the history of the world." And that scheme was not simply aimed at lining the pockets of Saddam, his family, and his Baathist party. It had a strategic purpose: to enable Iraq to break out of the box of the sanctions regime and revive the very weapons programs that it was the stated goal of more than a dozen United Nations resolutions to end. The only people for whom this really was "all about oil" were French, Russian, and Chinese diplomats and their governments, dishonest United Nations bureaucrats, and the Saddam Hussein regime, which used oil to corrupt the United Nations' political process in an unprecedented way.

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All of which reinforces the grave questions about the United Nations as a locus of sovereign authority that classic just war thinking would want to pose, even prior to a sober analysis of the United Nations' current dysfunctionality. In light of these questions and in the wake of the United Nations' performance in the seven years before the Iraq War, the burden of proof lies squarely on those moral theorists who would claim a monopoly on the legitimate use of armed force for an organization that arguably lacks sovereignty, rightly understood; that concedes a legitimate right of self-defense to states in its charter; and that, through the Oil-for-Food program, was the *de facto* financial partner of a tyrant and the agent of its own political corruption.

Another core component of just war theory is the question of just cause. From a classic just war perspective, there were multiple and mutually reinforcing rationales for making the moral judgment that the removal of Saddam Hussein and his regime, and the creation of a new political order in Iraq, satisfied a developed version of the war-decision criterion of "just cause."

The Iraqi regime was in clear violation of more than a dozen United Nations resolutions demanding its disarmament, and, according to those resolutions, the burden of proof was on Saddam Hussein to show that he had in fact disarmed. Absent such proof, the assumption had to be that he had not, with severe consequences to follow. The regime had been a massive violator of human rights for decades, its signature activities having included rape as an instrument of state policy, various grotesque forms of torture, and the use of chemical weapons against its own citizens. The mass graves dug up all over Iraq in the aftermath of the war bore powerful testimony to the fact that Saddam's Iraq was a killing field of systematized brutality and lethality—a model case, some might argue, for "humanitarian intervention" to depose a despotic, murderous regime.

So, too, Saddam's Iraq had long proved itself a threat to regional stability, having conducted a long and bloody war against Iran (with, alas, misguided support from the United States), during which it had used ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. Moreover, Saddam's ambitions to be a new Saladin were well known; the fear that Saddam aroused in his neighbors was only intensified after the 1991 decision to leave him in power, and was evident in efforts by key Persian Gulf leaders in 2002 and 2003 to get from the United States rock-solid assurances that America really would see through regime change in Baghdad this time.

Meanwhile, no serious person doubted that Saddam, who had once harbored such scoundrels as Abu Nidal and Abu Abbas, was still involved with terrorists, including al-Qaeda terrorists. Those convictions have been amply confirmed by documents captured during and after the war, which demonstrate that the Saddam Hussein regime trained hundreds, even thousands, of jihadist terrorists in camps around Iraq in the years immediately preceding the war.

Then there was the Iraqi regime's lust for weapons of mass destruction. Everyone—the Clinton administration, the United Nations, the Russians, the French, the Chinese, the British, and a host of U.S. intelligence agencies—was convinced that Saddam Hussein had retained stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons after the 1991 Gulf War and was actively seeking nuclear-weapons capability. And no small part of the reason the world was convinced that Saddam Hussein retained such weapons was the Iraqi regime's recalcitrant behavior in dealing with international weapons inspectors. American war plans for Iraq assumed that the Iraqi army would use chemical weapons, at least (witness the deployment of expensive protective equipment for U.S. forces).

The Bush administration's stress on weapons of mass destruction as a crucial component of the *casus belli* against the Iraqi regime was based on at least three factors: the administration's sincere conviction that Saddam had a capacity for such weapons and sought to increase it; the belief that Iraq's defiance of the United Nations' disarmament resolutions made the strongest case for military action at the Security Council; and the political needs of British prime minister Tony Blair, who had told the American administration that Iraq's weapons of mass destruction had to be emphasized in order to keep his own Labour back-benchers in line in the House of Commons.

In the event, as the McKay and Duelfer Reports disclosed, Iraq's capability for these weapons had been essentially destroyed after 1991, though Iraq retained the human and technical infrastructure necessary to reconstitute its weapons programs (perhaps with a different mix of capabilities) once it had broken out of the box of sanctions; meanwhile, Saddam refused to comply with the United Nations' disarmament requirements, in order to maintain the fear-driven mystique (and power) that his previous possession and use of weapons of mass destruction had afforded him. The fact that coalition troops did not find caches of such weapons in Iraq points to a serious intelligence failure on the part of nearly every actor of consequence on the world stage, as it underscores both Saddam's duplicity and his megalomania. But does the absence of

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weapons of mass destruction in Iraq in March 2003 fundamentally change the just war calculus?

I suggest that it does not. Prudent statecraft assumed that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction; the debate was over what to do about that. And, as James Q. Wilson has pointed out, whatever else can be said about prewar intelligence failures, we now know for certain than an aggressive Iraqi regime does not have weapons of mass destruction with which to threaten the region and the world. Ensuring the disarmament of Iraq was one facet of the just cause argument in favor of deposing Saddam by military force; that desirable and morally defensible end has been achieved.

The criteria of just cause and sovereign authority intersect on this issue of weapons of mass destruction. Regime change in Iraq had been U.S. policy since the Clinton administration in 1998—because regime change was understood to be the only way to guarantee Iraq's disarmament, end the suffering of its people, and achieve a measure of stability in the Persian Gulf. That judgment was shared by the Bush administration, if now in the radically changed post-September 11 strategic environment, which intensified legitimate concerns that neither the Middle East nor the United States could be safe in a world in which the Saddam Hussein regime remained in power.

Further, by invading Iraq and deposing the Baathist regime, the United States, Great Britain, and their allies were enforcing, *de facto* if not *de iure* (although that too remains a contested legal point), the disarmament resolutions that the United Nations was unwilling or unable to enforce. The fecklessness displayed by both the League of Nations and the great powers when National Socialist Germany militarily reoccupied the Rhineland in 1936 is widely thought to have eroded the foundations of world order in the 1930s—with lethal results. Would a similar fecklessness in the face of United Nations disarmament demands have strengthened world order? It seems very unlikely. And cannot a case be made that, over the long haul, the work of a coalition of the willing to enforce the international consensus embodied in those United Nations resolutions will strengthen the foundations of the peace of order?

By its international and domestic behavior, its weapons capabilities and ambitions, and its stated intentions, the Iraq regime of Saddam Hussein had shown that it constituted, *de facto*, an "aggression underway." Responding to that aggression through a proportionate and discriminate use of armed force was not only morally legitimate, according to classic just war understandings of just cause; it was, reasonable analysts could argue, morally necessary.

We have still to consider the just war criterion of "last resort." Had everything possible been done, short of full-scale war, to achieve the morally worthy ends of peace, security, and freedom in Iraq—and a changed political equation in the Middle East?

Michael Walzer, for example, suggested in late 2002 and early 2003 that Saddam's regime could be contained by expanding the no-fly zones in Iraq to cover the entire country, by robustly supporting the United Nations' weapons inspectors, and by tightening sanctions. Walzer was under no illusions about the wickedness of Saddam's regime—and, like everyone else, was convinced that Saddam had weapons of mass destruction and sought more of them.

Yet Walzer's moral and political realism seems to have failed him in this instance. Three years earlier, in 1999, the sanctions regime against Iraq was already crumbling, with only the United States and Great Britain, among the permanent members of the Security Council, supporting its extension. China, France, and Russia were all seeking ways to ease the sanctions regime into virtual or legal nonexistence. As the Duelfer Report indicated, the combination of tens of billions of dollars from the Oil-for-Food program and the collapsing political support at the United Nations for sanctions led the Iraqi regime to the not-unreasonable conclusion that it was, in fact, about to get out of the box, at which point it could resume its pursuit of weapons of mass destruction.

There is no reason to think that the Walzer proposal for "sanctions-plus" or a "little war" would have commanded support within the Security Council or, if imposed by the United States and Great Britain alone, would have had the desired effect within Iraq. Moreover, the effects of draconian sanctions on Iraq's long-suffering civilian population would have been severe, thus calling that approach into moral question as something ominously close to a siege. In other words, by March 2003 every reasonable option for enforcing Iraqi disarmament short of war had been exhausted.

The debate over "last resort" was also, however, a debate over the Bush administration's doctrine of "preemption," as articulated in its September 2002 *National Security Strategy*. That debate can be located at the intersection of the sovereign authority, just cause, and last resort criteria of a developed classic just war analysis of the preinvasion situation in Iraq.

The tone of *NSS-2002*, with its blunt affirmation of "unprecedented" and "unequaled" American strength and influence in the world, is undoubtedly grating at

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points, perhaps especially on allies. The document's determination to advance a "distinctly American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and our national interests" raises immediate cautions in the mind of anyone schooled by Augustinian realism to recognize that, in politics, even the best intentions will come into conflict with unavoidably imperfect policy options from time to time. Read as a whole, however, *NSS-2002* is neither a sermon nor an exercise in triumphalism but rather a sober-minded attempt to define a morally sound security strategy by which the United States and its allies can advance the cause of the peace of order in the twenty-first century.

According to *NSS-2002*, the strategy of deterrence that saw the free world through to safety in the Cold War is unavailing against terrorist networks and the most extreme rogue states. To rely solely on a "reactive posture" is too dangerous. Thus the first use of military force must be considered an available option under the doctrine of "imminent danger," which international law has recognized "for centuries." While the United States "will not use force in all cases to preempt emerging threats," it "will, if necessary, act preemptively." Such first use of military force will be one of the means by which the United States seeks to defend the order that exists in international public life and to expand the zone of freedom (and hence of order) in the world; other available means include public diplomacy, foreign aid, and coalitional activity with allies whose purposes in the world are the same.

At the time it was issued, and indeed ever since, criticism of *NSS-2002* has focused primarily on its call for preemptive military action—although *NSS-2002* spends far more time discussing cooperative international diplomatic, economic, and political activity in support of the peace of order than it does discussing preemptive military action. Preemption, however, was the strategic "new thing" being proposed in response to the radically altered circumstances of post-September 11 international public life. That, plus the fact that the word "preemption" seemed to imply a settled skepticism about the role of international legal and political institutions in managing conflict, made it inevitable that preemption would be perceived as the centerpiece of *NSS-2002*.

Suppose, however, that *NSS-2002* had adopted language derived more explicitly from the just war tradition—which can indeed imagine the morally legitimate first use of armed force—rather than the language of preemption? Substituting just-war-derived language for "preemption" in *NSS-2002* yields the following, interesting results:

> While the United States will constantly strive to enlist the support of the international community, we will not hesitate to act alone, if necessary, to exercise our right of self-defense by *the first use of armed force* against such terrorists, to prevent them from doing harm against our people and our country. . . .
>
> The United States has long maintained the option of *the first use of armed force* to counter a sufficient threat to our national security. The greater the threat, the greater is the risk of inaction—and the more compelling the case for *the first use of armed force*, even if uncertainty remains as to the time and place of the enemy's attack. To forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if necessary, *engage in the first use of armed force.* The United States will not use force in all cases to *forestall* emerging threats, nor should nations use [our] *first use of armed force* as a pretext for aggression.
>
> We will always proceed deliberately, weighing the consequences of our actions. To support options *involving the first use of armed force*, we will . . . build better, more integrated intelligence capabilities . . . coordinate closely with allies . . . [and] continue to transform our military forces. The purpose of our *first use of armed force* will always be to eliminate a specific threat to the United States or our allies and friends. The reasons for our actions will be clear, the force measured, and the cause just.

Phrased this way, *NSS-2002* emerges more clearly as what I expect its authors intended: an effort to describe a morally serious and politically feasible national-security strategy in which the use of armed force, as one necessary instrument of statecraft, is understood according to the canons of a developed just war tradition. Given the political and media contexts into which *NSS-2002* was launched, however, the sound-bite language of "preemption" readily fed the perception that *NSS-2002* marked a breach with the just war tradition and with the tenets of international law. Using the classic language of the morally responsible first use of armed force would have been truer to the logic of *NSS-2002* and might have helped accelerate needed fresh thinking among just war analysts and churchmen.

James Turner Johnson offered a historical perspective on this facet of the Iraq War debate in these terms:

> Classic statements of the just war idea did not stigmatize first resort to force because their concern was with responding to injustice, however it might be manifest. They did not prioritize defense against armed attack, and certainly did not define just cause in terms of such self-defense, reflecting

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> Augustine's conception of just war [as one in which] a Christian might justifiably use force to protect an innocent neighbor against harm. Augustine's aim was not, as [Paul] Ramsey later saw clearly, to justify use of force to respond to prior use of force—one did not have to wait until the neighbor had been harmed to act—but to show how force might be morally justified to prevent harm from being delivered. . . . From the perspective of classic statements of the just war idea, there was no question that one might justifiably use force to prevent an attack by a wrongdoer as well as to repair the injustice caused by such an attack or to punish the attacker.

Strikingly, there have been very few just-war criticisms of the *in bello* (war-conduct) practices of the coalition forces during the brief ground-combat phase of the war—which reflects the fact that advances in military technology, including real-time intelligence, global-positioning systems, and precision-guided munitions, have made it more possible than ever before for responsible political authorities to use what the classic just war tradition would consider truly "proportionate" and "discriminate" armed force in the service of worthy political ends. Insofar as there were grave violations of just war conduct during ground combat in Iraq, they were committed by Iraqi forces—a fact little commented on by either the just war critics of the war or by the media. Still, the predominance of *ad bellum*, or war-decision, issues in the Iraq debate suggests that the focus of just war debate for the future has decisively shifted to this cluster of questions.

But perhaps another set of questions, which have been broached since the ground-combat phase of the war ended, will also come to greater prominence in the years ahead. For some time now, certain just war thinkers have suggested that there is a third cluster of questions to be pursued in a thorough just war analysis: In addition to the war-decision questions of the *ius ad bellum* and the war-conduct questions of the *ius in bello*, there are questions of what Michael Walzer has called the *ius post bellum*.

As Walzer writes, "It seems clear that you can fight a just war, and fight it justly, and still make a moral mess of the aftermath." James Turner Johnson has expressed the same concerns in a different way, arguing that satisfying the classic *ad bellum* or war-decision criterion of "right intention" includes the commitment to securing a just peace after the conclusion of combat.

Whether one deems this cluster of questions the third part of an expanded just war tradition or an extension of "right intention," one of the classic deontological *ad bellum* criteria, this is obviously an area in which considerable criticism of the Iraq War has been focused—whether the issue at hand involves the scandals at Abu Ghraib prison, interrogation methods, de-Baathification policies, counterinsurgency strategies and tactics, or the provisions of the new Iraqi constitution with respect to religious freedom and the role of Islamic law in post-Saddam Iraq.

These issues are, obviously, important in themselves; similar issues are likely to become important in the future, because the Bush doctrine and its application in Iraq have launched us into uncharted waters, where new military, political, and moral challenges abound. As *NSS-2002* makes clear, the United States will actively seek to shape events and thereby reshape the contours of world politics. Given the new realities of world disorder, I believe there was no responsible alternative to setting sail on those waters. That conviction, however, reinforces a prudent concern that our navigation be as intelligent and precise as possible as we head out into inevitably rough seas.

The administration's recently released *National Strategy for Victory in Iraq* is, in my judgment, a major step toward getting the navigation right, at least with respect to Iraq. But the fact that it was issued two and a half years after ground combat had ended illustrates the truth of Niall Ferguson's suggestion that the United States, lacking a classic imperial instinct, has lacked what we might call an "imperial playbook" on the British model and that something resembling such a playbook is a moral and political necessity if the goals of *NSS-2002* are to be achieved.

The myriad questions involved here require thinking through a dense thicket of issues. One crucial facet of the problem involves what has come to be known as "public diplomacy"—which is to say, the government's responsibility to identify the goals of it policy, to explain the strategies and tactics (military and nonmilitary) deployed to achieve those goals, to make the case for the moral probity of its goals, strategies, and tactics—and to do all of this both at home and abroad.

The war against terrorism is a long-haul business; the maintenance of national focus and morale is no easy thing in such a war, not least because one cannot plot the war's progress as my parents' generation plotted the progress of the war against Germany and Japan sixty years ago. Regular, prime-time presidential reports to the nation, even if only fifteen minutes in length, would have been a useful tool in maintaining that national focus over the past four and a half years—and in challenging, if only indirectly, the largely negative reporting on the war in Afghanistan, the Iraq War, and the war against al-Qaeda. Such exercises in presidential leadership would be a useful tool in the future, as the struggle for Iraq continues, the battle against al-

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Qaeda and similar terrorist networks unfolds, and the threats to world order posed by Iran and North Korea continue—and perhaps intensify.

Still, if the Bush administration has not always done a good job of determining the public narrative in America about the war against terrorism or the Iraq War, it never even got started in Europe. U.S. embassies in both old and new Europe have, with rare exceptions, failed to carry the crucial moral and political arguments in Europe's centers of public opinion. American commentators with European credibility should have been deployed throughout the continent, in person and through the electronic media, to challenge the virtually unchallenged cartoon of American evangelical cowboys running riot in the world—a cartoon that helps explain, at least in part, the vapors of Anglican bishops in Great Britain who imagine that Tim LaHaye's fictional speculations on the Book of Revelation play a formative role in U.S. foreign policy. No doubt the current crisis of civilizational morale that besets western Europe would have made things difficult in any event; but they didn't have to be as difficult as they have been. And in any event, it is a simple matter of self-respect to get into the argument and fight.

Moreover, a commitment to making public arguments on behalf of the probity and prudence of what the United States and its allies were and are attempting in Iraq would help shape a more rational international public discourse than we have seen in recent years. Truth is often thought to be the first victim of war. Yet if all just wars aim at the establishment or recovery of the peace of order, then vigorous truth-telling about the American decision to go to war, about America's conduct of the war, and about America's postwar efforts at reconstruction and pacification in Iraq is an important component of the pursuit of a just peace.

In his first address to the diplomatic corps accredited to the Holy See, Pope Benedict XVI spoke forcefully of the relation of truth to the peace of order. As he put it, "commitment to truth is the soul of justice," "commitment to truth establishes and strengthens the right to freedom," and "commitment to truth opens the way to forgiveness and reconciliation." Those three points are worth pondering far beyond the Apostolic Palace in Rome. The truth liberates, in many ways.

The world knows—and the American people know—about nearly everything that has gone wrong in Iraq. Major mistakes have been made since ground combat ended, and while that was perhaps inevitable in fighting this new kind of war—in which ground combat defined the battlefield for the military, social, economic, and political struggle in which we are currently engaged—it does not excuse the mistakes.

Still, as I say, that story has been told, over and over again. There were other stories that could have and should have been told, far more effectively—the story of a murderous regime deposed; the story of successful reconstruction efforts in a long-suffering country; the story of three elections, which will produce, this year, a regime with the greatest democratic legitimacy in the modern history of the Middle East; the story of Libya defanged and politics reshaped in Lebanon; the story of changing perceptions of the politically possible and the morally desirable throughout the Arab Islamic world.

Those stories strongly suggest that those who made the ultimate sacrifice in the war in Iraq, and those who will carry the wounds of this war for the rest of their lives, served in a morally worthy cause. FT

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

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

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

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

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

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

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Books in Review

What Hath God Wrought?

The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success
by Rodney Stark
Random House, 280 pages, $25.95

Reviewed by Algis Valiunas

"And having food and raiment let us be therewith content. . . . For the love of money is the root of all evil." St. Paul's admonition to Timothy rings with the hard ascetic fervor that one has come to think of as distinctively Christian. Of course, certain of Paul's successors have recognized the extremity, not to say the impossibility, of his ideal and have proven more accommodating than he to the world and the flesh. Pure-hearted, otherworldly intransigence has its place among the Christian virtues, but so does the acknowledgment that the great world takes part in defining the terms for a well-lived life.

The title of a notable new book by Rodney Stark (a professor at Baylor University, specializing in the social science of religion) indicates how far the tide of secular values has advanced upon the shore of religious virtues: *The Victory of Reason: How Christianity Led to Freedom, Capitalism, and Western Success.*

Stark proclaims reason triumphant in Christianity; Paul asserts the primacy of faith, "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." Stark celebrates freedom; Paul calls himself "the prisoner of Jesus Christ for you Gentiles" and instructs, "Let every soul be subject to the higher powers." Stark extols the creation of wealth; Paul preaches contentment with the bare minimum. Stark honors earthly

Algis Valiunas *is a literary journalist and the author of* Churchill's Military Histories.

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

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dominion; Paul asks, "Hath not God made foolish the wisdom of this world?" For Stark, Christianity is the means, while liberty, prosperity, and power are the ends. Is his the foolish wisdom of this world, or is Christianity colluding with social science to present an essential teaching for our time?

Some of the greatest social scientists have addressed the intimate exchanges between Christian spirit and modern flesh. In the most famous and influential of such studies, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (1905), Max Weber writes that, although men have always and everywhere been driven by "unlimited greed for gain," capitalism is a development of Western modernity that seeks "forever *renewed* profit, by means of continuous, rational, capitalistic enterprise" and that religious belief established the foundation for this "tremendous cosmos of the modern economic order."

Beginning with the observation that Protestants predominate in the ranks of both capitalist masters and skilled industrial laborers, Weber dismisses the commonplace that Catholics direct their attention to eternity while Protestants take pleasure in earthly life; rather, he contends, it is the Protestants'—specifically, the Calvinists'—terrified obsession with salvation and damnation that produces the capitalist virtue of "worldly asceticism." Calvin's doctrine of predestination, in its "extreme inhumanity," compels believers desperately to seek evidence that they are among those marked for heaven, and the most convincing evidence they can find is their devotion to and prosperity in a worldly calling. Stripped of what Weber calls the "magic" of Catholic sacrament, which dispenses "atonement, hope of grace, certainty of forgiveness," Calvinism demands "a life of good works combined into a unified system." In that system hope of spiritual election meshes with unflagging effort in the business at hand.

In *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1922), the English economic historian and Labor party official R.H. Tawney expands and modifies Weber's thesis. In Tawney's view, capitalist industriousness does not emerge directly from spiritual agony; rather, he sees that secular economic individualism and Puritan regard for business as a godly calling are separate, powerful streams of thought whose confluence in seventeenth-century England marks an epoch. "To such a generation, a creed which transformed the acquisition of wealth from a drudgery or a temptation into a moral duty was the milk of lions. . . . The good Christian was not wholly dissimilar from the economic man." Economic self-interest, or the law of nature, comes to be identified with the workings of Providence.

Rodney Stark has little use for Weber or Tawney. He presents himself explicitly as the anti-Weber, who shall redefine the field so badly skewed by his unworthy predecessor. Stark concedes that Weber was right in saying religion influenced the rise of capitalism but insists that Weber got the places, dates, and denominations all wrong. Citing such distinguished authorities as Hugh Trevor-Roper, Henri Pirenne, and Fernand Braudel, Stark declares that, long before the Reformation, capitalism was already underway in the medieval Catholic and republican cities of Venice, Genoa, and Florence. Political freedom was indispensable to capitalism's emergence, and Christian theology prepared the way for freedom.

Indeed, Stark argues, Christian theologians, among whom he favors St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas, invented reason and cleared

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the ground for modern science; the Greeks, the Romans, the Chinese, the Muslims, and the Jews were all woefully deficient in that respect. Christian reason stood for progress in understanding the word of God and developing civilization in accordance with His will.

Medieval Europe, commonly and erroneously described as mired in the Dark Ages, was the matrix of that civilization. Then and there technological innovations proliferated: overshot waterwheels, post windmills, the horse collar, and horseshoes harnessed unexampled power; stirrups and the high-backed saddle made heavy cavalry possible; the sternpost rudder and the round ship opened the high seas to navigation; brakes and pivoting front axles smoothed land transport considerably; the latest medieval conveniences, such as chimneys, clocks, and eyeglasses, made one glad to be living in the thirteenth century.

High culture also flourished. The invention of polyphony, adequate musical notation, and complex instruments such as the pipe organ, harpsichord, and violin enlarged and refined the scope of music; the flying buttress made possible the towering glories of Gothic architecture; Dante, Chaucer, nameless troubadours, and monkish hagiographers inaugurated vernacular literature; universities sprouted like mushrooms throughout Europe during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. The Copernican revolution of the sixteenth century built on the insights of Jean Buriden (1300–1358) and Nicole d'Oresme (1325–1382), who made the case that the earth turns on its axis, and of Nicholas of Cusa (1401–1464), who argued that wherever in the universe a man might stand, he will suppose himself at the motionless center, so that despite all appearances the earth just might not be stationary and the sun not revolve around it.

As for capitalism, it originated in ninth-century monasteries, where the life of contemplative withdrawal from the world did not extinguish an interest in economic well-being. St. Benedict had certified the virtue of work in the sixth century, instructing his monks to "live by the labor of their hands, as our fathers and the apostles did." Such diligent labor built and secured thriving monastic estates.

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

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lending money to the nobility. Eventually the more prosperous monks would leave the manual labor to a hired work force and limit their own work to executive oversight and saying Masses, for a fee, to ease the pain of souls in purgatory.

This "religious capitalism," though of limited scope, did furnish the template for the private enterprise that developed in the northern Italian city-states and that would dominate trade, banking, and manufacturing in Western Europe. In due course Italian banks would establish a foothold in the north, streamlining the chaotic Flemish and English woolen industries, then turning first Antwerp and later Amsterdam into Europe's shipping and financial centers.

Stark's argument that the medieval founders of capitalism embodied the Protestant ethic without being Protestant is quite cogent, although his high-handed dismissal of Weber sounds churlish and self-regarding: Weber did, after all, discover the territory that Stark is bent on remapping, and he deserves all due respect.

While Stark's technological and economic history seems sound, at least to a nonspecialist, the intellectual history that undergirds the argument is shot through with preposterous assertions and glaring omissions. To declare reason the invention of Catholic theologians is absurd. To speak slightingly of classical Greek "learning" and "lore" without making clear that the signal Greek achievement is philosophy, the effort to understand the world by reason alone, is a travesty. Stark makes Aristotle and Plato sound like bumpkins whom no truly reasonable man would think of taking seriously.

Accordingly, Stark maintains cunning silence about the immeasurable debt that his beloved Thomas Aquinas owes to Aristotle, whom St. Thomas and numerous other Scholastics named simply "the Philosopher," in need of no further identification. And Stark inanely traces direct lines of descent from the seventeenth-century innovators of the New Science to Thomas Aquinas and the scholastics, evidently unaware that Francis Bacon, the foremost such innovator, contemptuously controverts the teaching of these theologians—and their intellectual father, Aristotle—in *The New Organon.*

About the greatest Muslim philosophers Stark is similarly misleading. He finds them fruitless, and blames their blind devotion to Aris-

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totle. In fact, however, such thinkers as Alfarabi (ca. 870–950) and Averroes (1126–1198) attempt to understand Islam, as Aquinas attempts to understand Christian teaching, in the light of philosophy and thereby to show the pious that their faith is supported by universal reason.

Of course, reason can be subtly subversive of revelation. In *The Attainment of Happiness,* Alfarabi teaches that religion is an imitation of philosophy and is thus a lower activity; religion moves the imagination, while philosophy demonstrates the truth by force of reason. In *The Decisive Treatise, Determining What the Connection Is Between Religion and Philosophy*, Averroes indicates that there is a way of knowing God that is superior to the approach through Islamic law: "If the jurist infers from the saying of the Exalted, *Reflect, you have vision,* the obligation to acquire a knowledge of juridical reasoning, how much more fitting and proper that he who would know God should infer from it the obligation to acquire a knowledge of intellectual reasoning!" These Muslim philosophers are exponents of reason no less than Thomas Aquinas is, and they acknowledge the same philosophic pedigree as he.

To make out such intellectual freedom and boldness, beholden principally to reason, as the dominant tendency in Christianity requires some selective editing. For theology must cleave to revelation more closely than to reason: Christian intellect is free only within limits. In 1277, at the direction of Roman authority, the Bishop of Paris, Etienne Tempier, issued his *Condemnation of 219 Propositions.* These errant propositions were the progeny of Aristotelianism, Greek and Arabic alike, which was on the upsurge at the University of Paris and which threatened orthodoxy; some twenty of the propositions clearly represented the doctrine of St. Thomas, who had died two years before.

Reason had to be taught its proper place. Thus, for instance, the bishop declares that philosophy cannot question "the resurrection to come," though reason has no way of proving or disproving its coming: "Even a philosopher must *bring his mind into captivity to the obedience of Christ.*" St. Thomas would, of course, make a long and distinguished return, but even he had had to concede that certain unphilosophical truths are given, such as the miracles in the New Testament. Reason must accept them on faith, and explain them as fully as it can, the way Aquinas does the Virgin Birth—the example Stark adduces as evidence of Christian reason at its acme. But here it is plainly faith that has precedence over reason.

PROBABLY WITHOUT thinking about it much, Stark ultimately sides with the world and the flesh, which value reason over faith and esteem the Christian teaching only so long as it comes through with the goods. The ascetic otherworldliness of Christianity has almost no place in this book, which like most products of the democratic intellect judges by the standard of physical well-being.

It is Weber and Tawney who express misgivings about the victory of economic rationality that Stark celebrates. Weber sees modern men trapped in "an iron cage" where material desire consumes them. Tawney scorns an age for which "the attainment of material riches is the supreme object of human endeavor and the final criterion of human success"—a far cry from the appreciation of business as a sacred vocation. "What is certain is that [this modern dispensation] is the negation of any system of thought or morals which can, except by a metaphor, be described as Christian." Reason of a philistine sort is indeed victorious in our world, and the spirit can only conduct a rear-guard action that is brave and noble but may nevertheless be doomed.

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Body and Soul

Maimonides
by Sherwin B. Nuland
Schocken, 234 pages, $19.95

Reviewed by David Novak

The eight-hundredth anniversary of the death in 1204 of Rabbi Moses the son of Rabbi Maimon the Spaniard—better known to the world as Maimonides—was celebrated throughout the world. It gave Jews, especially, the opportunity to call the world's attention to Maimonides' great contribution to Judaism, to philosophy, and to medicine. This was very much in keeping with Maimonides' career as a thinker who extensively employed philosophy as well as a dedicated physician and writer of a number of important medical treatises.

But it should be remembered that Maimonides was primarily a Jewish theologian, one who radically yet faithfully rethought the two strands of Jewish theology: the law (*halakhah*) and its norms, and the biblical narrative (*aggadah*) and its ideas. Even his interest in philosophy was for the sake of explicating the norms and ideas of the Jewish tradition; and his interest in medicine came from an imperative he first saw being emphasized by the Jewish tradition.

Dr. Sherwin B. Nuland, himself both a committed Jew and a distinguished surgeon and teacher of medical history and ethics at Yale, has written a popular appreciation of Maimonides, one that reflects on Maimonides' theology, his philosophy (which, for any medieval thinker, would include natural science), and his work as a medical theorist and practitioner. Sherwin Nuland is an amateur in the highly specialized field of Maimonidean studies. Still, not being afflicted with the professional desire to please one's colleagues (and possible reviewers) in the field, amateurs have the ability to bring fresh insights and perspectives to the materials they use because they often approach them with more spontaneity. Fresh treatments of Maimonides, which are not as stodgy as much current Maimonidean scholarship seems to be, are indeed welcome.

David Novak *is the J. Richard and Dorothy Shiff Professor of Jewish Studies at the University of Toronto, and vice-president of the Union for Traditional Judaism.*



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Nuland's book is ambitious. It deals with Maimonides' life and the social and political background of his era—together with his views in theology, philosophy, and natural science. The book succeeds fairly well in its presentation of the main features of Maimonides' life and times (although one wishes that Nuland had appended some sort of bibliography so the reader might appreciate which secondary works he has so extensively drawn on). A doctor himself, Nuland is at his best when reflecting on Maimonides as physician and medical writer. He also skillfully shows us how Maimonides can be a role model for physicians today, especially for Jewish physicians who want their Judaism to influence their medical practice the same way Maimonides' Judaism influenced his.

But I found Nuland's treatment of Maimonides' theology to be confusing. I suspect this is because Nuland is often theorizing out of secondary sources *about* Maimonides rather than developing his own approach from the original sources *in* Maimonides' own work. And, by relying so heavily on what others say Maimonides says, he seems to have imbibed some of the decidedly modernist prejudices of many modern treatments of Judaism. Indeed, some of these prejudices may have been part of Nuland's overall philosophical outlook before he actually came to study Maimonides—which might explain why he adopted them so uncritically.

In his epilogue, Nuland speaks of Maimonides accomplishing "an incorporation of philosophy and science into religious thought... because he was bringing a progressive worldview to this theology." By "philosophy and science," Nuland means, here and elsewhere in the book, Aristotelian physics and metaphysics, what we today might call "natural science" and "science-based philosophy." By "religious thought," Nuland means "the Law [better, *the Torah*] of the Jews." Thus Nuland speaks of this synthesis of Judaism and Greek philosophy and science as "appealing to both ancient and progressive impulses." But, of course, many Jews have (as have many Christians) asked Tertullian's famous question: "So what does Athens have to do with Jerusalem?" In other words, why do Jewish thinkers need to incorporate the views of some other culture (let alone the views of another religion at the heart of that other culture) into their own theo-

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logical view of the Torah? Classical Jewish thinkers like Maimonides hardly thought that Judaism needs "updating," let alone updating beholden to some non-Jewish criterion.

By dogmatically accepting the distinctly modern assumptions of historical progress and cultural synthesis, Nuland misses a key point in Maimonides' philosophical theology: the true relation of the Torah to the created world. Maimonides pointed out in several places (unfortunately, not mentioned by Nuland) that the Torah is given *into the world* and that, like the world into which it has been given, it too is a creation of God. As such, our understanding of the Torah's *content* requires that we simultaneously understand its worldly or natural context.

If human language, with its logic, is the way God has given us to understand the world, then the Torah must be understood in that same language and with that same logic. "The Torah speaks according to human language" is a rabbinic principle that Maimonides reworked and made a cornerstone of his theology. For Maimonides, the Torah is in the world but not of it.

Further, for Maimonides, human language in its logical and metaphysical purity (that is, when it is truly *scientific* in the classical sense of the term) is not subject to any historical development or any cultural synthesis. That is because logic and metaphysics deal with eternal truths. So does the Torah. Conversely, historical development is about how ideas change. Cultural synthesis is how a compromise between various opinions is worked out. But truth does not change, and truth is not arrived at by some sort of compromise.

Maimonides' liking for Aristotelian science and philosophy (of which he was far more critical than Nuland is aware) was not due to its being more "progressive" than "ancient" Judaism. In fact, Maimonides was convinced that the Jews originally had of their own science-philosophy, every bit as universal as that of Aristotle, the supreme Greek philosopher (although in some places Maimonides prefers Plato to Aristotle). What the Greeks helped the Jews do is to retrieve the Jews' own universal science-philosophy. Hence reading the Greek thinkers (mediated by the Arabs) enabled Jews to reintroduce Judaism into universal scientific and philosophical discourse.

That is why Maimonides continually argued that Jewish ideas and even

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Jewish laws can be reformulated to appeal to universal human reason and not just to traditional Jewish interests. That was also why Maimonides saw Judaism to be a religion that, in theory, could be the content of universal proselytizing. Maimonides believed that Judaism is capable of being represented as the most rational relation with God possible for any human being in the world at any time. Thus Judaism begins with Abraham's discovery of the original religion of Adam, a religion Moses reiterated and expanded.

What Maimonides wanted to do, in Nuland's own words, is to have "the real truth of Jewish law . . . be sustained by the methods of the philosophers." In that way, philosophy can be the "handmaiden of theology." The universal methods of the philosophers are well suited to show us the truth of the world and the truth of the Torah given into that world, both of which are direct creations of God. "Uncovering" the truth of the Torah would have been a better word for Nuland to use than "sustaining" in order to more accurately characterize the relation of philosophy to theology in Maimonides' thought. "Sustaining" suggests that philosophy can ground theology, which Maimonides, like any Torah-committed Jew, would have to deny.

Truth, for Maimonides, is neither ancient nor modern. It is both *universal* and *eternal:* applying everywhere and always. This is so whether the truth is the Torah's truth or worldly truth. The task of philosophical theology is to correlate revealed truth with natural truth—a correlation possible and desirable because truth is one. To introduce modern historicist notions of "progress" confuses one of Maimonides' most important insights. Only regarding medicine does Maimonides occasionally stress that contemporary knowledge is to be preferred because our contemporaries seem to know things about the human body that were unknown to our ancestors, even unknown to the ancient sages of the Talmud.

A second modernist prejudice appears in Nuland's treatment of Maimonides and, indeed, in his treatment of what constitutes a good Jewish approach to medicine, epitomized by Maimonides. It shows up in his argument that even in Judaism one can separate ethics from theology. (That prejudice goes back at least as far as Kant, who was adopted by many modern Jewish thinkers as *the* philosopher.) Thus Nuland writes: "Whether the physician of today believes himself or herself to have been called by God or to have been self-chosen, the obligation is the

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same." By the term "self-chosen," Nuland is invoking here the modern notion of autonomy—namely, that our norms are morally valid only when we can justify them as the products of our own will.

To be sure, Maimonides did not think that in order to be a Jewish physician one had to have a particular calling from God (as would be the case with a prophet). Nevertheless, Maimonides clearly believed that the general benevolence God commanded in the Torah—and which could be readily intelligible to human reason—is still *theonomous*: a divine command, a *mitzvah*. As such, human beings have the free *choice* to accept or reject this divine command, but it is not the invention of their own autonomous *will*. Nuland approves of what he takes to be the Jewish view that the physician "is the individual messenger or deputy of God." But do messengers of God choose themselves? Aren't their appointments as messengers—as well as the message they are given—the result of divine election?

Nuland might have been on stronger ground had he emphasized that Maimonides saw the practice of medicine to be perhaps the highest form of the *imitatio Dei*: the imitation of the supremely benevolent God. The choice of the individual physician to imitate God (who is called in Exodus 15:26 "your physician") might then be seen as the individual's choice rather than God's. But that is not the autonomy Nuland seems to be endorsing. The imperative still comes from God, albeit God exercises that imperative by revealing Himself to be *attractively* benevolent. Here the divine imperative is made in an implicit, exemplary way rather than by explicit precept. And to use the kind of Aristotelian terminology Maimonides would have liked, we could say that in this way God is more the formal cause than the efficient cause of the imperative to imitate Him.

Sherwin Nuland has really written two books here. The historical one is quite good; the philosophical and theological one less so. If he ever writes a revised version or a sequel (which I hope he will), I would advise him to expand the historical part and either leave out the philosophical and theological part or radically rethink it.

On the whole, however, the information in the book, especially pertaining to the history and practice of medicine, which Dr. Nuland knows so well, makes *Maimonides* a worthwhile read.

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

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

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

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

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The Way of the Wicked

THE ROOTS OF EVIL
by JOHN KEKES
Cornell University Press, 261 pages, $29.95

Reviewed by Brian C. Anderson

PROWLING WASHINGTON'S poorer neighborhoods some years back, John Allen raped, stole, mugged, assaulted, pimped, and dealt narcotics, until a bullet in the spine, received during a botched robbery, crippled him. Confined to a wheelchair, he found he really missed the criminal life. "It was really something, but it was a lot of fun," he reflected. "I know one thing: Out of all the things I've done—and I done more bad than good—I done some cruel things, I done some unnecessary things, but I am not really sorry for maybe three things I done my whole life. 'Cause I like to have fun in my life."

Ask around a typical university humanities department or a big liberal foundation what kind of man John Allen was, and you might hear something about how our unfair society gave him no option other than predation or about how he desperately needed therapy. You probably won't hear much about his being *evil*, though. The word "evil" seems out of fashion these days (except perhaps to describe George W. Bush). Even Islamic terrorists busily blowing up innocent children and mothers tend to get a verbal pass.

The moral and political philosopher John Kekes rejects this thought-killing nonjudgmentalism. Evil exists, he says, and philosophy has the job of explaining it. And that is

BRIAN C. ANDERSON *is senior editor of* City Journal *and author of* South Park Conservatives: the Revolt against Liberal Media Bias.

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what his serious and humane new book, *The Roots of Evil*, sets out to do.

From the outset, Kekes sets himself against most Enlightenment and religious accounts of evil. Enlightenment thinkers tended to view human nature as intrinsically good, while evil was a product of a flawed social order: Fix society and evil will vanish. Kekes, by contrast, sees evil as ineradicable, though he believes we can ameliorate its worst effects. Similarly, Kekes (a nonbeliever) claims, religious theories that posit the goodness of creation run aground: The "very existence of evil . . . constitutes a reason against believing in a morally good order."

Actions are evil, he asserts, if they combine three basic features: the "malevolent motivation" of actors, the "serious excessive harm caused by their actions," and the lack of a "morally acceptable excuse for their actions." On these terms, Allen's actions were unambiguously evil: He self-consciously chose to hurt people for his own enjoyment. One must be realistic about human nature: Human beings are capable of magnanimity and mercy; they can also be stone-cold killers.

In Kekes' view, Allen's thuggery exemplifies the evil that can result from "disenchantment with ordinary life." Boredom *is* an underappreciated source of wickedness. But there are many others, Kekes says, and he explores five more. A particularly lethal one—on a much larger scale—is utopian politics. Kekes devotes a fascinating chapter, "Perilous Dreams," to Robespierre and the Jacobins, whose fanaticism anticipated twentieth-century totalitarianism. Kekes unsparingly details the atrocities of Robespierre's two-year reign—women raped, children killed or mutilated, prisoners disemboweled before howling mobs.

What licensed the brutality was the Jacobins' ideological approach to politics. Robespierre and his followers, like left-wing revolutionaries since, divided the political world in absolute terms. "All political choices of the time were interpreted as choices between morality and immorality, good and evil, virtue and vice," writes Kekes.

"The choices Robespierre favored were of course on the side of the angels, so his opponents could be demonized." Illustrating this chilling logic, Kekes offers the words of St-Just, Robespierre's close ally: "The republic consists in the extermination of everything that opposes it."

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

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But is it right to call Robespierre evil, his apologists ask? Wasn't he seeking a better, fairer society? Kekes will have none of it. "Robespierre had people lynched, buried alive, hacked to pieces, slowly drowned, publicly humiliated, and parts of their still-warm bodies devoured by the mob," he observes. Whatever justification one might offer "cannot even begin to account for the savage, inhuman cruelty and ferocious malevolence" of his actions. Even if it *were* necessary to kill his victims—not that it was, of course—the wild excess of the harm he and the Jacobins inflicted reveals the moral truth. The same kind of excesses characterized the actions of Kekes' other evildoers.

Consider the "dirty warriors" of Argentina's military junta during the late 1970s. Committed to national and military "honor"—a concept that when perverted becomes a third source of potential evil, Kekes believes—they used kidnapping, gruesome torture, and murder to eradicate subversives (dropping bound victims out of airplanes to drown in the ocean was a preferred method of killing). The junta defined subversion so loosely that anyone who disagreed with the dirty warriors' vision of politics became a potential victim.

Here, too, politics became a battleground between good and evil, making "toleration, compromise, and moderation impossible." And religious faith can encourage evil, too, as we are reminded daily in our struggle with Islamist terror. Kekes' example of religiously inspired atrocities is the thirteenth-century Catholic Church's crusade against the Cathars, which wiped them out—along with many who had little or nothing to do with them.

AMBITION AND envy can also lead to evil actions. Kekes shows how a desire to please superiors and make a name for himself made it possible for Nazi officer Franz Stangle—a devoted family man—to supervise the extermination of Jews in Treblinka. Stangle knew that what he was doing was monstrous. But as Kekes explains, he built a "protective shield" between his actions and himself.

"This enabled him to prevent the knowledge of the nature of his actions and his feelings about them to affect his motivation to perform those actions, as well as to deny that his actions reflected on him." He had a job to do. He didn't like it, but he was going to do it well—that's just the way he was. He focused on his garden to quiet his conscience.

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Charles Manson's career frustrations—he *so* wanted to be a rock star, but he had no talent—helped spark the murders he and his counter-cultural "family" carried out in California in the summer of 1969.

The second half of *The Roots of Evil* elaborately develops a secular theory of evil out of Kekes' examples. His conclusion: Evil is multicausal, brings together individual and social factors (Robespierre probably would have lived out his life as a harmless provincial lawyer if not for the French Revolution), and is particular (every act of evil has its own story).

Since it reflects aspects of human nature—envy, ambition, the need for belonging—evil is a permanent threat. We can best combat it, Kekes believes, by cultivating "moral imagination," by which he means "the attempt to appreciate other ways of life by coming to understand them from the inside as they appear to those who are actively engaged in them." An education in the literary and philosophical classics helps nourish the moral imagination. Though Montaigne's name never comes up in *The Roots of Evil*, his spirit of decency and moderation runs through its pages and through Kekes' thought generally.

There is much to admire in this lucid and morally serious book. Its concreteness sets it apart from the arid abstraction of many works of analytic philosophy. Its insistence on the existence of evil is refreshing in an age of academic relativism. Its mod-

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est conclusions are wise and generally right.

Unfortunately, as in his previous works, Kekes exhibits here a kind of tone-deafness about religious thought and practice. All religious orthodoxy appears to him as a kind of mental zombism, as in this strange passage: "Devout Catholics, orthodox Jews, fundamentalist Protestants, or Shiite Muslims . . . are told what to do and they do it. They have not themselves 'designed and thought' of their actions. They do what is expected of them. And if they are in doubt, they ask their superiors or moral authorities, and they tell them." In his chapter on the annihilation of the Cathars, Kekes actually seems to think that Catholics believe that papal infallibility extends to anything popes do or say.

Now, some of the smartest, most reflective folks I know are religiously orthodox. The notion that the existence of evil renders absurd any religious worldview that posits the goodness of creation—or even the goodness of a creator—is unpersuasive in the extreme. Kekes neglects the Christian idea that God gave us the gift of freedom, separating us from the animals. Without the possibility of choosing between good and evil, freedom becomes meaningless. Kekes' account of the roots of evil may be superior to naive Enlightenment theories of man and society, but it leaves sophisticated religious theories of evil, which recognize man's fallen nature, untouched—indeed it unconsciously echoes them.

Despite this weakness, *The Roots of Evil* is an important book. Like Kekes' previous books on liberalism and conservatism, on the art of life, on the illusions of egalitarianism, and on many other topics, it will reward religious and secular readers alike. At a time when evil acts—beheadings, suicide bombings, torture chambers—dominate headlines, John Kekes' evocation of elementary decency is salutary.

The Watch and Ward Society

OUT OF DUE TIME: WILFRID WARD AND THE DUBLIN REVIEW, 1906–1916
by DOM PASCHAL SCOTTI
Catholic University Press, 324 pages, $69.95

Reviewed by Joseph Pearce

A BOOK SHOULD NOT be judged by its cover; nor, perhaps, should it be judged by its opening pages. The opening pages of this book are plagued by the sort of wooly-mindedness that its subject devoted his life to combating. It does not do Wilfrid Ward justice, and it does him a veritable injustice when it implies he subscribed to views he would have spurned or condemned.

And yet, *Out of Due Time* is full of fascinating facts about the intellectual climate of Edwardian and early Georgian England—and, specifically, about the Catholic contribution to that climate as expressed in the pages of the *Dublin Review* under Wilfrid Ward's editorship. Let's begin, however, with the nonsense that litters the first chapter.

Alarm bells are set ringing on the first page when the author claims that Ward's "greatest desire was to see the reconciliation of the Church and the world." Since no effort is made to define what is meant by "the world" in this context, we are left wondering what this statement means, and fearing, perhaps, that it means what we think it means.

This is an early example of what might be termed "intellectual impressionism": a failure to provide definitions and a spurning of clear meaning in favor of a fuzzy and foggy "feel-good" factor. It springs from the assumption that conflict is always bad—or, worse, impolite—and that it should be avoided at all costs, and also from a desire to reconcile ourselves with the prevailing tendencies of the modern world in order to remain "relevant" to the fads and fashions of the time.

That is not the way Wilfrid Ward thought or acted. He would, in fact, have agreed with G.K. Chesterton, an occasional contributor to the *Dublin Review* under Ward's editorship, who insisted that we did not need a Church that will move with the world but a Church that will move the world. *Pace* Dom Scotti, Ward's "greatest desire" (after his desire for Heaven, presumably) was to reconcile the world to the Church. This is a world away (and a Heaven and a Hell away) from the reconciliation of the Church and the world. One necessitates good, old-fashioned evangelization; the other implies compromise, accommodation, and perhaps even surrender. Ward wanted the former and utterly rejected the latter.

In *Out of Due Time*, Scotti criticizes Ward's father, the enigmatic and robust William George Ward, with an array of adjectives, such as "extreme and dogmatic" and "papal and rigid," that say more about the author's liberal prejudices than they do about his subject. In similar vein, the author writes of Ward himself: "Ward's view of the Church was always triumphalist: no matter her human imperfections, she was the ark of salvation and the locus of divine truth, and nothing could diminish his respect and loyalty to her."

Since "triumphalism" is only ever used in a derogatory sense, denoting a presumed superiority and a supercilious, gloating arrogance toward others, one can only assume that a

JOSEPH PEARCE *is writer-in-residence and associate professor of literature at Ave Maria University in Naples, Florida. He is the author of fourteen books, including biographies of Solzhenitsyn, Chesterton, Tolkien, and C.S. Lewis, and is coeditor of the* Saint Austin Review, *a bimonthly journal of Christian culture.*

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belief in the Church as "the ark of salvation and the locus of divine truth" is somehow an example of arrogant and supercilious bigotry. It is also noteworthy that Dom Scotti later, in a derogatory sense, refers to those who are "ultra-orthodox," seemingly oblivious to the logical absurdity of the very juxtaposition of "ultra" and "orthodox." One is either orthodox or one is not.

Comparing Wilfrid Ward to Father George Tyrrell and Baron Friedrich von Hügel, Scotti describes Ward as the "least adventurous" of the three. Considering that Tyrrell was destined to be excommunicated as a modernist, it seems that "adventurous" is a synonym for "heretic." Such a conclusion is reinforced by Scotti's seeming sympathy toward Tyrrell's point of view, stating that Tyrrell felt Ward "had not sufficiently separated himself, in principle, from the extreme right."

What, one wonders, is meant by "extreme right" in such a context? One might hope that Scotti is referring to Ward's doctrinal orthodoxy, which was extremely correct, as opposed to Tyrrell's modernism being extremely wrong. One knows, alas, that this is not the case. Only the "extreme and dogmatic" and the "papal and rigid" are narrow enough to define ideas in terms of right and wrong. Scotti is not speaking of anything as insensitive and intransigent as right and wrong, with all its moralistic associations, but about right and left.

The terms are not those of antediluvian morality but post-Enlightenment politics. Once something is described as being "extreme right," it can be sneered at and dismissed, which allows us to avoid the onerous task of defining terms and arguing our own position. Ward's tradition-oriented and antimodernist Catholic associates are on the "extreme right" and, as such, can be dismissed without the necessity of intellectual engagement. They are "extreme right" and *ipso facto* anathema.

And thus endeth the first chapter. Thereafter *Out of Due Time* shows, for the most part, much improvement and much less nonsense. The second chapter begins with a good historical overview of English Catholicism in the nineteenth century, including an enlightening discussion of the Cisalpine movement.

The author's view is still an occasional impediment to a full understanding of the facts. What, for instance, is one to make of his com-



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

parison of the essential characteristics of the Enlightenment with those of the Church? "While the Enlightenment emphasized man's untrammeled reason (Kant's *sapere aude*) and the necessity of intelligibility, the Church was built on the superiority of revelation, the authority of tradition, and the intrinsic value of mystery."

The presumption that the "untrammeled reason" of the Enlightenment always remained trammeled by "the necessity of intelligibility" is curious, though perhaps arguable. But the suggestion that the Church was in some way hostile to reason and the necessity of intelligibility is plainly at variance with the whole scholastic tradition, which places *fides et ratio* in necessary harmony: the intelligibility of the one always being a buttress to the other. The emphasis on the Church's insistence on the superiority of revelation implies a belief in the inferiority of reason, a view that would not have been held by St. Augustine or St. Thomas Aquinas—or by Wilfrid Ward.

Similarly, the assertion that the Church was built on "the intrinsic value of mystery" is not true, at least if the statement is taken literally and in isolation. Mystery has no intrinsic value *per se*. Its value is connected to, indeed trammeled by, orthodoxy. Without the necessary connection between mystery and orthodoxy, the former is not trustworthy and its intrinsic value questionable. It was, I believe, Ronald Knox who quipped that mysticism begins in mist and ends in schism. This, of course, is not always true, but it is true that the greatest mystics, such as St. Teresa of Avila and St. John of the Cross, were profoundly orthodox, as were their mystical experiences.

In spite of such impediments to the full enjoyment of the work, it is full of much that scholars of the period will find enlightening. The better parts of *Out of Due Time* represent an engaging and highly informative journey through an intellectually invigorating decade—as seen in the pages of the equally invigorating *Dublin Review*. The chapter on the modernist crisis is, as one might expect, deficient and defective in places, though full of interesting detail. The chapters "Politics" and "Society" are well-written and, for the most part, well-reasoned, and the chapter "Literature" is a delight, presenting us with a procession of the *illustrissimi* and lesser literary lights of the period: Chesterton, Belloc, Wells, Francis Thompson, R.H. Benson, Compton Mackenzie, and Arnold Lunn, to name but several. *Out of Due Time* is worth purchasing for the chapter on literature alone.

In the final chapter the author reveals his reason for giving the book its title. "Ward was, in many ways, a man born out of due time. In his political and social conservatism, he was born too late, and in his openness to theological trends, too early." Such a woeful attempt to turn Wilfrid Ward into a "trendy," a slavish follower of fashion, is reminiscent of another book, recently published, about Wilfrid Ward's daughter. In *The Living of Maisie Ward*, Dana Greene succumbed to the temptation to paint her subject in the colors of her own choosing, with little regard for Ward's true colors as a staunch and resolute defender of Catholic orthodoxy against modernism. Now, with the publication of *Out of Due Time*, the sin against the daughter has been revisited upon her father. In truth, Wilfrid Ward was not a man born out of due time but was a man for all seasons.

This book has the wrong title because it is largely a wrong-headed book about a right-headed man. Writing of Wilfrid Ward, Scotti unwittingly hits the nail on the head: "Like his father, his mind was firmly

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grounded in dogma and first principles; he disliked flabbiness and muddled thinking." Quite so. *Out of Due Time* spurns dogma and is full of flabbiness and muddled thinking. Wilfrid Ward would not have liked it.

Briefly Noted

Defending Human Dignity: John Paul II and Political Realism
by Derek Jeffreys
Brazos, 235 pages, $19.99

Derek Jeffreys, an assistant professor at the University of Wisconsin, undertakes a study of the contributions of John Paul II to a Christian approach to political life and to international relations. Jeffreys pays particular attention to the influence on Karol Wojtyla of the phenomenology of Max Scheler. And so in Jeffreys' first chapter we hear little about war and peace and justice, but much about lived experience, the perception of values, the hierarchy of values, and love between persons. Though Wojtyla accepts the fundamental categories of Thomism and philosophizes within them, he also brings into his philosophizing a keen interest in the subjectivity and interiority of persons. Perhaps the most important single thought that Jeffreys gathers from Wojtylean personalism is the priority of spiritual over material values. Of course, this priority is as old as Plato. The originality of Wojtyla lies in the way he rethinks the priority in personalist terms, affirming that properly personal values rank above non- and sub-personal values. It must be said that this personalist originality of Wojtyla remains underdeveloped by Jeffreys. But he wants to engage what he calls "political realism" as a normative theory. Jeffreys finds this realism in thinkers who scorn as self-indulgent those statesmen concerned with right intentions and moral integrity. Jeffreys sees a particularly revealing mark of political realism in the resort to utilitarian calculation, which he wants to challenge by means of the teaching of John Paul II. Jeffreys is certainly right about John Paul's personalist opposition to normative realism. But John Paul is convinced that there is not only the will to power at work among nations but also the will to truth, which can stir in consciences in such a way as to exercise great influence on the course of history. Appeals to conscience can raise large and powerful legions. Jeffreys takes some notice of this in his last pages, but he would accomplish the project of his book more completely if he gave greater prominence to John Paul's teaching on the energies of the spirit powerfully at work in history. Then, too, Jeffreys makes too much of the difficulty of doing the utilitarian calculations once one has acknowledged the existence of spiritual values in addition to the obvious material values; though this is indeed a worthy argument to be made against the realists, what is more according to the mind of Wojtyla, I think, is the argument that in doing the utilitarian calculations,

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persons are inevitably instrumentalized. Still, we hear in Derek Jeffreys an important new Christian voice. He has meditated deeply on the legacy of John Paul and has brought it to bear in an intelligent and original way on questions of political life and international justice.

—John F. Crosby

THOMAS JEFFERSON: AUTHOR OF AMERICA
by CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS
HarperCollins, 188 pages, $19.95

Christopher Hitchens—the same Christopher Hitchens who provided a rather unorthodox view of Mother Teresa in *Missionary Position*—has now given a similarly unorthodox take on America's third president. His *Thomas Jefferson* depicts the author of the Declaration of Independence as a pragmatic idealist. Hitchens' underlying thesis is that Jefferson in fact created the model for a conflicted America which seeks to do good but is not beyond compromising her lofty principles when convenient. The book borders on psycho-history. Hitchens posits early insecurity and low self-esteem in the young Jefferson. He believes them to be rooted in a poor relation with his mother and an awkward encounter with a Rebecca Burwell on whom he had a youthful crush. Hitchens states that these traumas were overcome by study, the practice of law, and a good marriage—but his portrayal of Jefferson's duplicity throughout his life makes the reader wonder whether he really believes that Jefferson ever overcame his early psychological damage. Hitchens' Jekyll-and-Hyde Jefferson is most obvious in his public protestations against slavery while he failed to release the slaves he held at Monticello. In a more positive light, Hitchens sees Jefferson as a visionary not bound by ideology. This is especially true of the westward expansion of the young nation. Hitchens also highlights Jefferson's uneasiness with religion. Calling the man anti-clerical, Hitchens ends up seeing Jefferson as the forerunner of contemporary America's secular creed. Hitchens is an iconoclast, but his view of Jefferson does give us an insight into this Founding Father's influence on the American psyche and thus makes a plausible argument that Jefferson helped create the nation of paradoxes that we are today.

—Michael Orsi

THE ROSARY
by GARRY WILLS
Viking, 208 pages, $24.95

This is a simple and straightforward presentation for those who wish to learn the history, value, and manner of praying the rosary. After a useful introduction Wills commends the rosary by tracing its history, noting some prominent Catholics who speak of their own rosary prayer and mentioning as well some recent papal instructions encouraging its use. He points to several ways in which the rosary may be prayed and notes that the rosary "is not an assignment, just a help to contemplation and to prayer." Even for those familiar with the rosary, the next chapter, "Elements of the Rosary," can be helpful in its presentation of the various prayers and in introducing what Wills calls a "synchronic" understanding of history to explain the permanent contemporaneity of the events in the life of Christ. The last section of this chapter introduces Tintoretto and explains why his paintings will accompany the reflections on the various mysteries of the rosary. Wills then considers the twenty mysteries that have composed the rosary since the publication of *Rosarium Virginis Mariae* by Pope John Paul II. The first five are the Joyful Mysteries. In some ways these receive the best treatment from Wills. The information is helpful and the use of historical studies judicious. Wills' presentation of the Luminous Mysteries follows the same format. The treatment of the Transfiguration could have been more prolonged with the help of liturgical themes and the patristic penetration of the mystery. The meditation on the institution of the Eucharist on the other hand, is adequate, especially regarding the communal aspect of the Eucharist. The weakest of the whole twenty meditations is that on Cana and the accompanying reflections on prayer. The section on the Sorrowful Mysteries is solid, and the best treatments are those dealing with the Agony in the Garden and the Crucifixion. Wills adduces some powerful passages from Newman, Belloc, and Augustine, along with his own reflections on Tintoretto. The rather disparaging treatment of the Stations of the Cross would have been better omitted. The Glorious Mysteries are well presented and should help the modern reader understand the reality proclaimed by the Gospels and sustained by the Church. Especially to be recommended is Wills' treatment of the Marian mysteries, with which *The Rosary* concludes. Wills' treatment of indulgences is excessively negative and theologically superficial. He translates the Greek biblical texts himself, and while the effort to provide new wording for expressions that have often become too familiar is commendable, some of the results are distracting and even wrong, as when he translates *doxa* in Romans 6:4 as "dazzle" ("Christ rose from the dead in the dazzle of his Father"). Still, despite its shortcomings, this book can be recommended to those who are interested in learning how to pray the rosary or who would like a new approach to help them in a familiar devotion.

—Francis Martin

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The Public Square

A Continuing Survey of Religion, Culture, and Public Life

Richard John Neuhaus

The Two-Hundred-Year War

Going on five years since September 11, 2001, and many, if not most, Americans seem very uncertain about what it means that we are at war—or whether we really are at war. There is a nearly unanimous agreement that there are "terrorists" out there, and maybe some among us, and that they mean us harm; therefore we should be alert and take appropriate preventive measures. But there is still a puzzlement in public discussions about why they dislike us so much and how best to engage in dialogue in order to stop a minority of fanatics from hijacking the peaceful religion of Islam for their violent purposes. It is dangerously misleading, some say, to speak of our being at war. We do face a challenge, and it could assume ominous proportions, but the way to respond is by dialogue and, when dialogue fails, by police action to stop or punish criminal activity. But we must not let ourselves think that we are at war.

There have also been forceful voices rejecting that view as naive and potentially suicidal. Norman Podhoretz has been writing in *Commentary* about our being in the midst of World War IV (the Cold War was World War III). And, although many describe it as alarmist, Samuel Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* is an unavoidable presence in these discussions, while others were awakened to the present danger by David Pryce-Jones' *The Closed Circle* or Bat Y'eor's writings on jihad, dhimmitude, and Europe's continuing decline and fall into "Eurabia."

Of particular interest also are the books of Fouad Ajami, *Dream Palace of the Arabs* and *The Arab Predicament*. The scholarly work of Bernard Lewis has received extended attention in these pages. His *What Went Wrong?* and *The Crisis of Islam* are invaluable introductions to the historical, cultural, and political origins of the resentments that feed radical Islam's hostility to the West. Although these writers are not agreed on every aspect of what the phrase means, they are convinced that we are "at war."

As almost always, there is another side to the argument. Popular on college campuses is John Esposito's *The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality?* The case for Islam as a "religion of peace" is pleasantly advanced in Karen Armstrong's recent *Islam*. And then there are the anti-American tirades of Noam Chomsky, such as *Hegemony and Survival* and *Imperial Ambitions*. Leaving aside the many partisan rants against the Bush administration and all its works, there are thoughtful writers who are eagerly, even desperately, determined to resist the claim that we are at war.

Into this frequently confused and heated discussion comes a new book from Yale University Press. *Knowing the Enemy: Jihadist Ideology and the War on Terror* is by Mary Habeck of the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. The book, which is admirably accessible also to the nonspecialist, is particularly valuable in its careful distinction between Islam as such and those within Islam who

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have no doubt that they are at war with the rest of the world, including most of the Islamic world (which they view as the pseudo-Islamic world).

Some speak of "radical" or "fundamentalist" Islam, others prefer the terms "Islamism" and "Islamists." Habeck suggests that the more accurate terminology is "jihadis" and "jihadism." She leaves no doubt that, whatever the terms used, the threat is inextricably part of Islam. For perhaps understandable reasons, she wants to distance herself from the Huntington argument which critics depict—falsely, I think—as overheated. She writes, "The conflict that jihadis believe is inevitable has nothing to do with Samuel Huntington's 'clash of civilizations.'" It is the jihadis, she contends, who believe in the Huntington thesis:

> In their reading of history, the conflict between the United States and Islam is part of a universal struggle between good and evil, truth and falsehood, belief and infidelity, that began with the first human beings and will continue until the end of time. A literal clash of civilizations is taking place around the world and, in the end, only one system can survive: Muslims must rid the earth of democracy or else the supporters of democracy (especially the United States, but the entire "West" as well) will destroy true Islam.

A particular merit of Habeck's book is that she takes with utmost seriousness the centrality of religion in the jihadist view of the world. Economic and political factors related to modernization and the history of colonialism of course play a part. But Habeck writes:

> In contrast to Western critics of colonialism, who attribute European imperialism to capitalism, power politics, or greed, the jihadis argue that religion alone explains this hostility. The entire purpose of imperialism was, in this view, to destroy Islam. . . . The decline of Islam is thus not mainly the result of internal weaknesses or sin by the Muslims themselves, but is rather the deliberate policy of an external religious enemy whom jihadis can—and do—blame for all the evils suffered by Muslims around the world.

In this view, the Crusades have never ended. Habeck writes, "The five-hundred-year gap between the ending of the Crusades and the start of French and British incursions into Egypt is glossed over as if it does not exist. To eliminate Islam, the Christian colonizers used every wicked tool at their disposal." Missionary and educational efforts, the imposition of European legal codes, and every other facet of colonialism were aimed at destroying Islam. "With the collapse of the European empires, the United States took up the cause and—through its ideology of liberalism—is now the leading spirit behind the attempts by falsehood to destroy Islam and kill or convert the Muslims." For this reason, the United States is called the "Greater Unbelief," worse even than the unbelief of apostate Muslims (of whom, in the jihadist view, there are many).

Sympathetic Western writers about Islam laud the period in which Islam was an advanced culture, integrating Greek philosophy and scientific curiosity, and employing the capacities of human reason to interpret sacred texts. "The jihadis," writes Habeck, "will have none of this argument, since for them the intermixing of Greek and Western ideas with Islam only further polluted an already weakened religion." The jihadist interpretation of Islam, she underscores again and again, is the traditionalist interpretation. They are not the innovators who have "hijacked" Islam for alien purposes but are the defenders of a faith that they believe has been lethally compromised by Muslims in thrall to the seductions of modernity. Here is Habeck's central argument:

> The consistent need to find explanations other than religious ones for the [jihadist] attacks says more about the West than it does about the jihadis. Western scholars have generally failed to take religion seriously. Secularists, whether liberals or socialists, grant true explanatory power to political, social, or economic factors but discount the plain sense of religious statements made by the jihadis themselves. To see why jihadis declared war on the United States and [try] to kill as many Americans as possible, we must be willing to listen to their own explanations. To do otherwise is to impose a Western interpretation on the extremists, in effect to listen to ourselves rather than to them.

It is the great merit of Habeck's book that she compels us to listen to them rather than to ourselves. Extreme jihadist thinking goes way back, certainly long before the modern period, colonialism, and developments such as the establishment of the State of Israel. The ideological lineage is traced from the thirteenth century up through Abd al-Wahhab (d. 1792) of Saudi Arabia's officially promoted Wahhabism, Mohammed Rashid Rida (d. 1935), Hassan al-Banna (d. 1949), and the powerfully influential Egyptian theorist Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966). Although there are variations and disagreements among these figures, this is the religious-ideological lineage claimed by al-Qaeda and figures such as Osama bin Laden.

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If one asks what they want, the answer is that they want the world to submit to Islam, which is to say, to Allah as revealed in the Qur'an and authoritatively interpreted by what they consider to be authentic tradition. The generally accepted Muslim belief is that "the Torah and Gospels were sent down for a particular people at a particular time, while the Qur'an is for all of humanity throughout all time." While all Muslims believe that Islam is intended for the entire world, jihadis believe the world "must be brought to recognize this fact peacefully, if possible, and through violence if not." Habeck says there is hope "that a more tolerant vision of orthodox Islam can win out, using the very traditions and texts that the extremists claim to honor," but it would appear that that more tolerant vision is today on the defensive.

In the jihadist vision, "Islam becomes a sort of liberation theology, designed to end oppression by human institutions and man-made laws and to return God to his rightful place as unconditional ruler of the world." In this connection, Christians may recognize similarities not only with liberation theology but also with the "theonomist" or "reconstructionist" ideology associated with the late R.J. Rushdoony, a Calvinist of a theocratic bent. In jihadi eyes, the most fundamental error of Western liberalism is the distinction, even division, of the sacred and profane, resulting in what the very influential Qutb termed a "hideous schizophrenia." Christians misread (or perhaps invented) the words of Jesus about rendering to Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's, which resulted in the Christian failure to seize and hold state power. Muslims, they say, must not make the same mistake.

Western apologists routinely point out that "jihad" can mean not warfare but a personal spiritual struggle. However, by far the dominant meaning of jihad, Habeck notes, is warfare understood not as "holy war" but as "just war"—"a war that is justified for Muslims because it means to free other people from falsehood and lead them to truth." This just war is open-ended. In the words of al-Banna, "Moreover, we will not stop at this point, but will pursue this evil force to its own lands, invade its Western heartland, and struggle to overcome it until all the world shouts by the name of the Prophet and the teachings of Islam spread throughout the world." Islam is nothing less than a universal "army of salvation" to conquer the world.

There are, to be sure, passages in the Qur'an suggesting that "people of the book," meaning Christians and Jews, can be peacefully tolerated. But the Qur'an was "sent down" to Mohammed over twenty years, and the tradition to which the jihadis subscribe holds that the later passages "abrogate" the earlier. As Habeck writes, "There is thus no longer any need to accept Christians and Jews as fellow believers. They have only the choices outlined in the later verses of the Qur'an—either to accept Islam, to submit to Muslim domination [dhimmitude], or to die. Polytheists (like Hindus) have only the choice of conversion or death."

There are strategic disagreements among jihadis. Some hold that the first front of war is to reestablish authentic Islam within the Islamic world, while others contend that the Greater Unbelief embodied in the United States is the priority target. It is agreed that any land once conquered by Islam, or where Islam was prevalent, must be brought under the sway of *dar al-Islam* (the house of Islam). The jihadis who carried out the March 2004 bombings in Madrid gave as one of their reasons the "Spanish crusades against the Muslims" (the *reconquista*), noting that "it has not been so long since the expulsion from Al-Andalus and the courts of the Inquisition." By the same claim, the entire Balkans, Hungary, Romania, Austria, the Crimea, and Poland are eternally Islamic lands for which a defensive, albeit belatedly defensive, jihad is to be waged.

No Borders with Unbelievers

Jihadis agree on the imperative of "opening the nations for Islam." Habeck writes: "Jihadis thus neither recognize national boundaries within the Islamic lands nor do they believe that the coming Islamic state, when it is created, should have permanent borders with the unbelievers. The recognition of such boundaries would end the expansion of Islam and stop offensive jihad, both of which are transgressions against the laws of God that command jihad to last until Judgment Day or until the entire earth is under the rule of Islamic law." In sum, "Muslims have been given the leadership of the entire planet."

It is recognized that the achievement of this goal will be neither fast nor easy, especially since most of existent Islam is deemed to be apostate. One influential jihadist group argues that the false Muslims now in control of Islamic lands will have to be killed, along with everyone who in any way supported them, "even if this led to the killing of millions of Muslims and to the martyrdom of millions of believers." (Believers, as distinct from nominal Muslims.) Jihadis tell their supporters not to be discouraged by a lack of a mass uprising by the *umma*, the Muslim community, but to patiently persevere in obedience to the command of God. "This," writes Habeck, "is a war that could last two hundred years, but eventually Islam will produce another Salah al-Din [Saladin] who will rouse the Islamic world, unite the Muslims against their enemies, and drive them from the lands of their community."

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We in the West would like to believe that Muslims, like everybody else, basically want the peace, freedom, and prosperity that we associate with democracy and a market economy. What we would like to think they want the jihadis view as the heart of the evil against which they are waging war. Sovereignty, including political sovereignty, belongs to God alone. Rulers and legislators of every sort have only one duty, which is to uncompromisingly implement the revealed laws of God without the slightest modification. The democratic theory that the people are sovereign is simply blasphemy and rebellion against the rule of God. "Unlike Islamists," writes Habeck, "who agree that there should be no separation between religion and politics but who do not necessarily reject democratic governance, jihadis want nothing to do with 'man-made' laws or men legislating according to their own choices and desires." It is argued that, even if the laws were identical to those of the *sharia*, if they were adopted in a democratic system, they would be illegitimate and *kufr*—meaning contrary to Islam.

The Best Hope

This is fanaticism of a very bloody and rigorous order. Mary Habeck's great service is to help us understand what these jihadis believe, and that what they believe is firmly rooted in Islamic tradition, although it is not the only understanding of that tradition. When it comes to what we should do, she is modest. She believes that the U.S. attack on the jihadi regime of Afghanistan badly shook the confidence of leaders such as bin Laden. In view of feckless American responses to jidahi attacks in Beirut, Somalia, and elsewhere, he had assured his followers that the United States did not have the will or ability to fight back. Habeck has relatively little to say about U.S. policy in Iraq but emphasizes that Islam might take a more tolerant turn were the Palestine-Israel conflict somehow resolved. One can readily agree with that, but such a resolution is nowhere on the horizon.

She writes, "The term 'war on terror' has never been satisfactory because it suggests that this is war against a tactic, that there is no agency (or enemy), and that it will be difficult if not impossible to know when the war is won." She suggests we might call it "the war on jihadis" or "the war on jihadism" or "the war on the khawarij." (The khawarij were heretics who, soon after the death of Mohammed, claimed they were the only true believers.) I don't see "the war on the khawarij" really catching on. Perhaps the war on Jihadism, if the term became as recognizable as "Nazism" or "Communism." Meanwhile, it seems we're stuck with "the war on terror."

Claiming no originality for the suggestion, Mary Habeck ends her book by suggesting that democracy is the best hope, although democracy attuned to Islamic religion and culture. "Only democratization will directly attack the jihadist ideology while creating governments that are more responsive to their citizens. The jihadist argument is that democracy is completely antithetical to Islam and moreover is specifically designed to destroy the religion. If democracies can flourish in Islamic lands without disturbing the practices and beliefs of Islam, the entire jihadist argument will collapse." In view of everything she has said up to the last page, that is an ominously big if.

But, as with almost all decisions of consequence, one must ask, What is the alternative? Habeck does not speculate on how many Muslims are part of or sympathetic to the jihadist cause, along with its networks of terrorism intended to advance what is viewed as a just war against the infidel. She is very clear that their religious beliefs justify and, in some circumstances, mandate suicide bombing and mass slaughter by nuclear, biochemical, and other means. I recently heard an expert on Islam remark—I think he intended to be reassuring—that "probably no more than ten percent" of Muslims support the jihadist ideology. Ten percent is somewhat over a hundred million people. How many of a hundred million are prepared to die in attacks, including suicide attacks, on the Greater Unbelief? Nobody knows.

Fanatical ambitions to conquer the world will strike many as simply fantastical, and they almost certainly are that. But we can only speculate on what would be the American response to an attack in this country that killed, say, a hundred thousand or more people. The jihadis have speculated long and hard about that, and they are confident that any probable scenario would play into their hands, rallying more millions of the faithful to their cause. And it is possible that they are right. One alternative is not to respond. As Toynbee observed, most great nations die by suicide.

The wan hope is held out that Islam will become more tolerant as Muslims become more secular. Certainly many Muslims are attracted to the fruits of modernity—fruits both rich and rotten. But secularization as a comprehensive process is a now-dated phenomenon peculiar to Western, and mainly European, societies. It seems very unlikely that most Muslims will buy into modernity if it means a betrayal of their identity as faithful Muslims.

So it comes down to who gets to define what it means to be a faithful Muslim. Jihadism in its various forms has for two hundred years been a contender in defining Islamic fidelity, and it would appear to be stronger today than ever before. Its cosmic vision of

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Islamic victory is promulgated in mosques and schools around the world, being handsomely funded by oil-rich nations such as Saudi Arabia.

As is obvious in Europe, that vision is powerfully appealing to young Muslims, including those who are second or third-generation immigrants. The jihadis declare that they are prepared for a war of two hundred years, or as long as it takes, even to the Day of Judgment.

Knowing the Enemy will strike some as an excessively belligerent title. But when a formidable force declares itself to be your deadly enemy, and is effectively acting on that declaration, it is the better part of wisdom to recognize it as an enemy and try to understand what it is up to, and why. That recognition does not provide clear answers on how to counter or defeat the enemy. Certainly every resource of honest dialogue and negotiation should be employed to persuade people that they need not and should not be our enemy. But a careful reading of Habeck—along with the likes of Huntington, Ajami, and Lewis—leaves no doubt that millions of people possessed of lucidly lethal intentions in obedience to what they believe to be the commands of God have declared war on us, and therefore we are, not by our choice, at war. It is deeply troubling that so many Americans have not yet come to recognize that sobering reality.

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Challenging a Giant

In any intellectual discipline, there are those whom we call giants. A giant is someone so big you can't get around him. In the recent history of theology there are, for instance, the Protestant Karl Barth and the Catholic Karl Rahner. A person who has not come to terms with, or at least taken a position with respect to, Barth and Rahner can hardly be taken seriously as a theologian. No more than someone ignorant of or indifferent toward Einstein or Planck is a serious physicist. In the last twenty years or so, Hans Urs von Balthasar has been widely hailed as another such theological giant, with Catholics, Protestants, and, to a lesser extent, Orthodox thinkers producing numerous monographs on his prodigious corpus. Balthasar plays a large part in, for instance, David Hart's recent and justly acclaimed *The Beauty of the Infinite*.

Balthasar was a Swiss thinker who died at age eighty-three in 1988 and was created a cardinal by John Paul the Great (although he did not live to receive the red hat). The most invitational introduction to Balthasar's great enterprise is Edward T. Oakes' *Pattern of Redemption*. It is an excellent summary, and a very frisky summary at that. Balthasar's own writings, filling a very long bookshelf, are usually anything but frisky. He went in for heavy-duty intellection that is sometimes ponderous and exhaustingly discursive, but always adorned with dazzling erudition and rewarding one's effort with scintillating insights of a frequently counterintuitive nature. One spends pleasurable hours reading Balthasar not so much in an analytical mode as in surrendering oneself to the beauty of how his mind works and its adventurous probings of theological imagination. Reading Balthasar is in large part a meditative exercise bordering on the contemplative.

But now comes along a young scholar of a determinedly no-nonsense disposition with a five-hundred-page indictment of Balthasar for being at serious odds with cardinal teachings of Scripture and the consensual tradition of Christian orthodoxy. *Lux in Tenebris: The Traditional Catholic Doctrine of Christ's Descent into Hell and the Theological Opinion of Hans Urs von Balthasar* is a dissertation, by Alyssa Helene Pitstick, accepted by the prestigious University of St. Thomas (better known as the Angelicum) in Rome. The title may suggest a limited critique of Balthasar's argument that—contrary to the tradition of liturgy, iconography, and teaching, both East and West—the Holy Saturday descent into hell was not triumphant but was the completion of Christ's redemptive work in his absolute alienation from God in the state of the damned. Far from being an arcane academic dispute, Pitstick contends, this "theological opinion" of Balthasar's entails grave departures from orthodox teaching on the two natures, human and divine, in the one person of Christ, and indeed raises fundamental questions about the co-equality of the Son in the Holy Trinity.

Alyssa Pitstick gives no quarter. Along the long way of her argument, she notes instances in which Balthasar, in her view, misrepresents scriptural, patristic, and magisterial texts and simply ignores aspects of the tradition inconvenient to his argument. I confess that at first I thought she was being terribly ungenerous, even nitpicking, but she finally convinced me that, on the descent into hell and some other signature themes of the great man, there are, at least implicitly, possible incompatibilities with the received structure of faith. It is an audacious thing for a doctoral student to take on a thinker of the stature of Balthasar, but Alyssa Pitstick has thrown down a gauntlet that other theologians should not ignore.

Her critique notwithstanding, I continue to admire and delight in the mind of Hans Urs von Balthasar. At his funeral, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, now Pope Benedict, described Balthasar as perhaps the most learned man in Europe. That John Paul created him a cardinal for his contributions to Catholic theology

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cannot lightly be dismissed. His restoration of the categories of beauty and drama in contemporary theological reflection is a singular achievement. His book on Karl Barth and the relationship between nature and grace is, if one may be permitted the term, magisterial. I recommend reading Father Oakes' introduction and then going on to some of the Balthasar texts. Anyone with a healthy theological curiosity risks being hooked in short order. And yet, like the third-century Origen, to whom Balthasar was deeply devoted, Balthasar may end up with a somewhat ambiguous reputation in the history of Christian thought. There is no doubt he is a giant, albeit a flawed giant. Thanks to Alyssa Helene Pitstick, a new and lively debate over his achievement is almost certainly underway. It is hoped that her thesis, revised in book form, will be out from Eerdmans later this year.

FT

Bonhoeffer Today

Born in 1906, a hundred years ago, and executed on the direct orders of Hitler on April 9, 1945, Pastor Dietrich Bonhoeffer had a deep insight into the dynamics of modern tyrannies of whatever ideological flavor. As Pope John Paul II tirelessly taught, disdain for God and the common good is inextricably linked to disdain for man. Bonhoeffer wrote in his *Ethics*:

> The news that God has become man strikes at the very heart of an age in which both the good and the wicked regard either scorn for man or the idolization of man as the highest attainable wisdom. The weaknesses of human nature are displayed more clearly in a time of storm than in the smooth course of more peaceful periods. In the face of totally unexpected threats and opportunities, it is fear, desire, irresolution and brutality which reveal themselves as the motives for the actions of the overwhelming majority. At such a time as this it is easy for the tyrannical despiser of men to exploit the baseness of the human heart, nurturing it and calling it by other names. Fear he calls responsibility. Desire he calls keenness. Irresolution becomes solidarity. Brutality becomes masterfulness. Human weaknesses are played upon with unchaste seductiveness, so that meanness and baseness are reproduced and multiplied ever anew. The vilest contempt for mankind goes about its sinister business with the holiest of protestations of devotion to the human cause. And, as the base man grows baser, he becomes an ever more willing and adaptable tool in the hand of the tyrant. The small band of the upright are reviled. Their bravery is called insubordination; their self-control is called pharisaism; their independence arbitrariness and their masterfulness arrogance. For the tyrannical despiser of men popularity is the token of the highest love of mankind. His secret profound mistrust for all human beings he conceals behind words stolen from a true community. In the presence of the crowd he professes to be one of their number, and at the same time he sings his own praises with the most revolting vanity and scorns the rights of every individual. He thinks people stupid, and they become stupid. He thinks them weak, and they become weak. He thinks them criminal, and they become criminal. His most sacred earnestness is a frivolous game. His hearty and worthy solicitude is the most impudent cynicism. In a profound contempt for his fellow-men he seeks the favor of those whom he despises, and the more he does so the more certainly he promotes the deification of his own person by the mob.

While We're At It

■ The people over at the *New York Times* take a lot of ribbing about their claim to be the newspaper of record. Never mind. There are in fact some things we would never know about were they not reported in the *Times*. For instance, in the February 13 National Report section, there is a long front-page story with the headline "At Churches Nationwide, Good Words for Evolution." You possibly didn't know about this nationwide marshalling of religious forces to defend the theory of evolution against the advocates of Intelligent Design and related nuts. It is happening. For instance: "At St. Dunstan's Episcopal Church, a small contemporary structure among the pricey homes of north Atlanta, the Rev. Patricia Templeton told the 85 worshippers gathered yesterday, 'A faith that requires you to close your mind in order to believe is not much of a faith at all.'" Wait, that's not all. "In the basement of an apartment building in Evanston, Illinois, the Rev. Mitchell Brown said to the 21 people who came to services at the Evanston Mennonite Church that Darwin's theories in fact had compelled people to have faith rather than look for 'special effects' to confirm the existence of God." That's it. A small Episcopal church in Atlanta and a smaller Mennonite gathering in a base-

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ment in Evanston. The rest of the story quotes people who agreed with what the two ministers said. It mentions that ten thousand mainline/oldline clergy had signed a letter declaring February 12 to be Evolution Sunday. The two reporters on the story checked with other clergy who had signed, but they said they did not mention evolution in their sermons. Never mind, a story is a story. "At Churches Nationwide, Good Words for Evolution." Anyway, "nationwide" is a term of art. If you're the newspaper of record and, not incidentally, committed to puffing evolution, you gotta go with what you got.

■ I have discussed in this space the brouhaha over religion at the Air Force Academy. Some chaplains tell me there really was a problem with some evangelical Christian officers who aggressively evangelized in a way that suggested that, if you are not one of them, you're really not with the program. After months of controversy and deliberation, the air force has come out with a brief set of guidelines, including this: "In official circumstances or when superior/subordinate relationships are involved, superiors need to be sensitive to the potential that personal expressions may appear to be official or have undue influence on their subordinates. Subject to these sensitivities, superiors enjoy the same free exercise rights as all other airmen." That sounds about right. It doesn't sound right to Abe Foxman of the Anti-Defamation League, however. He complains that the guidelines will result in religious expression being biased toward Christianity. Given that 90 percent of the people involved are Christians of one sort or another, it is not surprising that religious expression would tend to be Christian. As I previously mentioned, Mr. Foxman hoped to pocket a militantly secularist victory with the air force and then move on to banning table prayers at the Naval Academy in Annapolis. In this he was joined by Barry Lynn of Americans United for the Separation of Church and State (a.k.a. Americans United for a Naked Public Square). Mr. Lynn was very upset by the new air-force guidelines. He said, "It appears that the air force does not understand that all prayer, including so-called 'inclusive prayer,' is an inherently religious activity for which not all staff and cadets wish to be subject to." To paraphrase Churchill, the free exercise of religion is something that Mr. Lynn will not up with put.

■ It has been said, and said truly, that John Paul the Great had a more informed appreciation of America—the Catholic Church here, but also American forms of religious, cultural, and political relationships—than any pope in history. In the modern era, Rome's ways of thinking about democracy and religion were much more influenced by the French Revolution of 1789 than by the American Revolution of 1776. John Paul's appreciation of the American experience is continued and in some respects refined in the thought of Benedict XVI. In *Without Roots*, recently published by Basic Books, Benedict responds to an essay by Marcello Pera, President of the Italian senate. He writes: "In this regard, I would like to quote a significant phrase from Tocqueville: 'Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot.' In the letter that you addressed to me, you quote an expression from John Adams that expresses a similar thought, namely, that the American Constitution 'was made only for a moral and religious people.' In the United States, too, secularization is proceeding at an accelerated pace, and the confluence of many different cultures disrupts the basic Christian consensus. However, one senses much more clearly in America than in Europe the implicit recognition that the religious and moral foundation bequeathed by Christianity is greater than any single denomination. Europe, unlike America, is on a collision course with its own history. Often it acts as a spokesperson for an almost visceral denial of any possible public dimension for Christian values. Why is this so? Why is Europe, which has such an ancient Christian tradition, unable to know a consensus of this type? A consensus that, irrespective of membership in a specific faith community, accords a public, sustaining value to the fundamental concepts of Christianity? Since the historic bases for this difference are well known, a brief description of them should suffice. American society was built for the most part by groups that had fled from the system of state churches that reigned in Europe, and they found their religious bearings in free faith communities outside of the state church. The foundations of American society were thus laid by the free churches, which by the tenets of their creed and their very structure are not a state church but rather a free assembly of individuals. In this sense you could say that American society is built on the foundations of a separation of church and state that is determined and indeed demanded by religion (a separation whose motivation and configuration could not be more different from the conflictual separation of church and state imposed by the French Revolution and the systems that followed it). In America the state is little more than a free space for different religious communities. It is in its nature to recognize and permit these communities in their particularity and non-membership in the state. A separation that is conceived positively, since it is meant to allow religion to be itself, a religion that respects and protects its own living space distinctly from the state and its ordinances. This separation has created a special relationship between the

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state and the private spheres that is completely different from Europe. The private sphere has an absolutely public character. This is why the non-governmental is not excluded in any way, style, or form from the public dimension of social life. Most of America's cultural institutions are non-governmental, such as the universities or arts organizations. The legal and tax system favors and enables this type of non-governmental culture, by contrast to Europe, where, for example, private universities are a recent and only marginal phenomenon."

■ Benedict has over the years been kept closely informed about the American religious situation and especially about the project called Evangelicals and Catholics Together. In the same book, he writes: "American Catholics also recognized the positive character of the separation between church and state, for both religious reasons and for the religious freedom that it guaranteed them. It is also thanks to their significant contribution that American society has maintained a Christian consciousness. Their contribution is more valid than ever at a time in which profound, radical changes are taking place within Protestantism. Since the traditional Protestant communities are continuously adapting to secularized society, they are losing their internal cohesion and their ability to persuade. The evangelicals, who used to be the most relentless enemies of Catholicism, are not only gaining ground on the traditional communities, but they are also discovering a new commonality with Catholicism, which they are coming to see as a defender against the pressures of secularization and an upholder of the same ethical values that they themselves profess: values that they feel have been given short shrift by their Protestant brothers."

■ Stanley Fish is a bright and engaging gadfly. He has been known to describe himself as a "sophist" in his mission to upset conventional wisdoms, most of which travel under the banner of "liberalism." I have debated him in these pages (see "Why We Can Get Along," February 1996) and frequently fail in resisting the temptation to see what he is up to now. Here he is again on the *New York Times* op-ed page. The subject is Christianity and Islam, and why Christians don't stand up to radical Islam's demands for submission. His message, in brief, is: "Let's you and them fight." Religions worth their mettle, according to Fish, are "comprehensive accounts"—they purport to be the truth about everything and true for everyone. You either believe what you say you believe and are therefore a thug, or else you only pretend to believe and are therefore a liberal wimp. As Fish would have it: "A firm adherent of a comprehensive religion doesn't want dialogue about his beliefs; he wants those beliefs to prevail. Dialogue is not a tenet in his creed, and invoking it is unlikely to do anything but further persuade him that you have missed the point—as, indeed, you are pledged to do, so long as liberalism is the name of your faith." But of course that is utter poppycock. A firm adherent to orthodox Christianity is firmly committed to dialogue. To be sure, he wants the truth in which he believes to be accepted by others. But it is very much a tenet of his creed that his duty is to faithfully bear witness to the truth, and to commend to God the truth's prevailing. Some Christian theologians consider Stanley Fish an ally in the great battle (and great fun) of smiting liberalism hip and thigh. That is, I believe, a serious mistake. Fish's contention that religion that hasn't sold out to liberalism is fanaticism will be rejected by those who decline to choose between being a wimp or a thug.

■ In the March issue I wrote about the dismissal by Wheaton College of a faculty member who entered into full communion with the Catholic Church. The president of the college said the decision turned on whether a Catholic could accept the authority of Scripture as construed by the Protestant Reformation. I pointed out that numerous heresies, before and after the sixteenth century, appealed to scriptural authority. Friends at Wheaton have pointed out to me, in turn, that the college's Statement of Faith (available on Wheaton's website) precludes most of the heresies I mentioned. True enough. I was aware of Wheaton's Statement of Faith, but my comment was addressed to the president's claim that acceptance of scriptural authority is *the* criterion by which a Catholic is excluded from teaching at Wheaton. I should have made that distinction more clearly. At the same time, I stand by my observation that there are at Wheaton, and in evangelicalism more generally, doctrinal disagreements of great moment that are not resolved by appeal to scriptural authority—nor, I would add, by appeal to Wheaton's Statement of Faith. As I said, the reason given for the dismissal that gave rise to this discussion does seem to focus rather narrowly on preventing Catholics from teaching at Wheaton. (For a discussion of this and related questions, see the reflection in this issue by Alan Jacobs, who teaches at Wheaton.)

■ Somewhat amusing are many of the responses to Pope Benedict's first encyclical, *Deus Caritas Est*. The dominant note in the news reports is that Benedict was engaged in something like a public-relations game, putting forward a "friendly face" to counter the impression of Joseph Ratzinger as the Vatican "enforcer." After all, what could be so warm and fuzzy

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as an encyclical entitled "God Is Love." News reports here and elsewhere spoke of a document that is free from "the strictures of orthodoxy" and avoided such "controversial issues" as sexuality or priestly discipline. All of this is, I am convinced, quite entirely to miss the point. In the first encyclical of this still-new pontificate, Benedict recalls us to the most fundamental and radical of Christian truth claims: All that is is brought into being and sustained in being by love, by the God who is love, and who calls and enables us to respond to His love as supremely exemplified in the cross of Christ. This is the call to radical discipleship that is now, as always, the most "controversial" of the Church's proposals to the world. Indeed, it is the enduring "scandal" of the gospel. If we don't get that right, we are not likely to get much else right—including the numerous controversies that generate endless chatter about what's right and what's wrong about the Church and the world. An extended examination of the radical teaching of *Deus Caritas Est* is planned for the next issue.

■ Leon Wieseltier of the *New Republic* is taking no prisoners. The subject is Daniel C. Dennett's book, *Breaking the Spell: Religion as a Natural Phenomenon*, in which the author sets out to smite religion hip and thigh, much in the style of village atheists of yore, but this time in the name of the dubious science of evolutionary biology. "In his own opinion," writes Wieseltier, "Dennett is a hero. 'By asking for an accounting of the pros and cons of religion, I risk getting poked in the nose, or worse,' he declares, 'and yet I persist.' Giordano Bruno with tenure at Tufts!" Dennett explains the development of religion by means not scientific but scientistic, says Wieseltier. "There are a number of things that must be said about this story. The first is that it is only a story. It is not based, in any strict sense, on empirical research. Dennett is 'extrapolating back to human prehistory with the aid of biological thinking,' nothing more. *Breaking the Spell* is a fairy tale told by evolutionary biology. There is no scientific foundation for its scientistic narrative. Even Dennett admits as much: 'I am not at all claiming that this is what science has established about religion. . . . We don't know.' So all of Dennett's splashy allegiance to evidence and experiment and 'generating further testable hypotheses' notwithstanding, what he has written is just an extravagant speculation based upon his hope for what is the case, a pious account of his own atheistic longing." Wieseltier concludes: "Dennett recognizes the uses of faith, but not its reasons. In the end, his repudiation of religion is a repudiation of philosophy, which is also an affair of belief in belief. What this shallow and self-congratulatory book establishes most conclusively is that there are many spells that need to be broken."

■ "Lose a few, lose a few." That's the frequently muttered motto of those contending for truth and justice in public affairs. But then, every once in a while, they win one. That seems to be happening in the campaign of vilification against Pius XII and his "silence," or worse, in the time of the Holocaust. Churchill said that a lie gets halfway around the world before truth gets its pants on. Truth is now up and running fast. There was *The Pius War*, edited by Joseph Bottum and Rabbi David Dalin, and now there is Dalin's own *The Myth of Hitler's Pope: How Pius XII Rescued Jews from the Nazis*, together with Ronald Rychlak's *Righteous Gentiles: How Pius XII and the Catholic Church Saved Half a Million Jews from the Nazis*. All three books devastatingly debunk the scurrilous attacks that have appeared in the past seven years by the likes of John Cornwell (*Hitler's Pope*), James Carroll (*Constantine's Sword*), Garry Wills (*Papal Sin*), and Daniel Goldhagen (*A Moral Reckoning*). Rychlak, who is a professor of law and knows all the forensic ins and outs, is especially effective in a point-by-point rebuttal of the reckless charges that have been made against Pius. Cornwell, incidentally, has been forced to withdraw his claims, in a way, and now says we don't know enough to make a definite judgment about what Pius did or could have done. Some detractors of Pius claim that we cannot be satisfied that he intended to rescue Jews in the absence of an actual written order from him to that effect. Rychlak notes that in this they are following the line of the Holocaust deniers who say that Hitler is exonerated because there is no written order by him calling for the killing of Jews. It will be remembered that, until Rolf Hochhuth's play *The Deputy* in the early 1960s, Pius was much praised, by Jewish leaders among others, for his efforts to rescue victims of the Holocaust. Then, quite suddenly, everything changed and he was depicted as a villain. Rychlak notes the close friendship between British Holocaust denier David Irving and Rolf Hochhuth. When, in November 2005, Irving was arrested in Austria for Holocaust denial (which is a crime in some European countries), he was the guest of Rolf Hochhuth. There is obviously an affinity between those who play fast and loose with history, in this case between a Holocaust denier and a defamer of Pius XII. (As of this writing, Irving told the Austrian court that he used to be but is no longer a Holocaust denier, claiming to have been convinced that it happened after studying journals and other documents of Heinrich Himmler. The Austrian court nonetheless sentenced him to three years in prison.) Not long before the pope's death, Father Peter Gumpel of Rome's dicastery for saints told me that John Paul the Great expressed the hope that he would live long enough to beatify Pius XII. That was not to be, but, if

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he is beatified, the vindication will be in significant part due to the efforts of people like Dalin and Rychlak. Lose a few, win a few.

■ When this past February many thousands of Muslims ran amok in protest against a Danish newspaper that printed unflattering cartoons of Mohammed, many commentators, including your scribe, said the West must stand firm in making clear that we are not about to live by Muslim rules. There followed an article in the *Wall Street Journal* by a French writer, Amir Taheri, making the case that, in fact, Islam does not forbid the visual depiction of Mohammed and has often tolerated even the "making fun" of aspects of Islam. Mr. Taheri writes: "Islamic ethics is based on 'limits and proportions,' which means that the answer to an offensive cartoon is a cartoon, not the burning of embassies or the kidnapping of people designated as the enemy. Islam rejects guilt by association. Just as Muslims should not blame all Westerners for the poor taste of a cartoonist who wanted to be offensive, those horrified by the spectacle of rent-a-mob sackings of embassies in the name of Islam should not blame all Muslims for what is an outburst of fascist energy." It is good to be assured that Mr. Taheri and many Muslims both past and present have a more friendly disposition toward the freedoms cherished by democracies. But we already knew that. Their argument is with Muslims, not with us. We can only hope that they win the argument.

■ So I am asked: "How come you're now in favor of the media's mocking of religion?" The answer is that I'm not. I am in favor of censorship, with it being understood that the best form of censorship is self-censorship, which is simply another way of saying self-control. But, when governments try to quash free speech—except in cases such as yelling "Fire!" in a crowded theater—I'm generally on the side of free speech. And when mobs threaten violence or death against those exercising the freedom to criticize, I'm always on the side of freedom. In the Christian understanding, the protection of freedom is integral to respect for the dignity of the human person, also when the person abuses that freedom. An additional and very important factor in the February events is that you had in Europe a demand, backed by threats, that Europe must live by Muslim rules. This is what is meant by the prospect of Europe becoming Eurabia. In this case, as in other cases over the last several years, the response of many European governments was not reassuring.

■ In February's violent Islamic protests against the Danish cartoons depicting Mohammed in an unfavorable light, on February 5 to be exact, a gunman shot and killed Father Andrea Santoro while he was praying in his little church in Trabzon, Turkey. Herewith an excerpt from Fr. Santoro's last letter to his friends: "Meanwhile, in Trabzon, the minute Christian community has met every Sunday morning to celebrate the Liturgy of the Word, and the church has been opened twice a week to Muslims, under the responsibility of a trustworthy person. I will let you know how it goes. I greet you, commending these reflections to you and exhorting you to always put faith in contact with the present moment. It must not be an abstract and generic faith, but a faith like that of the first 'beginnings,' which has been transmitted to us from generation to generation. As the gospel says, leaven has a mysterious capacity to ferment the dough, if it comes into contact with it—the dough of all times, all places, all generations. Moreover, Jesus said: 'I am the light of the world, he who follows me will not walk in darkness.' If his light illuminates us, not only will it illuminate every situation, even the most tragic, but in addition we too, as he always said, will be light. The tenuous light of a candle illuminates a house, an extinguished lamp leaves everything in darkness. May he shine in us with his Word, with his Spirit, with the sap of his saints. May our life be the wax that is consumed willingly. Affectionately, Father Andrea."

■ The great anxiety was to maintain one's credentials as a liberal intellectual. Within that world, death came in the form of being perceived as having "sold out" or, even worse, having become a "neoconservative." Such risks were run over the decades by writers such as Michael Walzer and the late Irving Howe, who criticized the more mindless excesses of the Left. The late and much-missed Christopher Lasch was almost alone in keeping his liberal audience while not caring a whit whether he was still seen as a man of the Left. It is very different with Todd Gitlin, professor of journalism at Columbia and, back in the olden days, president of the radical Students for a Democratic Society. Those of a certain age will remember the 1962 SDS Port Huron statement which condemned intellectuals who were victims of "unreasoning anti-communism." Now Mr. Gitlin has published *The Intellectuals and the Flag* (Columbia University Press), criticizing the "fundamentalist left" for its contempt of patriotism. "Viewing U.S. power as an indivisible evil, the fundamentalist left has logically foregone the possibility of any effective opposition," he writes. This was said many times during the 1960s and 1970s by liberal intellectuals. When I was still counted among them, I was impressed by the virulent reaction to my writing that "American power is, on balance and considering the alternatives, a force

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for good in the world." I think I understand what Mr. Gitlin is going through. The remarkable thing is that he is still going through it thirty years later. Reviewing his book in the *New York Sun*, Gerald Russello puts it nicely: "Despite these strengths, the book will appeal only to that generation of Vietnam-era intellectuals who still believe left-wing nostrums, suitably repackaged, will carry the day. Despite Mr. Gitlin's obvious sincerity and vigor of thought, these essays remain firmly in the bedrock of conventional liberalism. There is no talk here of immigration, abortion, crime, or other issues most voters consider central to their understanding of a civil community. Questions of culture are here, but they are refracted through Mr. Gitlin's triple inheritance of [David] Riesman, [C. Wright] Mills, and [Irving] Howe. . . . Even when calling for a newly engaged leftism, disdain for those not imbued with the revolutionary zeal breaks through." What others view as superannuated nostrums, Mr. Gitlin and a few stalwarts view as keeping the faith. Distancing themselves from the vulgar Michael Moores, Howard Deans, and Al Frankens, they are on the academic sidelines of censorious oldsters reminiscing about the days when there was an intellectual left of public consequence. The old ideas are repackaged, it is even allowed that conservatives may have a point on this or that, but beneath it all and through it all is the unquenchable byword of leftist continuity, "Come the revolution!"

■ In recent years it has become a tradition—dare one say a venerated tradition—to stage *The Vagina Monologues* on February 14 on college and university campuses, including Catholic colleges and universities. The tide is turning. Father Brian Shanley, president of Providence College in Rhode Island, has read the play with care. He notes that it claims to be "a celebration of female sexuality in all its complexity and mystery" and "a bible for a new generation of women." It is, he says, no such thing. "Far from celebrating the complexity and mystery of female sexuality, *The Vagina Monologues* simplifies and demystifies it by reducing it to the vagina. In contrast, Roman Catholic teaching sees female sexuality as ordered toward a loving giving of self to another in a union of body, mind, and soul that is ordered to the procreation of new life. The deeper complexity and mystery lies in the capacity of human sexuality, both male and female, to sacramentalize the love of God in marriage. Any depiction of female sexuality that neglects its unitive and procreative dimensions diminishes its complexity, its mystery and its dignity. Moreover, to explore fully the dignity of woman requires not only a consideration of female sexuality, but also of the capacity of woman for intellectual, artistic, moral, and spiritual activity; none of these dimensions are featured in *The Vagina Monologues*." He draws attention to a monologue "wherein the alcohol-fueled seduction of a sixteen-year-old girl by a twenty-four-year-old woman is described as resulting in 'salvation' and 'a kind of heaven.'" Committed as Providence College is to the original Bible and a quite different understanding of salvation, Father Shanley concludes that the college will no longer sponsor or permit *The Vagina Monologues*.

■ *The Vagina Monologues*, along with a Queer Film Festival, also figures in an extensive reflection on academic freedom, excellence, and integrity by Father John Jenkins, president of Notre Dame University. The issue, he says, is not censorship but sponsorship. His statement, published in the February 9 edition of *origins*, includes this: "*The Vagina Monologues* and Queer Film Festival have raised difficulties because they either are or appear to be at odds with certain fundamental values of a Catholic university. The fact that they have been sponsored annually by units of the university and have been widely publicized prominently associates the university's name with them. Such occurrences suggest the university endorses or at least finds compatible with its values certain views which are not in fact compatible. The wide publicity and prominence given such events tends to instrumentalize our collective identity and our higher meaning. The concern here, as I said, is not with censorship, but with sponsorship."

■ Father Jenkins also said this: "You have, then, my thoughts on this matter. I am absolutely committed to Notre Dame's continuing quest to be a truly preeminent university, to be a leader in inquiry and creative expression, to be a place of vibrant debate and intellectual engagement. I am equally committed to maintaining our distinctive Catholic character—indeed, with the other fellows of the university, I bear a special responsibility in this regard. It is with this mission of the university in mind that I have offered you my thought on academic freedom and our Catholic character." One might raise a question about the "equally committed," which could be misunderstood as suggesting that there is a tension between Catholic character and academic excellence. As fine and courageous as Fr. Jenkins' reflection is, the case needs to be made more explicitly that Notre Dame's commitment to excellence has its source and most critical support in its constitution as a Catholic university. But let me not quibble. Since becoming president, Fr. Jenkins has signaled that the country's premier Catholic university is newly confident about its distinctive character and mission, and that is altogether good news.

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■ The editors of *Commonweal* are most decidedly displeased with my little essay "The Truce of 2005?" in the February issue. Their long editorial begins with this: "Fr. Richard John Neuhaus is clearly a man to be reckoned with. Counselor and confidant of presidents, cardinals, and popes. Conjurer of naked public squares, neoconservative triumphs, Catholic moments, 'Great' pontificates, and 'the authoritative interpretation' of Vatican II. Scourge of liberals, secular humanists, the imperial judiciary, lax bishops, mainline Protestants, and feminists. Writer, theologian, and self-confessed martini aficionado. Indeed, he is by all accounts precisely what he insists those who would follow him into the Catholic priesthood must be: He is a 'manly man.'" The niceties over with, they get down to business. (Of course, their estimate of my influence is grossly exaggerated, but that seems to serve their purposes.) Neuhaus dares to "issue an ultimatum" to the pope, they say. Others have it that I have "thrown down a gauntlet" to the pope. This is very odd. I point out that some prominent Catholic leaders have very publicly challenged the instruction, issued by the pope's authority, on not admitting homosexuals to the priesthood and suddenly I am the one challenging papal authority. The editors say that the "Truce of 1968," having to do with the widespread rejection of the encyclical *Humanae Vitae*, is a "neoconservative myth." They write that many Catholics, placing their "trust [in] their own moral experience," were using artificial contraception well before the encyclical was issued. Just as many gay Catholics today say they have no moral problem with homogenital sex. Of course the editors are right. Then and now and always, there are many who are not faithful to the Church's teaching. The question in 1968 and the question now is whether official teachers in the Church—as distinct from lay-edited publications such as *Commonweal*—can with impunity publicly reject what the Church teaches. If the answer is yes, it seems inevitable that the conclusion will be drawn that the Church does not mean what she says—about this or perhaps anything else of moral consequence. The editors do not explicitly reject the teaching that homosexual acts are intrinsically immoral and therefore the desire to engage in such acts is objectively disordered. Neither do they affirm the teaching. They write, "It is true that, like many Catholics, *Commonweal* is engaged in the difficult task of discerning whether new understandings of homosexuality are compatible with the gospel and the Church's moral tradition. We look first to the Church for guidance and instruction. But since God's presence in the world is not confined to the Church, we also look to the lives and testimony of our friends and neighbors.... Neuhaus, on the other hand, argues that the Church's teaching about homosexuality is not open to debate or evidently to any further development. The debate, however, is taking place, and Catholics betray no disloyalty or impiety by participating in it." I would go further: Faithful Catholics should participate in the debate—on the side of the Church's teaching. As for the possibility of doctrinal "development," if there are "new understandings" of homosexuality that contradict the unanimous and unbroken moral tradition from ancient Israel and the early Church up to the present, they are, by definition, misunderstandings. The Church's understanding can always be refined and deepened, as can our sympathy for those afflicted by same-sex desires, as can our awareness that we all depend more on the forgiveness of sin than on the perfection of virtue. But with respect to "the gospel and the Church's moral tradition," it would seem that *Commonweal*'s "difficult task" is not to discern what they think the Church's teaching should be but to assent to what the Church's teaching is. It is not always easy. It is made still more difficult when dissent is presented as discussion and debate.

■ Some Vatican diplomats have been made uncomfortable by Benedict XVI's candor with respect to the religious dimension of the threat posed by terrorism. In his annual message to the gathering of diplomats from the many countries with which the Holy See has official relations, the pope spoke of the imperative of securing safety for Israel and of developing "democratic institutions for a free and prosperous future" for Palestine. He then said: "The same considerations take on a wider application in today's global context, in which attention has rightly been drawn to the danger of a clash of civilizations. The danger is made more acute by organized terrorism, which has already spread over the whole planet. Its causes are many and complex, not least those to do with political ideology, combined with aberrant religious ideas. Terrorism does not hesitate to strike defenseless people without discrimination or to impose inhuman blackmail, causing panic among entire populations in order to force political leaders to support the designs of the terrorists. No situation can justify such criminal activity, which covers the perpetrators with infamy, and it is all the more deplorable when it hides behind religion, thereby bringing the pure truth of God down to the level of the terrorists' own blindness and moral perversion." The use of the phrase "a clash of civilizations" is telling. On several other occasions in the past year, the pope has explicitly called on Muslim leaders to accept their responsibility to recognize and counter the use of Islam in support of actions incompatible with peace and development.

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■ It is widely reported that Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger was, along with others, made nervous at times by John Paul the Great's propensity for offering apologies to any and all who might ever have been offended by what Catholics have done. This does not mean that, now that he is pope, he is denying the need for honest self-examination. In the same address to the diplomatic corps, he reflects on historical wrongs in which Catholicism was complicit and says: "This is undeniably true, but in every case it was the result of a series of concomitant causes that had little or nothing to do with truth or religion and always, for that matter, because means were employed that were incompatible with sincere commitment to truth or with the respect for freedom demanded by truth. Where the Catholic Church herself is concerned, insofar as serious mistakes were made in the past by some of her members and by her institutions, she condemns those mistakes and she has not hesitated to ask for forgiveness. This is required by the commitment to truth."

■ Herewith the headings of a front-page story in the *Wall Street Journal*: "Wealthy Kingdom: With Elite Backing, a Catholic Order Has Pull in Mexico: Legion of Christ Targets Rich and Has Friend in Rome; Priests as Society Stars: 1,000 'Consecrated Women.'" Well, you get the idea. Written by Jose de Cordoba, the story is what is known in the business as a hit job. Imagine another way of putting the story: "Catholic Success Story: With Influential Backing, Order Makes a Big Impact in Mexico: Legion of Christ Recruits Business Leaders to Serve Poor; Was Loved by John Paul II; Priests Have Great Popular Support: 1,000 Women Give Lives in Service." That would be what is known in the business as a puff job. But the second set of headings would have been, all in all, more accurate. There is nothing new in the *Journal* story. It notes that Legion schools have in many places displaced the leading role of Jesuits in educating the children of the wealthy. Jesuit hostility to the Legion, in Mexico and elsewhere, is no secret. Mr. Cordoba apparently thinks there is something sinister about Legion-inspired business leaders posting on their message boards "Moral Value of the Month." And he sneeringly refers to young Legionaries teaching poor village children about the sacraments and rewarding a little girl who had the right answers with a lollipop. Oh, those devious Legionaries. Of course he tries to make what he can of the charge that forty or fifty years ago Father Marcial Maciel, the founder of the Legion who is now eighty-five years old, sexually abused young men. I've discussed those charges in some detail in First Things (see Public Square, March 2002), explaining why I think they are false. In any event, there is no court, ecclesiastical or civil, that could justly adjudicate them at this late date. I have known the Legion of Christ for about ten years. The Legionary priests I know are admirable in their orthodoxy, their devotion, and their manifest joy in being engaged in a great cause. I also know people who have had unhappy experiences with the Legion, and some of them are very bitter. The Legion is not for everybody. I'm not at all sure I would have made a good Legionary priest. Every order or movement has its own charism. I expect St. Francis would not have been so happy as a Dominican, or St. Dominic as a Franciscan. Our Lord said, "By their fruits you shall know them." By the measure of results in advancing the mission of Christ and his Church, the Legionaries of Christ are very impressive indeed. It is a pity that the *Wall Street Journal* gave so much space to a reporter who, for whatever reason, obviously does not like them.

■ Michael Joyce has died at age sixty-three. He was a dear friend and indispensable helper in the launching of the Institute on Religion and Public Life, the publisher of this magazine. For fifteen years, Mike headed up the Milwaukee-based Bradley Foundation and there he gave the world a new definition of creative philanthropy. Bradley had and has but a small part of the resources of such philanthropy giants as Gates, Ford, Johnson, Lilly, Packard, Rockefeller, and MacArthur. Among U.S. foundations, Bradley is way down the list in ninety-first place. But Mike, backed by the Bradley board, had the imagination and guts to see where a little help could make a big difference. He had a particular passion for parental choice in education. In Milwaukee and the nation, the cause of parental choice—through vouchers and other means—is already making a huge difference for poor children, especially those otherwise condemned to disastrous government school systems in the cities. In 1984, we launched the Center on Religion in Society here in New York in partnership with a small Illinois-based think tank. It was a fine arrangement for a few years, but then there were personnel changes at the Illinois office, and we ran into fundamental disagreements. I sought a peaceful parting of the ways in which we would establish the New York enterprise on an independent basis. As it happened, the parting was distinctly unpleasant. I won't go into the details, as they are available in several articles and books. Without the help of Mike Joyce and Bradley in 1989, it is quite possible that the Institute on Religion and Public Life would not have gotten off the ground. Never once did Mike or Bradley attempt to interfere with or direct even the smallest part of our work. Mike was—by no means incidentally—a devout Catholic and very convivial

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company. In an interview a couple of years ago, he spoke of his work with Bradley: "Our overarching purpose was to use philanthropy to support a war of ideas defending and helping to recover the political imagination of the nation's founders, the self-evident truth that rights and worth are a legacy of the Creator, not the result of some endless revaluing of values." Firmly devoted to the permanent things, he took delight in demonstrating, and helping others to demonstrate, their exciting possibilities for a more humane future. Michael Stewart Joyce. *Requiescat in pace*.

■ We apologize for a number of proofreading errors in the March issue. Heads have rolled. In particular, my discussion of the black underclass should have said that Glenn Loury's essay favored the proposed solutions of Booker T. Washington over those of W.E.B. DuBois, as I hope was evident from the context.

■ When it appeared in January, I opined that Benedict's first encyclical, *Deus Caritas Est* (God Is Love), would not likely generate much media interest. "Pope Says God Is Love," I suggested, is less than a zinger of a headline. I underestimated the *Washington Post*, which carried the story under the headline "Pope Encyclical Mandates Love."

■ According to a Zogby poll, 89 percent of Catholics in the United States think their parish pastor is "doing a good job," and Pope Benedict gets the vote of 75 percent. Presented as good news but somewhat more worrying, 64 percent think their bishop is "doing a good job." That figure was 83 percent just before the sex-abuse crisis broke, and at one point sank to 57 percent. Sixty-four is still a long way from 83. Of course, some bishops might take comfort in the admonition "Woe to you when 83 percent speak well of you." Assuming, as some apparently do, that the decline in ratings is the result of their doing what they ought to do.

■ Joseph Frank, the biographer of Dostoevsky whose work has been discussed in these pages, reviews in the *New Republic* Jean-Luc Barré's *Jacques and Raïssa Maritain: Beggars for Heaven*. He writes: "Many turned to Maritain for spiritual consolation, and he and Raïssa became famous (or infamous, depending on the point of view) for having converted Cocteau, the novelist Julien Green, and a number of others to Catholicism. Included in this company was the unsavory and totally unscrupulous Jewish convert Maurice Sachs, who even studied to become a priest. Raïssa was justly suspicious of Sachs (though serving as his godmother at conversion), who had some literary talent and left a book of steamy memoirs published posthumously, *Le sabbat*, which disclosed the largely homosexual underside of the drug-filled and alcoholic escapades of so many of the luminaries of this period who turned to the Maritains for comfort and support. The memoirs amply cited by Barré contain many descriptions of the peculiar sympathetic radiance that emanated from Maritain's personality, often described as 'saintly,' and as seeming 'to have stepped down from the porch of a cathedral.' It is this aura that allowed him to exercise so powerful an influence on so many diverse and fiercely independent figures. Maritain himself was soft-spoken, reticent, and even hesitantly awkward; there was nothing at all commanding, impressive, or even self-assured about him. I know this from my own experience, having met him several times during the later years of his life. But there was an all-embracing quality irresistibly conveyed by his personality that I had never encountered before and have not encountered since." What a beautiful thing to be able to say of a person. Maritain died in 1973 and it is one of the regrets of my life that I never met him. Later, I hope.

■ The postal service willing, most subscribers will be receiving this issue while anticipating the Feast of the Resurrection. Herewith from a catechetical discourse by the fourth-century St. John Chrysostom: "Where is thy sting, O death? Where is thy victory, O hell? Christ hath risen, and thou art overthrown. Christ hath risen, and the demons have fallen. Christ hath risen, and the angels rejoice. Christ hath risen, and life reigneth. Christ hath risen, and not one dead resteth in the grave. For Christ having risen from the dead became the first fruits of them that slept. To him be glory and majesty to ages of ages. Amen."

■ Christ is risen! And let the people say, "He is risen indeed, Alleluia!"

Sources: Air Force Academy brouhaha, *New York Sun*, February 10. Stanley Fish on religious dialogue, *New York Times*, February 12. Leon Wieseltier on Daniel Dennett, *New York Times*, February 19. Amir Taheri on depictions of Mohammed, *Wall Street Journal*, February 8. Gerald Russello on Todd Gitlin, *New York Sun*, January 23. Zogby poll on bishops, *Religion Watch*, December 2005.

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

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

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

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
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

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
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